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1Introduction
“Well it is scary, isn’t it, all this genetic engineering?”
“Is it?”
“Yeah, you know, messing about with the body. They reckon there’s a gene for 
intelligence, sexuality-practically everything, you know? Recombinant DNA 
technology” said the girl using the term cautiously as if testing the water to see how 
much Marcus really knew. Seeing no recognition in his face she continued with 
more confidence. “Once you know the restriction enzyme for a particular, like, bit 
of DNA, you can switch anything on or off, like a bloody stereo. That’s what they 
are doing to those poor mice. It is pretty fucking scary”.1
 Zadie Smith
Why a book about mice?
What made me, a philosopher and a biologist, decide to write a book on 
mice? The answer to this question can be found in the quotation cited 
above, taken from Zadie Smith’s novel White Teeth. In this book one of the 
characters, Marcus, a scientist, has created FutureMouse©. In this animal 
he implanted custom-designed genes that can be ‘turned on’ and ‘off’. This 
gives Marcus the absolute control over its life and death. In collaboration 
with a novelist, he has written a pop science book called Time Bombs 
and Body Clocks: Adventures in Our Genetic Future that also includes a 
chapter on this mouse. The girl who is quoted above is reading this book, 
unaware that the person she is addressing is one of the authors. While the 
girl is ‘lecturing’ him about the scary aspects of recombinant DNA technol-
ogy, Marcus is wondering why it is that people fail to see his mouse as a 
laboratory entity that is determining the future of cancer, of reproductive 
life cycles, of the human life-span and ageing, but rather continue to see 
it merely as a mouse, an animal. They focus on the mouse ‘as mouse’, in 
a manner that never failed to surprise him: ‘They seemed unable to think 
of the animal as a site for experimentation into heredity, into disease, into 
mortality. The mouseness of the mouse seemed inescapable’ (Smith 2000: 
1. Zadie Smith (2000) White Teeth, New York, Vintage Books, p. 345.
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346). This fictitious scene taken from a popular novel illustrates a number 
of interesting aspects of the laboratory mouse.
First of all, it illustrates the different perspectives from which different 
individuals can perceive the genetically engineered mouse. On the one 
hand, we see a girl who is definitely not as hysterical as Marcus takes her 
to be. On the contrary, she is amazingly well informed, and expresses 
genuine feelings of moral concern. According to her views, a genetically 
engineered mouse is unnatural and the idea that you can program the 
mouse….is experienced as ‘pretty fucking scary’. On the other hand, we 
have Marcus who represents the rather stereotypical image of a scientist, 
seemingly unable to understand the feelings and reactions of lay people. 
He has a very instrumental view on laboratory mice connected with a deep 
faith in scientific progress. There is no such thing as mutual understanding 
between Marcus and the girl. Secondly, when we listen carefully to what 
the girl says, and consider what Marcus thinks, a whole variety of moral 
values emerges: a fuzzy set of morally relevant notions that are somehow 
involved in mouse biotechnology. The genetically engineered mouse is 
a complex phenomenon, from a moral point of view. Yet, in the end, 
although they seem to disagree considerably over the value and moral 
status of the mouse, both Marcus and the girl seem to agree about one 
thing: namely, the fact that a biotechnological revolution is taking place, 
here and now, at this very moment, and that FutureMouse© is one of the 
main characters in this revolution. To Marcus this is progress; to the girl 
there is ‘something a little fascist about the whole deal’ (Smith 2000: 346).
Today, in laboratories all over the world, genetically engineered mice 
like Future/Mouse are being produced and used for biomedical research. 
These mice are determining the future of medicine. Mouse geneticists have 
sequenced (‘cracked’) the mouse genome and added genes coding for 
fluorescent proteins to it. In addition to the thousands of mouse mod-
els that mimic human diseases they have created mice that are smarter, 
stronger and live longer than ordinary mice. In the biotech revolution that 
is taking place, the mouse plays a central role. The biotech revolution is 
a radical change in terms of the way ‘we’ are taking control over living 
entities. Biotechnologists are challenging nature. Or, to put it more pre-
cisely, the biotech revolution challenges traditional beliefs about nature. 
These gentech mice are not simply unnatural, they force us to reconsider 
long-held beliefs about natural species, about life and death, disease and 
health. In other words, these mice raise, and force us to reframe, a series 
of profound philosophical questions. By way of the mouse, biotechnology 
affects what lies at the core of humanity, of what it is to be human. For 
biologists these mouse technologies offer great possibilities to study the 
mysteries of life. For philosophers, they are a source of confusion. How 
does mouse biotechnology affect the way we make sense of life? Are we 
seizing the position of Dawkins’s blind watchmaker? The mice also raise 
many ethical questions: ‘Are we doing the right thing?’ ‘Where will all this 
‘tinkering with genes’ lead to?’
The key message I want to put forward in this book is that, if we want 
to understand the impact of the biotech revolution, we have to look at the 
mouse. The mouse is the key actor in this radical series of events that is 
taking place in the life sciences right now. To understand the meaning of 
biotechnology both from a biological perspective and a philosophical per-
spective, we have to take a closer look at this animal’s unique history and 
its presence in biomedical laboratories. I will do so by focussing on three 
central questions: an ontological, an epistemological, and an ethical one:
1 What is the genetically engineered laboratory mouse?
2 How is the mouse currently used, and what is its role and function in 
the pursuit of knowledge and power?
3 What are the moral implications of mouse biotechnology, or, how must 
we deal with the issues raised by the genetically engineered mouse?
As the fictitious dialogue between Marcus and the girl from White Teeth 
illustrates, there are many perspectives from which we can look at the 
genetically engineered mouse. All of these perspectives will produce 
different answers to these questions. Each perspective produces a differ-
ent image of the mouse. We cannot say that one of them is more ‘real’, 
more ‘adequate’ more ‘truthful’ than the others. Rather they reveal com-
plementary dimensions. One cannot be replaced by any of the others: 
they emerge on different levels. Every perspective has its own revelatory 
power, its own truth, its own value. At the same time every perspective on 
the mouse also entails a certain blindness to the aspects of the mouse that 
are brought to the fore by the other perspectives. A typical mouse image 
coming from a biologists’ perspective is that of an animal which provides 
‘inside’ information concerning the in vivo behaviour of our DNA. This 
raises a number of philosophical (notably epistemological) questions con-
cerning the role of the mouse in the process of knowledge production in 
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the field of mammalian or human genetics. What is the value of the mouse 
as a model organism?
Philosophical questions can also be asked about ‘boundary conflicts’. 
What exactly is an animal that carries genes from both mice and humans? 
Such an animal not only transgresses the species boundary between mouse 
and man, it also transgresses the boundary between nature and culture, 
what is given by nature and what is man-made. This results in the ethical 
question whether the mouse also signifies the crossing of a moral bound-
ary. And, if so, why? Other ethical questions are related to animal welfare 
issues raised by contemporary mouse biotechnology. Do these animals 
suffer from the instrumental use we make of them?
By far the most intriguing questions about the mouse are those about 
its future. What will be the implications of these technologies, tested in 
and developed with the help of mice? Will they eventually be applied to 
humans? What can we learn about biotechnology in general by looking 
at the mice? What can we learn about our own future? What does the (hi)
story of the mouse tell us about possible future scenarios? What can we 
learn from the mouse about ourselves, our genes and the role we play 
in the ‘natural’ process of evolution? I believe these are questions of vital 
importance precisely because a revolution is taking place right here and 
now that will have a radical impact on the way we view and – perhaps – 
reshape ourselves, in a distant future that begins today.
A short note on methodology
In order to address these questions, a variety of sources will be consulted. 
Being a philosopher, my main tool, my main method of investigation, is 
of course reading. Most of the sources I will use are written documents. In 
order to understand what the genetically engineered mouse is, I will study 
what is written and said about these mice and about animal biotechnology 
more general. This discourse on mice emerges at various levels. In the 
first place, there is a scientific discourse on mice that materialises in the 
form of research articles in scientific journals such as Science, Nature and 
the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science where major break-
throughs in mouse biotechnology are eagerly reported. But also important 
are the writings of philosophers, reflecting on the moral aspects of animal 
biotechnology, or of social scientists, studying the role of the mouse in 
the scientific practice. Besides research papers and scientific articles, I also 
consulted (auto) biographical reflections of scientists involved in mouse 
biotechnology. This latter type of written information can be found not 
only in scientific journals but also in the popular press such as newspapers 
and magazines. In addition to the reflections and reports on the mouse 
that originate from academic circles, there are highly relevant forms of 
‘mouse discourse’, emerging in more popular environments. This may 
involve written materials, such as (science) fiction stories and articles in 
the media, but also works of art produced by contemporary artists.
The discourse (scientific, philosophical and otherwise) on genetically 
engineered mice amounts to an archive of incredible proportions. There-
fore, one has to be selective. Insofar as the scientific literature is taken 
into account, I will focus on the highlights, the breakthroughs, such as 
the ‘birth’ of the first inbred strains, the birth of the first transgenic mouse, 
the first human gene inserted in the mouse genome, the emergence of the 
first knock-out mouse, etc. To this I added a number of biographical or 
autobiographical publications, focussing on authors who themselves had 
played a major role in the mouse biotech revolution.
Insofar as the philosophical and ethical literature is concerned, it was 
not at all that easy to steer my own course in an ocean of writings. First 
of all, I was primarily interested in publications on animal biotechnology 
that evoke a living or ‘tangible’ image of the mouse. In other words, I was 
interested in publications that really speak about mice, rather than about 
philosophical concepts. Therefore, I more or less ignored philosophical 
writings in which, because of their level of abstraction, the mouse is lost 
in a jungle of words. This book is about real, living mice, the myths they 
evoke, their images, and their meanings.
Moreover, this book is neither about animal ethics (or animal ethics com-
mittees), nor about policy making and legislation on animal biotechnol-
ogy. Again, the focus is on the meaning of the genetically modified mouse. 
Therefore, I hardly discuss the writings of the various Dutch bioethicists 
who have tried to analyse and clarify notions such as integrity and intrinsic 
value in order to make them suitable for use in animal ethics commit-
tees or bioethics committees. Moreover, the focus is on the international 
literature, rather than on sources written in Dutch that focus on national 
policy development.
While reading these diverse sources of information I ask myself a number 
of questions: What language is used in these different sources? What do 
they reveal about mice? What metaphors are used? What myths are referred 
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to? What kind of images of the mouse emerge in these writings or in these 
works of art? For this ‘reading method’, the writings of a number of phi-
losophers and social scientists have served as a source of inspiration. They 
have provided me with basic concepts and methodological tools. Mary 
Midgley, for instance, has inspired me to take a closer look at metaphors 
and myths at work in scientific practice. Karen Rader inspired me to take 
a historical perspective on mouse biotechnology, and Jon Turney taught 
me how to connect scientific reports with public perceptions articulated in 
the media. These and other sources have allowed me to see the mouse as 
the ‘right organism’ for the job. They taught me that mouse images evolve 
along ‘never-converging tracks’, and that a philosophical understanding of 
the mouse calls for a ‘palaeontology of the present’. Finally, powerful im-
ages such as Bryan Crockett’s Ecce Homo have been of major importance 
for the development of my view on the genetically engineered mouse.
But there is more to philosophy than reading. An important, perhaps 
even decisive, source of information is personal experience. Trained as a 
medical biologist, I have worked with laboratory animals2 and, as a result, 
developed a ‘scientific gaze’ on the laboratory animal (Nuijtinck et al. 
1997). I know, from ‘inside’ so to speak, what a scientist means when he or 
she says ‘we study these complex phenomena in the mouse model because 
…’. I understand what is to be deeply fascinated by small and inconspicu-
ous processes such as cell-cell interactions or the function of a single gene 
in the complex process called DNA regulation that can only made visible 
by technological devices such as microscopes, amplifiers, oscilloscopes 
and micro-arrays. On the other hand, as a philosopher I am trained to 
‘read’ what lies behind these sentences: the so-called ‘self-evident’ and 
‘obvious’ conventions of these research practices. How can an animal be 
a model? What is a model, and what kind of knowledge does it produce? 
The distance between various mouse perspectives becomes visible as soon 
as they come into contact, or even conflict with one another. The use 
of animals in experimental research is an issue of public moral debate 
of long-standing. Many philosophical questions about the use of mice 
in research are translated sooner or later into ethical questions. Can an 
animal be regarded as an instrument? Does it have intrinsic value, besides 
instrumental value? And, if it has intrinsic value, what does this imply 
for the scientific practice concerned? Some of the ethical questions are 
2. Albeit Wistar rats and goldfish, rather than mice.
related to the practice of biotechnology. Does the genetic engineering of 
the mouse amount to a violation of the animal’s integrity?
In my experience the different vocabularies used in experimental biol-
ogy and philosophy do not mix very well. This has been my experience 
as a member of an Animal Ethics Committee (In Dutch: Dier Experimenten 
Commissie or DEC). On countless occasions, I had to explain the differ-
ence between ‘intrinsic value’ and ‘integrity’ at a DEC meeting or answer 
questions such as: ‘Is the integrity of the offspring of transgenic mice vio-
lated at birth?’ or ‘Can the integrity of mice be violated in different degrees 
and, if so, how can you measure this objectively?’ Between the two cultures 
of experimental biology and philosophy a gap seems to exist that is both 
epistemological and ethical. In order to deepen my understanding of this 
gap, I decided to do fieldwork in the mouse facility at the same institute 
where I was a DEC member, the Netherlands Cancer Institute (NKI). This 
institute plays a leading role in the Dutch mouse biotechnology. Much of 
the research conducted at the NKI involves transgenic mice. Mice are also 
created for scientists who work in laboratories outside the institute. The 
mice travel all over the world. At the NKI I visited the mice in the transgenic 
mouse facilities and talked to the biotechnicians who perform many of the 
surgical operations and actually do the genetic modifications, the animal 
caretakers who feed the mice and clean their cages, the researchers who 
plan the genetic modifications and use the mice for their research, and the 
mouse pathologists who search for the cause of death. I did this when they 
were all at work. I witnessed the routine procedures for breeding mice, 
transplantations of genetically modified embryos into foster mothers, the 
checking of the health and fitness status of the mice, the removal of organs 
as part of an experiment, and post-mortem autopsies of mice. As a result, 
I learned about the day-to-day ‘facts of life’ of these mice and the motives 
and visions of the people who work with them.
These experiences, together with the written sources studied, have 
shaped the outline of my research. It is not at all my intention to give a 
‘correct’ or ‘objective’ image of the mouse. Such an image does not exist. 
Instead, I will present a broad variety of images in the form of photo-
graphs, quotes, artworks, visions, etc. The resulting image of the mouse 
is highly complex and ambiguous. Nonetheless, there is a certain amount 
of structure that can be discovered in this bewildering variety. Three basic 
(irreducible) mouse images will be identified.
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Rough outline of the book
In Chapter 1, I focus on biological science. I introduce the mouse, so to 
speak, by entering its ‘natural’ habitat, the scientific laboratory. In order 
to answer the questions how it got there and how it evolved towards 
its present form, I go back to the early 1900s when the mouse made its 
entrance into biomedical science. From thereon I follow its ‘career’ as ‘the 
right tool for the job’ in genetics research. I describe three crucial steps 
in the ‘genealogy’ of the lab mouse: 1) the transformation of the mouse 
from an object of study as an animal into a homogeneous laboratory tool 
that could be used for studying of the laws of genetics; 2) its becoming 
the pioneering species in transgenic technology; and 3) its transformation 
from a model mouse into a mouse model used for the study of human 
diseases. It is here, I argue, that the mouse, as a result of a long process of 
human interference in its genetic make-up, has become a living artefact.
In Chapter 2, I focus on the moral and social debate about mouse 
biotechnology. What are the moral implications of the genetic engineer-
ing of research animals, and how should we deal with the genetically 
engineered mouse? How are these questions addressed and answered 
by philosophers? In the moral debate about animal biotechnology, I see 
three never-converging tracks. On the first, there is a discussion about the 
promise of biotechnology to cure us from life-threatening diseases; on the 
second, a discussion about animal suffering; and, on the third, a discus-
sion whether we humans have any right at all to tamper with genes or to 
‘play God’. On these three tracks, three different images of mice appear: 
(1) mice as high-tech laboratory tools; (2) mice as animals of flesh and 
blood and as victims of science; and (3) mice as monsters that resemble 
the one that Frankenstein created. These images do not easily converge 
into an unequivocal moral verdict on mouse biotechnology, since they 
refer to different and perhaps even incommensurable moral values, such 
as progress in biomedicine, animal welfare, and respect for nature. Ac-
cording to Bernard Rollin, one of the most influential philosophers writing 
about animal biotechnology, only welfare issues are morally relevant. 
Other objections are, as he argues, ‘merely’ aesthetic. Many philosophers 
(including me) and members of lay audiences have strong objections to 
this line of reasoning. There clearly seems to be more at stake in animal 
biotechnology than animal welfare: namely, our vision of nature, or what 
we take as being natural. However, in day-to-day research practice, a 
utilitarian balance between human benefits and animal welfare seems to 
be the dominant ethical framework, for biomedical scientists, as well as 
for members of animal experimentation committees. Why this is the case 
I will explain by building on Martijntje Smits’s monster theory. This theory 
discusses public responses to the products of new technologies that at first 
sight challenge the nature-culture dichotomy. The genetically engineered 
mouse is such a ‘product’. I will argue that the mouse, despite its general 
use in the biomedical laboratory and its apparent domestication, is still a 
monster for many. Its monster character is, amongst other things, revealed 
by the myths, metaphors and vocabularies that dominate the biotechnol-
ogy debate. I will highlight the three most important ones: Playing God; 
the Frankenstein thing; and the yuk!-factor. What ‘truths’ lie behind these 
metaphors and myths? In order to answer these questions, I analyse these 
metaphors and/or myths in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 in more depth.
In Chapter 3, I take the artwork Ecce Home by Crockett as a starting point 
to discuss the playing God metaphor, or God talk, in biotechnology. In this 
sculpture, the genetically engineered oncomouse is represented as Jesus 
Christ. It is a very powerful visual image of the playing God metaphor. It 
suggests not only that scientists who are involved in mouse biotechnology 
play God but also that this type of science leads to salvation. Exploring this 
myth of science as salvation, I will argue that, regardless of whether we 
take the science-as-salvation idea literally or metaphorically, it reveals that 
biotechnology has the character of a promise. And the genetically engi-
neered mouse represents the promise of biotechnology in flesh and blood. 
Biotechnology is a future-oriented technology, a technology whose hopes 
and promises are more or less science fiction. But who is promising, and 
what is being promised? Who is playing God? What is their ultimate plan? 
What are the implications of mouse biotechnology for ordinary people?
This takes me to the fear of monsters coming out of laboratories, to be 
discussed in Chapter 4. This fear is often formulated by referring to Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein. Frankenstein’s monster is more or less the arche-
type of popular ‘biotech monster phobia’. In this chapter, I will address the 
question what it is that people find fearsome about biotechnology when 
they refer to Frankenstein. How does the myth of Frankenstein relate to 
new developments in biotechnology? What is the actuality of the myth? In 
order to answer this question I will tell the stories of four super mice and 
their creators and illustrate some of the (future) possibilities of genetic 
human enhancement. I will argue that, in the days of the super mice, 
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rereading Shelley’s novel is of great importance because biotechnologists 
did indeed discover a monster: namely, the fact that our own DNA, our 
essence, is malleable. How do we distinguish between good and bad 
‘genetic re-creations’? Is this purely a matter of taste?
Finally, in Chapter 5, I will explore more extensively the relationship 
between judgments of taste, aesthetic judgments and moral judgments 
about animal (or human) biotechnology. To do this, first, I will return to 
Rollin’s argumentation, as it was discussed in Chapter 2. Rollin believes 
that moral concerns based on ‘aesthetic judgements’ are not genuine moral 
concerns. In opposition to Rollin, I will argue that we have to take aes-
thetic judgements very seriously. Moral convictions are always based on 
a mixture of both reason and feeling. People who say ‘yuk!’ when being 
confronted with animal biotechnology are expressing genuine feelings of 
moral concern but apparently lack the vocabulary to do so in a philosophi-
cally articulate way. What is expressed when people say ‘yuk!’? I will argue 
that two things are involved in the yuk-response to animal biotechnology: 
namely, a feeling of confusion, or even disgust, that is the result of our 
vision of nature losing its status of being given, unquestioned and self-
evident ‘objectivity’, and the threat that animal biotechnology imposes on 
what we perceive as good life, or a life worth living. The second question 
I address in this chapter is what the role of art could be in the age of the 
biotech revolution. How can contemporary art assist in the moral and social 
assessment of animal biotechnology, in particular where questions about 
visions of nature, quality of life, identity, the normal and the abnormal are 
concerned? To illustrate my argument, I will introduce three art projects: 
the GFP Bunny project by Eduardo Kac (2000); the Transgenic Mice series 
by Catherine Chalmers (2000); and Genpets™ by Adam Brandejs (2005). 
I will argue that the most important value of bioart lies in making visible 
the invisible.
Chapter 1
The birth of the transgenic laboratory mouse
Over time, one invariable lesson of biological research has been the difficulty, 
virtual impossibility, of reliably predicting the properties of intact organisms 
from the properties of their constituent tissues, cells and molecules. Philosophers 
have argued the reasons, but empirically we know that accurate prediction 
is not possible now, or in the foreseeable future. For the genetics revolution to 
provide the insights we hope to gain into the human condition, we must have 
adequate experimental animals.3
 Kenneth Paigen
The human code was just the top layer of Celera’s information lode. Most valuable 
of all – even more important, perhaps, than the human code – would be the mouse 
genome… on the genomic level people and mice are amazingly similar… This is 
what makes mice such superb lab models for cancer and other human diseases: 
genetically, they are essentially little hairy human beings that can be manipulated 
in the lab in ways that people obviously cannot.4
 James Shreeve
Animals are born, are sentient and are mortal. In these things they resemble 
man. In their superficial anatomy – less in their deep anatomy – in their 
habits, in their time, in their physical capacities, they differ from man. 
They are both like and unlike.5
 John Berger
Introduction
Meet them in the lab
They are mice like any other. As a rule, there is no way you can tell from 
the outside whether a mouse is genetically modified or not. If you want to 
know, you have to look at its genes. This is not to say that transgenic mice 
3. Kenneth Paigen (1995) A miracle enough: the power of mice, Nature Medicine, Vol. 1, No.3, p. 215.
4. James Shreeve (2004) The Genome War. How Craig Venter tries to capture the code of life and save the 
world. New York: Knopf, p. 265.
5. John Berger (1991/1977) ‘Why look at animals’, in About Looking, New York: Vintage Books, p. 4.
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are ordinary mice. On the contrary, whoever visits the transgenic unit of a 
research laboratory for the first time will be surprised by the large variety 
of specific mouse strains that are involved in mouse biotechnology. Every 
mouse strain has its unique properties. They differ in coat colour, the 
typical behaviour they display, and the distinct physical properties they 
have. The OLA, for example, also known as the 129, is very cute; it has 
a beautiful silver grey coat. It is a mouse of great value because it has 
good embryonic stem (ES) cells. At this moment there is no other mouse 
with ES that can so easily be cultured in vitro. Apart from that, however, 
it is a remarkably stupid animal, according to some researchers at least. 
Moreover, the 129 mice have a bizarre pathology. Over time they all 
develop an infection of the eye. The FVB, a traditional white mouse, is a 
neurotic creature. You can easily recognize this animal when it is running 
in circles. But according to the molecular biologists who work with such 
mice, it is a ‘supermouse’ because of its embryonic properties. The FVB 
embryo is very easy to manipulate, but only by means of micro-injection. 
You cannot place cells of another mouse into a FVB blastocyst. In contrast 
to the FVB the blastocysts, those of the ‘black six’, also known as B6, are 
easy to manipulate. This is one of the reasons why it has become such a 
popular mouse. The B6 is also an excellent foster mother. Because of its 
character and good looks, it is the favourite animal of many who work 
with mice. The B6 is a beautiful, dark-coated, small mouse, originally 
bred by Chinese breeders of fancy mice. Quite striking to see are the 
patched chimeras, which are a mixture of two mouse strains. The cells 
of these mice, including the cells that make up the coat, originate from 
the embryo cells of two different mice and therefore have a different 
genetic make-up.
The transgenic mice live in animal quarters referred to as mouse facili-
ties. A tag is attached to their cage that provides information about the 
specific mouse strain: the genetic modification it carries; whether it is a 
homozygote or a heterozygote for this modification; its date of birth; and 
other specific information relevant to the animal caretakers and research-
ers. Before entering the mouse facilities one has to change clothing and 
shoes and wash hands thoroughly for a minute. This is merely one of 
the measures that have been taken to avoid the contamination of these 
precious animals. Bred only to live in laboratories, these mice are very sus-
ceptible to infections. For example, mice with severe immune deficiencies 
need to be kept pathogen free6. Outside the safe walls of the laboratory, 
many of these inbred mice, transgenic or not, would probably not survive 
very long.
The secret of the mouse’s scientific career
The ‘natural’ habitat of these laboratory mice is the laboratory. Nobody 
who is at home in contemporary bio-medical science will be surprised 
to see transgenic mice in a research facility. But how did they get there, 
and, why were these mice introduced into the laboratory? Since the first 
transgenic mice were born in the early 1980s, transgenic mice have had an 
impressive career within the life sciences. The vast majority of transgenic 
animals that can be found in a contemporary laboratory are mice. But, 
why was it the mouse, and not another animal, that became the most 
popular animal in transgenic technology? And, last but not least, how has 
the mouse evolved during the past 100 years as a laboratory animal? Not 
only in a literal sense: How did scientists influence the evolution of the 
lab mouse as a species, how did they influence its genetic make up, its 
genome? But also in a ‘conceptual’ sense; How did the mouse change from 
the perspective of the researchers?
This chapter is meant to be an introduction to the main protagonist of 
this book: the genetically modified mouse. It is not a creature ‘ex nihilo’, 
but the outcome of a long and unique history, an important chapter of the 
history of the life sciences. To understand the transgenic mouse of today, 
we have to look at its genealogy. For the reconstruction of the ‘birth and 
rise’ of the genetically engineered laboratory mouse, I use four types of 
written sources: 1) publications in the major scientific journals such as 
Science, Nature and Proceedings of the National Academy of Science. It 
is here that scientific breakthroughs are first presented to the scientific 
community and the public, and the scientists discuss the new mouse tech-
nologies in scientific reviews; 2) responses to these publications in the 
popular media such as national newspapers. These are a useful source of 
information because they reflect the spirit of the times and give a good 
impression of how developments in biotechnology are perceived by the 
public, and in the interviews with the responsible scientists important per-
sonal statements can be found that are illustrative of the scientific expecta-
tions of biotechnology at a particular time (e.g. Schmeck 1983; Saltus 1990; 
6. This introduction is based on exploratory ‘fieldwork’ carried out at the NKI in the Spring of 2003.
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Rensberger 1992b; Schrage 1993); 3) retrospectives by scientists who, for 
different reasons, look back on their own field of research and the animal 
with which they are so familiar, by highlighting either the pioneering role 
of great scientists (e.g. Paigen 2003a,b; Crow 2002; Klein 2001; Arechaga 
1998; Papaioannou 1998; Russel 1978) or their own role in the develop-
ment of the new revolutionary technology (e.g. Snell 1978; Strong 1978; 
Smithies 2001; Evans 2001; Capechhi 2001; Tarkowski 1998; Palmiter 1998; 
Bradley et al. 1998), or in order to the praise the mouse after the cracking 
of its genetic code for its contribution to biomedicine (Clarke 2002; Travis 
2003); and, 4) last but not least, the work of social scientists who study the 
emergence of typical research models, laboratory animals, and research 
materials and give answers to the question how and why the mice became 
‘the right organism for the job’ (Rader 1999, 2001). From these sources 
it can be concluded that the mouse was introduced into the biomedical 
laboratory a century ago. Since then, it has experienced a number of dra-
matic transformations. These transformations reflect important shifts and 
changes in biomedical power. For many years, before the emergence of 
transgenic technology, mice had been present in biomedical laboratories 
all over the world. Their specific evolution is highly influenced by science, 
but at the same time the laboratory mouse (its strengths and weaknesses 
as a model) has influenced the evolution of science as well. Ever since 
mice were introduced into laboratories, their genome has been influenced 
by the research agendas of science, but the opposite is also true: research 
agendas have been adapted to the mouse genome. The laboratory mice 
that have been used to create transgenic mice were by no means ‘normal’ 
mice. They were the result of a long process of inbreeding. But, probably 
even more important, as a result of the inbreeding, inbred mice have 
developed some unique properties that make them very suitable for trans-
genic technology.
Three crucial steps can be discerned in the ‘scientific career’ or ‘geneal-
ogy’ of the lab mouse. The first step was the transformation of the mouse 
from an object of study as an animal into a homogeneous laboratory tool 
that could be used for studying the laws of genetics. A second important 
step in the career of the mouse came about when the mouse became the 
pioneering species of transgenic technology. The third and final step can 
be described as the transformation of the mouse into a model. The mouse 
has become a mouse model, a transgenic stand-in for human beings in 
biomedical research7.
This chapter takes a more or less chronological approach, and is struc-
tured around these three steps. In Part One, I describe the birth of the 
laboratory mouse. Its history begins in the early years of the 20th century 
when researchers in biology began to inbreed mice for scientific purposes. 
Once this first step was taken, the inbred mouse became an important in-
strument in genetics. With this practice of inbreeding a new ‘phenomenon’ 
was born, the mouse became a laboratory mouse. In Part Two, I describe 
the transgenic revolution. When two critical threshold conditions were met 
in the 1970s: namely, the possibility to culture embryos in vitro, and the 
availability of DNA recombination technologies, a second step was taken: 
the creation of the transgenic mouse. I will refer to the development of 
the first transgenic mice and the technological improvements that led to 
the increasing control over gene expression as the ‘transgenic revolution’. 
In Part Three, I describe the development of the mouse as a model. Dur-
ing the transgenic revolution, research was primarily focused on gene 
regulation. When the possibility arose to knock out genes in a more direct 
and controlled manner, the mimicking of human gene defects in mice 
became the next challenge. With the ‘discovery’ of the knock-out technol-
ogy the ‘career’ of the transgenic mice received a real boost. The mouse 
then evolved into the animal model for human diseases. This evolution, 
from laboratory tool into stand-in, is one that is still taking place today. 
Every week, it seems, new mouse models are reported that mimic human 
genetic diseases.
Part One: The ‘birth’ of the laboratory mouse
Clarence Cook Little’s inbred mice
All the sources I consulted8 concerning the history of the laboratory mouse 
point to Clarence Cook Little as the first and most important scientist 
responsible for the ‘creation’ of the inbred mouse, the predecessor9 of the 
7. The three steps are defined on basis of content not chronology: the different steps run parallel in time.
8. Rader (1997, 1999); Mobraaten and Sharp (1999); Russell (1978); Paigen (2003a); Strong (1978); Hogan 
et al. (1986).
9. Three inbred strains in particular play a role in the transgenic revolution: the FVB, because of the 
large nucleus of its embryos; the B6, because of its easy to manipulate blastocysts; and the 129, the only 
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transgenic mouse. In retrospect, his work can be seen as the beginning, 
the first milestone in controlling the genetic nature of mice for research 
purposes (Mobraaten and Sharp, 1999). Little studied biology at the begin-
ning of the 20th century at Harvard University. There he followed genetics 
classes with W.E. Castle, Professor of Zoology, who invited him to work 
at his lab at the Bussey Institute. In November 1907, Little took over the 
work of maintaining Castle’s mouse stock. Castle believed that practical 
experience with real organisms was the best way to learn about genetics 
(Rader 1999). At the Bussey Institute, Little studied the inheritance of coat 
colour in mice. Most mice came from Granby Mouse Farm, managed by 
Abbie Lathrop. In those days, fancy and exotic mice were a much sought 
after curiosity. The mice that came from Lathrob’s farm were selected on 
the basis of physical features such as: friendly character, coat colour, or cu-
rious kinds of behaviour (for example: the Japanese waltzing mice). These 
animals – by no means wild mice – were Castle’s and Little’s experimental 
raw materials. Before entering Little’s scientific breeding programme, these 
mice were already the result of many years of selective breeding.
In the early days of the Bussey Institute, shortly after the rediscovery of 
Mendel’s work10, there was much discussion about whether the laws of ge-
netics could be studied through inbreeding. Little was convinced that, for 
research on the Mendelian inheritance of specific characteristics in mice, 
pure strains (that is, strains with a homogeneous genetic background) 
were needed. This was the reason why in 1909 he began to inbreed mice 
for his research in genetics. He bred mice that were recessive for specific 
coat colour genes by mating brother and sister in each generation in order 
to maintain the recessive genes. In those days, inbreeding of mammals 
was a controversial practice. For example, Castle, his own professor, who 
saw himself as an ‘experimental evolutionist’, did not believe that inbreed-
ing alone could ever produce artificial yet stable genetic forms of truly 
stable strains (Rader 1999). An inbred variety tends to be delicate and 
sickly, and to be therefore rather susceptible to disease. Animals that do 
survive often become infertile. Few scientists believed that viable strains of 
inbreds could be maintained in the long run (Strong 1978). Notwithstand-
ing the overall scepticism that his work provoked, in 1911 Little was able 
mouse strain that has ES cells that can be cultured in vitro.
10. In 1900, three botanists – Hugo de Vries, Carl Correns, and Erich von Tschermak – independently 
rediscovered Mendel’s work.
to report his first successful inbred strain, the DBA strain, named after its 
coat colour, diluted, brown, non-agouti.
It was not only his breeding skills that made Little the ‘father’ of the 
laboratory mouse. According to ‘laboratory mouse historian’ Karen Rader, 
Little was ‘not the first person to think of inbreeding mice or mammals, he 
was not the only researcher working with mice and not the only scientist 
to see the methodological potential of homogeneous mammalian animals 
for freeing genetic research from the local limits of time and space. […] 
however, he stabilized inbred mouse material at the time that he effectively 
connected this material to well understood sets of research questions and 
approaches in the rapidly expanding discipline of Mendelian genetics.’ 
(Rader 1999: 328).
Of mice, Mendel and cancer research
Researchers soon discovered that an important property of inbred mice 
was the relatively high incidence of spontaneous tumours. Some strains 
possessed unique susceptibility characteristics to various types of cancer 
(Mobraaten and Sharp 1999). Little’s DBA mouse for example displayed 
a hereditary susceptibility to mamma tumours (Rader 2001). It was not 
surprising, therefore, that the focus of Little’s research changed from coat 
colour to cancer research (Russel 1978). He was convinced that cancer was 
genetically determined and followed a Mendelian pattern of inheritance12. 
In order to study his hypothesis, he moved to Tyzzer’s lab in 1913. Tyzzer, 
a researcher on tumour resistance, had recently discovered that tumours 
derived from the Japanese Waltzing mouse (also an inbred strain) could 
be transported to mice of the same strain, but not to mice of other strains. 
Wild mice did not ‘accept’ the tumour transplants. In addition he saw that 
when he crossed the Japanese mice with wild type mice the resulting 
offspring F1 generation accepted the tumour but mice of the F2 gen-
eration did not. From these data he concluded that tumour susceptibility 
was not an inherited Mendelian trait. These confusing research data were 
the reason for a strong debate within the scientific community about the 
11.  This quote taken from Beck et al. (2000) is originally from Davisson, M.T. (1996) ‘Rules for nomenclature 
of inbred strains’, pp. 1532-1536, in Lyon, M.F., Rastan, S. and Brown, S.D.M. eds. Genetic Variants and Strains 
of the Laboratory Mouse, Oxford University Press 
12. Mice breeder Lathrop also reports in 1908 the occurrence of spontaneous tumours in some of her 
mouse strains. Lathrop and researcher Loeb started a study on the inheritance of cancer in mice. But 
unlike Little they did not link their cancer data to the Mendelian laws of inheritance. (Rader 1999)
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validity of the Mendelian postulates. Arguing in favour of Mendel, Little 
postulated that multiple Mendelian factors could explain the observation 
of the different tumour susceptibility in the F1 and F2 crosses. In other 
words, Little suspected that the effect observed could be explained by the 
involvement of more than one gene in tumour resistance. He suggested 
that a large number of genes were involved in determining whether a 
mouse would reject or accept a transplanted tumour, and that for each 
of these genes there were two alleles, one dominant and one recessive 
(Paigen 2003a). In order to prove his theory, Little compared two different 
homogeneous strains: the Japanese Waltzing mouse and his own DBA. 
His hypothesis was confirmed (Paigen 2003a; Rader 1999). It is important 
to note that, because of the mathematical precision of Little’s Mendelian 
based theory predictions, the multi-factorial hypothesis of cancer transmis-
sion could, by definition, only be probed with inbred mice (Rader 1999). 
In heterogeneous mice one has no control over the interference of other 
‘background’ genes in the resulting phenotype. Research data obtained 
from heterogeneous mice would simply be too complex to interpret.
With the linking of mouse genetics to cancer research the inbred mouse 
became the model animal for this type of research, simply because it was 
the best available candidate. Amongst mammals the mouse is second only 
to man in frequency and variety of spontaneous cancers. ‘Regrettably the 
frequency of occurrence was still all too rare’, noted Strong in a reflection 
on Little’s work. ‘A single mouse with a spontaneous tumour was selling 
for $300 in laboratories on the eastern seaboard. The use of mice in the 
number for quantitative research necessitated a ready supply at minimal 
cost’ (Strong 1978)13. During the first half of the 20th century, cancer was 
the driving force behind mouse genetics. It greatly influenced the devel-
opment of the mouse as a genetic system (Paigen 2003a). However, the 
career of the inbred mouse as model animal for cancer research did not 
proceed without dispute. Little became involved in a controversy with 
another prominent researcher in cancer genetics, Maud Slye, that lasted 
for years (Russel 1978; Rader 1999). Slye was of the opinion that research 
on inbred animals could never lead to reliable research data. Little had to 
convince other scientists of the usefulness of his inbred mice. Not only did 
the mice themselves have to be changed – into homogeneous lab animals 
13. The origin of inbred mice by Morse III (1978) is accessed via the digital version on the Iinternet. 
Therefore, the page numbers of quotations from this book are not available.
– but the dominant mind-set in the scientific community had to change as 
well. Little invested 40 years of work in his own laboratory, now known as 
the Jackson Laboratory, to get his inbred mice accepted.
The rise of mouse genetics
Of course, Little was not the only researcher involved in the early history of 
the inbred mouse. In 1918 he moved to the Cold Spring Harbor laboratory 
on Long Island (New York) where, at the station for experimental evolution, 
a small but robust research group was formed, focussing on mouse genet-
ics. They called themselves the ‘Mouse Club of America’. It was here that 
the research on tumour genetics using inbred mice started to get serious. 
(Russel 1978; Pennisi 2000; Rader 1997). Well-known researchers from the 
Mouse Club, besides Little, were Halsey Bagg, Leonard C. Strong, George 
Snell and Leslie C. Dunn. A number of inbred mouse strains in common 
use today were developed during that period by these researchers. These 
mouse strains were created either as strains exhibiting a very high inci-
dence of spontaneous neoplasia or as strains that proved to be useful as the 
necessary low-incidence controls (Paigen 2003a). The BALB/c for example, 
the first albino mouse, now one of the best known inbred mice, was bred 
by Halsey Bagg (Pennisi 2000). Strong, one of Little’s co-workers, crossed 
this BALB/c with an albino produced by Little into what they called the 
‘A-strain’ (Strong 1978). This mouse had a very high predisposition for lung 
and mamma tumours and was therefore very suitable for cancer research. 
Subsequently, Strong kept inbreeding this A-strain resulting into the C3H 
high tumour incidence sub-strain. With the aid of these mice he was able 
to show that cancer is indeed inherited (usually in a dominant way) (Strong 
1978). In 1921 Little bred the C57BL line. This is the inbred mouse line from 
which the the sub-variety C57BL/6 originates. C57BL/6 also referred to as 
Box 1
The guidelines for generating inbred mouse strains, first published in 1952, state 
that:11
‘A strain shall be regarded as inbred when it has been mated brother x sister (hereafter 
called BxS) for 20 or more consecutive generations F20, and can be traced to a single 
ancestral breeding pair in the 20th or a subsequent generation. Parent x offspring 
matings may be substituted for BxS matings provided that, in the case of consecutive 
parent offspring mating, the matings in each case is to the younger of the two parents. 
Exceptionally, other breeding may be used, provided that the inbreeding coefficient 
achieved is at least equal to that at F20 (0.99)’.
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B6 or ‘black six’, is one of the most popular mice today. It is also the mouse 
whose genome was ‘cracked’ in 2002 (Waterston et al. 2002). The name 
‘B6’ originates from the number of the ‘mother’ or founding female of this 
strain: she was female number 6 of the C57BL strain (Russell 1978). In 1928 
Dunn bred the 129, a mouse with a high incidence of testicular carcinoma. 
This mouse was the predecessor of the 129/Sv, a mouse variety of great 
importance for transgenic technology because of its ES cells.
In 1929, Little founded the Roscoe B. Jackson Memorial Laboratory, 
now known as the Jackson Laboratory, in Bar Harbor. Other prominent 
members of the Mouse Club soon followed him. It is from here that the 
inbred mice started to conquer the world, notably when in 1933 the 
laboratory began to sell inbred mice to other laboratories. The selling of 
mice soon became an important activity of the Jackson Lab, as it still is 
today. In 1941 the laboratory shipped 2500 mice a week, and in 2002 the 
number of mice shipped per week was 44,000 (Crow 2002). Thus was 
established the international fame that the Jackson Lab and the ‘Jax™’ 
mice have today.
Although cancer research was a dominant stream, not all members of 
the Mouse Club were into it. Dunn for example, also a pupil of Castle, 
used inbred mice to study genetic mapping, the localisation of genes on 
the chromosomes (Lyon 1990). In 1920, he published the first paper on the 
systematic search for linkage amongst coat colour varieties. This pioneer 
work on the genetic mapping of the mouse genome would later become 
of great importance to genomics and the human genome project. Another 
big name in mouse genetics was George Snell, who joined the Jackson 
Lab in 1935. He too was a pupil of Castle, and was mainly interested in 
the genetics of tumour rejection, rather than in the genetic mechanisms 
underlying cancer as such. Snell was interested in the genetics behind the 
immune system. In 1936, the major immune histocompatibility complex, 
at that time referred to as H2, had been discovered by immunologist 
Peter Gorer. In order to eliminate complexity introduced by the pres-
ence of different interacting H loci, Snell set up an ingenious strategy of 
cross-intercrossing and cross-backcrossing and started with the breeding 
of congenic strains14 (Klein, 2001). With these mice, Snell discovered in 
1951 that one of these H loci was more important than the others, and 
14. Congenic strains were created by repeated back-crossing of the F1 to one of the parents and selecting 
those individuals from the F2 that carried the H2 type coming from the other parent (Paigen 2003a).
he also found a visible genetic marker with which he could follow the 
segregation of the H locus. Later, Snell discovered that the H locus was in 
fact a complex. Today we know this H2 locus as the major histocompat-
ibility locus, one of the most important elements of the immune system. 
In 1980 he received the Nobel Prize for this boundary-breaking work 
(Paigen 2003a).
In 1939, the inbreeding of mice had reached such proportions that a 
reliable and extensive overview of the inbred strains was needed. For that 
purpose The International Committee on Standardized Nomenclature for 
Mice was founded. All mice strains were given names and codes on the 
basis of a standardised system. Later the term ‘genetic’ was added to the 
nomenclature. The committee was charged with the task of establishing 
and updating rules and guidelines for genetic nomenclature (Silver 1995). 
Mouse genetics is by its very nature a collaborative field of scientific inves-
tigations. It is therefore of key importance that researchers speak the same 
language and use the same coding system. Now, with the explosive growth 
of transgenic mouse strains this nomenclature, has become indispensable. 
Box 2
Decoding a mouse name
The rules for coding a (transgenic) mouse strain are described by the International 
Committee on Standardized Genetic Nomenclature for Mice (see: http://www.informatics.
jax.org/mgihome/nomen/gene.shtml)
A name code informs about the strain of the mouse, its origin (the lab where it was bred), 
the name(s) of the researcher(s) responsible, and its mutation.
Origin Strain Researcher Gene (mutation)
Cr = Charles River 129= 129 S=Stevens
J = Jackson A= A strain Ev=Evans
Tac = Taconic B6=C57/b6 Brd=Bradley
HSD= Harlan D1=DBA 1
Balb/c
129S7/SvEvBrd-Hprt b-m2
This mouse is the 7th sub-strain (steel-colour coat) of the 129 that it was bred in Stevens, 
Evans and Bradley’ s laboratory, and that carries a mutation for the b allele of the Hprt 
gene. The coding ‘m2’ indicates that the gene has been mutated for the second time 
(Malakoff 2000).
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Another sign of how the mouse research became more strongly organised 
was the Mouse News Letter that started to circulate in 1949. This newsletter 
was renamed Mouse Genome in 1990 and Mammalian Genome in 1997.
The mouse and the Wistar rat
An interesting comparison can be made with the rat, another commonly 
used laboratory animal. The tale of the Wistar rat also starts at the begin-
ning of the 20th century, when Helen Dean King at the Wistar Institute 
worked on an inbred rat strain. It was her explicit goal to develop a 
standard lab animal, an animal that would generate the same research 
data at different laboratories (Tocher Clause 1993), an animal one could 
make atlases of. This albino rat, also known as the Wistar rat, can still be 
found in large numbers in laboratories all over the world. It has become 
the standard lab rat. In modern laboratories, the name ‘Wistar’ stands for 
reliability and quality. As Little and Dean had already shown, inbreeding 
does not necessarily lead to inferiority and infertility. On the contrary, with 
her Wistar rat, Dean proved that by inbreeding it is possible to produce 
useful qualities such as mild character, fertility, etc. Notwithstanding these 
similarities, the inbred mouse and the inbred rat have had totally different 
careers in science. Whereas the rat is a popular animal in physiology and 
behaviour studies, the mouse is the animal associated with genetics and 
cancer research. After the discovery of the MHC, mice also became associ-
ated with immunology.
‘The right tool for the job’
One of the most important transformations that the mouse underwent 
at the beginning of the 20th century was from animal research object 
into a ‘laboratory tool’. Little was not interested in mice as animals, but 
in what he could learn from them about genetics. He used his inbred 
mice to study Mendelian genetics in a living species. As a result of his 
scientific approach, a combination of inbreeding and mathematics, the 
mouse became an instrument rather than an animal. Mice became part 
of the standard equipment of the modern genetics laboratory. For Little, 
the mouse probably had the same meaning as the pea had for Mendel15. 
15. Mendel himself started his research on the genetic inheritance of coat-colour traits by breeding 
mice he kept in his two-room living quarters. But, according to the Austrian Bishop Anton Schaffgots, 
it was inappropriate for a monk to share his living quarters with creatures that had sex and copulated. 
Little and his contemporaries were trying, so to speak, to look through 
the animals towards the laws of genetics. They were not interested in the 
mouse per se, but in his mysterious genes. They developed a genetic gaze 
on the animal. The laboratory mouse as a phenomenon was born.
The scientific rationale behind the mouse strains is well illustrated by 
the words of Mobraaten and Sharp: ‘High quality research depends on the 
purity and consistency of reagents, including experimental animals, for ef-
ficient reproducibility of results. It is readily recognized that the purity and 
consistency in experimental animals depends on both genetic homogene-
ity and controlled environments that avoid variation caused by nutritional, 
pathogenic or other environmental effects’ (Mobraaten and Sharp 1999: 
129). To serve science best, the mouse not only had to be transformed 
into a tool or instrument, it had to become the ideal tool for studying 
genetics, that is, it had to be as reliable and predictable as possible. In 
order to achieve this goal, Little and his colleagues had to eliminate as 
much variation as possible within their mouse strains. The interchange-
ability of individual mice within a strain guaranteed scientific objectivity 
and efficient reproducibility of results. The quality of the mice depended 
on their purity and consistency. In the hands of the geneticists, the popula-
tion of laboratory mice evolved into a collection of homogeneous strains. 
Mice of a congenic mouse strain are more or less genetically identical 
and therefore exchangeable. The variety between mouse strains, on the 
other hand, is quite significant. A specific inbred strain stands for specific 
behavioural and physical properties. This genetic variation between, but 
not within, different mouse strains, has made it possible to study genetics 
on the smallest level: the single gene. In the process of becoming the right 
tool for genetics research16, the individual mouse lost its former identity 
as an animal. The individual mouse became the equivalent of the mouse 
strain it represented. This is also reflected in the language of researchers, 
who refer to their mice as to ‘BALB/c’, 129 or ‘black six’. In a unique 
process of selection, an artificial subspecies: namely, that of inbred strains, 
was created.
Mendel was forced to move his research to the garden, where he continued his scientific work with peas 
(Paigen 2003a).
16. A reference to ‘the right tool for the job’, the title of a session during the meeting of the International 
Society for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Biology in 1989, and a book edited by Adele 
Clark and Joan Fuijimura (Lederman and Burian 1993).
24
Biotech Pioneers
25
The birth of the transgenic laboratory mouse
The transformation into a ‘standard’ or model animal was not unique 
for the mouse. But its role in genetics was. For research in genetics, mice 
were, at that time (as they are today) simply the right organism for the job. 
The mouse was cheap, easy to keep, and eager to multiply and reproduce 
itself. Newborn pups take about ten weeks to mature, so scientists could 
breed several generations in a short period. Moreover, mice are small, rela-
tively tame, and require less space, food and attention than, for instance, 
dogs, rabbits, or other animals. But most importantly, fancy mice, available 
from breeders and collectors of pet mice, were a physically diverse lot 
(Stroh 2002). They were a pool of interesting mutations in terms of coat 
colour and behaviour. All these characteristics made the mouse of key 
importance to genetics research. And when it turned out those mice, partly 
as an effect of their inbreeding, displayed a high incidence of tumours, the 
career of the mouse became a fact. Genetics determined the (genetic) fate 
(evolution) of the research mouse. As the dominant mammal in genetic 
cancer research, the mouse, in turn, influenced the course of mammalian 
genetics. The fact that researchers knew so much about its genes, their 
familiarity with the animal in the lab, and some typical properties of some 
inbred strains, all made the inbred mouse the ideal candidate for a pio-
neering role in the transgenic revolution that started in the late 1970s.
Part Two: The transgenic revolution
‘Those were heady days’ wrote Virginia Papaioannou in 1998, in a reflec-
tion on the ‘coming of age of the transgenic era’. ‘For those of us entering 
the field of genetics and mammalian embryology in the 60s and 70s, the 
excitement was palpable. As graduate students and post-docs, we saw that 
long-standing barriers were tumbling down before an onslaught of tech-
nological advances. And not only that the scientists breaking those barriers 
were all around us as mentors and colleagues. The rapid pace of progress 
and the seemingly boundless possibilities hooked us into the field, and we 
gradually became aware that we, too, were part of a revolution that was 
the way to opening the mammalian genome to experimental alteration’ 
(Papaioannou 1998: 841).
Manipulating the genome: recombinant DNA technology
In the early 1970s, two necessary conditions for the making of transgenic 
mice were met: recombinant DNA technology, and in vitro culture of 
mouse embryos. In 1972, Paul Berg, a pioneer in the field of biotechnol-
ogy, created the first recombinant DNA molecule. With his pioneering 
work, Berg showed that DNA can be manipulated and, even more, that 
DNA from one organism could be transported to another organism. In 
1972 he used a plasmid, a bacteriophage, and E. coli DNA for his recom-
bination. In 1980 he received the Nobel Prize for this boundary-breaking 
work (Anonymous 1980). The big question was, of course, whether DNA 
recombination would also be possible in mammalian cells, or even whole 
organisms. The genetic modification of a mammal is for several reasons 
more complicated than a single mammalian cell or single cell organism. In 
order to create a genetically modified mammal, one needs to manipulate 
its embryonic cells. This is only possible in vitro. The next step is to place 
the manipulated embryo into a pseudo-pregnant foster mother in order to 
let it develop into a normal whole organism. This asked for completely dif-
ferent skills, knowledge and technologies than those which the geneticists 
had been acquainted with so far.
Manipulating the embryo: the search for the ES cell line
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, besides genetics, another field within 
biology: namely, developmental biology, started to play an important role 
in the history of the lab mouse. Scientists such as Andrzej Tarkowski, 
Beatrice Mintz, Ralph Brinster and Richard Gardner started to experiment 
with the in vitro culture and manipulation of embryonic cells. They did so 
because they were fascinated by the processes that led to the development 
of a complex organism out of one single embryo cell. In the early 1960s, 
Tarkowski and Mintz independently demonstrated that fusing two 8-cell 
mouse embryos (3-day old) would produce chimeric adults containing 
cells from each original embryo (Arechaga 1998). The mouse embryos 
they used originated from mice with different coat colours. The result-
ing chimeras had a patterned coloured coat. ‘The composite animals that 
developed from such combinations of genetically different cells were dra-
matic to look at, but were even more impressive considering the potential 
they held for tracing cell lines, testing cell potential, and eventually (as 
we shall see later) as vehicles for gene manipulation’ (Papaioannou 1998: 
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843)). That these were remarkable experiments can also be concluded 
from the words of Tarkowski, who reflected upon his own work in 1998: 
‘At that time the idea of making one mammalian individual by aggregating 
two cleaving embryos must have looked rather preposterous and later I 
wondered why Professor Rogers F.W. Brambell, under whose supervision I 
worked […], had accepted this […] crazy project which I proposed to carry 
out in his laboratory’. But the fact that somebody else, namely Beatrice 
Mitnz, was involved in exactly the same experiments surprised him even 
more (Tarkowski 1998: 903).
Soon, others started to experiment with embryos. In 1968, Richard 
Gardner also successfully ‘created’ mouse chimeras. Unlike Mintz and 
Tarkowski, he did not fuse whole embryos. He injected embryo cells from 
one mouse into 4-day old blastocysts of another mouse (Arechaga 1998; 
Tarkowski 1998). Ralph Brinster, who was inspired by Gardner’s work, 
saw great potential in this blastocyst injection technique: ‘I believed that 
there were multipotent cells in older postimplantation embryos (e.g. 6-8 
days old) as well as cells from teratocarcinomas that would colonize a 
blastocyst, thereby influencing differentiation of an embryo in a predict-
able way, and perhaps enter the germ line’ (Arechaga 1998: 866). In 1972 
Brinster and his co-worker Moustafa were able to report another success 
when they succeeded in the creation of chimeras out of embryo cells of 
different ages, even up to 7-8 days (Moustafa and Brinster 1972). These 
studies supported the idea that mouse blastocysts could be colonised by 
nonsynchronous cells (cells of different age).
Encouraged by these results, Brinster searched for a pluripotent cell 
line that could be manipulated in vitro and subsequently replaced in a 
mouse blastocyst. Today we know this pluripotent cell line as the ES 
cell line. The history of the ES cell line dates back to 1967. In that year, 
Leroy Stevens bred a mouse strain with a high incidence of spontaneous 
testicular teratomas. This mouse, still widely used today, is the 129Sv. 
The teratomas of these mice are composed of different types of differenti-
ated cells and also of multipotent (non-differentiated) stem cells known 
as embryonal carcinoma (EC) cells or teratocarcinoma. From these 129/
Sv teratocarcinoma, Stevens cultured the OTT6050 cell line. These stem 
cells, or EC cells, resemble early embryos qua morphology, biochemistry 
and cell surface (Papaioannou et al., 1975). After his success with the 
chimeras in 1972, Brinster was able to lay his hands on this OTT6050 
teratocarinoma cell line. The cells he obtained had to be cultured as an 
ascites17 tumour (in the abdomen of a host mouse). Brinster injected these 
embryonic cells, once obtained from an agouti-pigmented mouse, into the 
blastocyst from a random bred albino mouse. According to his own re-
ports these experiments were very successful18. In 1974 the chimera mouse 
with agouti stripes on an albino background was born (Arechaga 1998). 
In 1975 Mintz, working at the Institute for Cancer Research in Fox Chase, 
Philadelphia, reported about the genetically mosaic mice. Like Brinster, 
she used Stevens’s 129/Sv teratocarcinoma. Mintz was surprised about the 
potential of malignant cells to develop after 200 transplant generations (8 
years in culture as an ascites tumour) into normal functional cells in the 
chimeric mice. ‘The tumor itself generally kills its host by 3-4 weeks after 
transplantation. Yet our oldest mosaic animal […] is now 11 weeks old 
and appears to be healthy and vigorous’, she wrote in a Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Science article in 1975 (Mintz and Illmensee 1975: 
3588). On the basis of these experiments, Mintz drew important conclu-
sions about the development of malignancies. ‘The origin of this tumour 
from a disorganized embryo suggests that malignancies of some other, 
more specialized, stem cells might arise from comparably thorough tissue 
disorganization, leading to developmental aberrations of gene expression 
rather than changes in gene structure’ (Mintz and Illmensee 1975: 3585). 
Gardner’s team from Oxford and Evans from London together confirmed 
in 1975 that these teratocarcinoma in vivo could add to normal morpho-
genesis and differentiation (Papaioannou et al. 1975).
The results were impressive and hopeful but, nevertheless, the research-
ers did not succeed in the transmission of the teratocarcinoma cell line into 
the germ line of the mouse (Papaioannou 1998; Bradley et al. 1998). An 
additional complication was the method of culture. The teratocarcinoma 
had to be cultured in vivo as an ascites tumour, which made it hard to 
manipulate the cells prior to injection into the blastocyst. This problem 
was solved when Evans and Kaufman in 1981 reported about a pluripo-
tent ES cell line that could be kept in an in vitro culture. These ES cells 
had, in contrast to cells derived from the embryonic carcinoma, a normal 
karyotype (Evans and Kaufman 1981). Another great advantage of the 
ES cells was that they could be cultured directly from the embryo. The 
17. An ascites tumour is a tumour that is kept alive in the abdomen of the mouse. As a result the mouse 
develops a painful ascites.
18. Beatrice Mintz is, however, more sceptical about his results (Mintz and Illmensee 1975).
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technique to culture ES cells from embryonic cells was of great importance 
to the later gene transfer technology. Evans and Kaufman initially named 
their cell line the EK cell line, an acronym of their own names. But Gail 
Martin, who conducted similar experiments a year later, introduced the 
term ‘Embryonic Stem cell’, ES cell, a term that is still in use. (Evans 2001). 
In 1984, Alan Bradley and his co-workers Evans, Roberston and Kaufman 
succeeded in the transmission of these ES cells into the germ line of chi-
meric mice (Bradley et al. 1984). ‘The appearance of a pup with dark eyes 
in a litter caused great excitement in the Evans’ laboratory. This pup was 
fathered by a male chimera generated from cultured embryonic stem (ES) 
cells. […] Unbeknownst to us at that time, this germ line transmission event 
signalled the emergence of a new age in mouse genetics’ (Bradley et al. 
1998: 943)19. The possibility to transmit ES cells to the germ line of mouse 
chimeras indicated that the technological pathway to create a transgenic 
mouse was available. If one were to use ES cells carrying foreign DNA 
and transmit them to the germ line, the offspring of the chimera would be 
transgenic.
1980-1981: the birth of the first transgenic mice
However, it was not via the ES cell-chimeric mice route that the first trans-
genic mice were created. The first transgenic mice were created in the 
early 1980s by the micro-injection of foreign DNA fragments into the pro-
nucleus of a fertilized mouse egg cell20. In the period between December 
1980 and November 1981, six groups reported independently about the 
birth of the transgenic mice (Constantini and Lacy 1981; Brinster et al. 
19. In response to this achievement Ralph Brinster sent a letter to Bradley with the simple message: 
‘Congratulations’. Bradley felt honoured that an individual of Brinster’s stature had taken the trouble 
to send a letter to a graduate student ‘Clearly Dr. Brinster recognized the breakthrough’ (Bradley et al. 
1998).
20. The ‘true’ birth date of the first transgenic mouse can be debated. Already in 1976, Rudolph 
Jaenisch at the Salk Iinstitute in San Diego, had injected pre-implantation embryos with the M-MulV 
virus. He observed that viral DNA could also be transmitted to the germ line of the mouse (Jaenisch 
1976). But Jaenisch was at that time not thinking about the creation of transgenic mice by means of 
viral transfection. He was interested in the infection of mammalian cells by DNA tumour viruses such 
as the M-MulV virus. He studied the activity and integration site of the virus in the different organs 
and the Mendelian inheritance of the viral DNA by the offspring of infected individuals. Whether he 
– unintentionally – created the first transgenic mice in 1976 is a matter of dispute. It was the first time 
a researcher had introduced exogenous DNA into a mouse embryo and observed the integration of 
foreign (viral) DNA. But the virus was not used intentionally as a vector to integrate a specific DNA 
fragment into the mouse genome.
1981; Wagner (E.F.) 1981; Wagner (T.E.) 1981; Harbers 1981; Gordon et 
al. 1980). The first group that was successful in the creation of transgenic 
mice was Frank Ruddle’s team from Yale University (Gordon et al. 1980). 
They injected a recombinant bacterial plasmid into the pro-nucleus of a 
fertilized egg cell of a mouse. The plasmid they used contained DNA seg-
ments (thymide kinase) of the human herpes simplex virus (HSVtk) and 
the monkey SV40 virus. The foreign DNA fragment they injected seemed 
to have integrated in the genome of their mice, but since the plasmid only 
contained a cDNA, the DNA fragment could not be expressed (Palmiter 
1998). The news was covered by two New York Times reporters who en-
visioned the ‘creation of animals with new traits and, ultimately, of cures 
for hereditary diseases amongst humans’ (Ferrel and Slade 1980: 7). Six 
months later, Mintz’s group reported the successful introduction of the 
human Beta-globulin and the HSVtk gene into the genome of mice foe-
tuses (Wagner (EF) et al. 1981). They also use a plasmid as vector. Unlike 
Ruddle, they did observe the expression of the HSVtk gene in one of their 
(late foetal) animals, although it was barely detectable. The researchers 
were clear about the implications of these results for medical research: 
‘These experiments provide a practical basis for novel investigations of the 
developmental control of normal gene expression in vivo of the cause and 
possible cures of genetic diseases’ they wrote in their article (Wagner (EF) 
et al. 1981: 5016). Jaenisch (at that time located in Hamburg) also success-
fully created transgenic mice (Harbers et al. 1981). The cloned viral DNA 
(M-MulV) that he injected was integrated and expressed at different levels 
in different mouse tissues. To Jaenisch and colleagues it was the greatest 
challenge to predict the expression of genes in different tissues (Harbers 
et al. 1981). Thomas Wagner (from Ohio) and co-workers (of the Jackson 
Laboratory) and (independently) Franklin Constantini and Elizabeth Lacy 
(working at Oxford) showed that the rabbit beta globulin gene could not 
only be expressed21 (at low levels) but also transmitted to the offspring 
(Wagner (TE) et al. 1981; Constantini and Lacy 1981).
Although these researchers were very successful in the integration of 
foreign DNA into the mouse genome, little or no gene expression was 
observed. (Palmiter 1998). The first experiment that delivered convinc-
ing evidence of gene expression was conducted by Richard Palmiter and 
21. It is interesting to note that, according to Palmiter, in both cases there was no expression of the 
B-globulin gene (Palmiter 1998).
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Ralph Brinster (Brinster et al. 1981). In the fall of 1979, Brinster, who 
was originally trained as a veterinarian, contacted geneticist Palmiter 
and asked him for chicken ovalbumin messenger RNA. Palmiter, in turn, 
supplied him (by mail) with the requested RNA constructs for Brinster’s 
micro-injection experiments22. After a series of experiments with ovalbu-
min mRNA, Palmiter decided to create a gene construct of the thymidine 
kinase TK gene and the metallothionine (MT) promoter. Because of the 
specific properties of the MT promoter, the expression of the MT-MK fu-
sion gene could be induced or increased by exposure to heavy metals. 
In the hope of potentially increasing the expression of the MT-TK gene, 
Brinster injected the mice with Cadmium (Arechaga 1998). This turned out 
to be a good set-up. Some of the mice thus born showed ‘phenomenally’ 
high thymidine kinase activity in the liver. In 1981, these mice appeared 
on the front page of the journal Cell (Brinster et al. 1981, Arechaga 1998). 
In their second publication on their genetically engineered mice, Palmiter 
and Brinster introduced the term ‘transgenic’ for mice that carried foreign 
DNA in their genome (Palmiter 1998)23.
Giant mice
In November 1981 Palmiter and Brinster heard about dwarf mice, mice 
with a genetical growth deficiency, also known as little. They decided to try 
to correct this growth defect by providing these mice with an exogenous 
growth hormone (GH) gene. Their plan was to create a fusion gene similar 
to the MT-TK gene construct used in their previous experiments. They 
would fuse the MT-promotor gene with the gene that codes for rat growth 
hormone. They contacted Ron Evans, who had just given a lecture on 
the cloning and characterisation of the rat growth hormone. Together 
with Evans, they designed a suitable gene construct for their transgenic 
experiments (Palmiter 1998). In 1982 the metalloine rat growth hormone 
(MT-rGH) fusion gene was ready for injection. The birth of giant mice in 
that same year meant a real breakthrough. In December 1982, the results 
22. These early experiments conducted by Brinster with Palmiter’s DNA constructs were the beginning 
of a very productive collaboration. The combination of genetics and embryology proved to be a fruitful 
one. Together they published over 120 articles in a 10-year period (Arechaga1998).
23. In the following, I will use both ‘transgenic’ and ‘genetically modified’ or ‘genetically engineered’ to 
refer to these mice, with a preference for the last. In the strict sense, ‘transgenic’ indicates the introduction 
of foreign genes to its genome. In this book I also discuss knock-out technology. Knock-out mice are not 
transgenic but are genetically engineered or modified.
were published in Nature (Palmiter et al. 1982). The dramatic image on 
the cover of Nature of a dwarf and a giant mouse (see Figure 1) received 
considerable attention both from the scientific community and the media. 
The news about the giant mice was widely covered. ‘When these experi-
ments were published, scientists, cartoonists, comedians and animal rights 
activists were aroused to the potential of transgenic technology. The ability 
to change the phenotype of the animal was so dramatic that everyone took 
notice, even though the experiments we published a year earlier clearly 
demonstrated the potential of the technique’, recalls Palmiter 16 years later 
(Arechaga 1998: 871). The image of the giant mouse soon took on a life of 
its own. The technology behind the size of the mice was not always well 
understood. In retrospect, Palmiter said he wished they ‘had used a GH 
from an animal smaller than the mouse, because many people mistakenly 
thought that the transgenic mice grew larger than normal because we 
used a GH gene from rat. Thus, some people missed the salient point that 
directing the expression of a gene to a more abundant cell type (such 
as hepatocyts) enhances the accumulation of protein in the blood and 
prevented normal feedback regulation’ (Palmiter 1998: 849).
The event was covered by Harold Schmeck from The New York Times, 
who wrote about ‘a new era in genetic engineering, from which important 
practical as well as scientific effects could be expected’ (Schmeck 1982: 1). 
Two and a half weeks after Harold Schmeck covered the scientific break-
through in The New York Times, an anonymous reporter published a much 
more critical piece on the giant mice in the same newspaper. This reporter 
was surprised that so little attention was paid to the ethical implications of 
this new technology (Anonymous 1982). ‘Though it is just a matter of time 
before such interventions become technically feasible in humans, the issue 
has received remarkably little public discussion from the biologists who 
are fast developing the tools for reshaping the handiwork of evolution 
… This asks for a critical review of the conclusions of the report of the 
President’s Bioethics Committee about the subject’, he wrote. ‘There are no 
ethical or religious reasons to stop the research […]. The only restriction 
the committee proposes is against human-animal hybrids.’ According to 
this New York Times reporter, these restrictions were ‘both too late and 
too soon’, too late because the first steps had already been taken with 
the introduction of the human insulin gene into bacteria, and too early 
because nobody thinks of creating mermaids or centaurs (Anonymous 
1982: 18). A year later, on the 18 November 1983, his words were already 
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outdated. That day, Palmiter and Brinster again reported about their giant 
mice (Palmiter et al. 1983). This time the giant mice carried the human 
growth factor. Some of them grew twice a large as their normal littermates. 
‘Scientists are setting out to grow breeds of giant mice that are genetically 
a little bit human’, wrote Harold Schmeck in a response to this news in The 
New York Times (Schmeck 1983: 1). The species barrier between mouse 
and man was crumbling.
Transgenic farm animals
In the early 1980s, the public and in particular scientists were impressed by 
the mouse experiments, but probably nobody would have guessed that 25 
years later the mouse would still be the leading character in the world of 
animal biotechnology. Palmiter and Brinster clearly saw a great future for 
this new technology, both medical and non-medical, but they had other, 
bigger, animals in mind. They talked about the ability to mimic or correct 
genetic disorders with this technology (Palmiter et al. 1982). They were 
very much interested in the processes of gene regulation. But, from their 
statements in their research papers and to the press, one can conclude that 
they were primarily interested in applying this technology to farm animals. 
‘Practically nobody’s interested in big mice, but there are obvious applica-
tions to agriculture’ Palmiter acknowledged to a reporter of United Press 
International (Khalsa 1983). They were particularly interested in the effect 
of increased growth hormone expression on animal size: ‘The implicit 
possibility is to use this technology to stimulate rapid growth of com-
mercially valuable animals’ (Palmiter et al. 1982: 614). Another interesting 
application of gene technology on farm animals that they mentioned was 
farming24. ‘The exceptionally high levels of GH found in the sera of some 
of these mice, raises the possibility of extending this technology to the 
production of other important polypeptides in farm animals’ (Palmiter et 
al. 1982: 614). But, before applying the technology to larger animals, the 
technique needed to be improved. This was at that time the biggest chal-
lenge. Optimising the conditions for integration and expression of foreign 
genes in mice should facilitate the eventual application of these techniques 
to other animals.
As a result of this future perspective, the transgenic experiments that 
followed often involved other animals than mice. In the early 1980s, 
24. Later, the term for this practice was changed into pharming.
Palimiter announced in several interviews that they would proceed with 
gene transfer experiments in sheep, rabbits and goats ‘to document the 
principle’ (Anonymous, 1983). In response to initial successes, Thomas 
Wagner from Ohio likewise changed the focus of his research to farm 
animals (Schmeck 1983). He announced that he had extended his research 
to sheep. He expected to create animals that would grow faster with the 
same amount of food, a commercially attractive efficient form of meat pro-
duction. He saw no ethical objections to this kind of research since ‘people 
have been manipulating the evolution of farm animals for thousands of 
years’ (Schmeck 1983: 1). A year later, he rejected ethical objections in a 
similar vein. He saw no threat from genetic manipulation of farm animals 
because ‘animals cannot infect the environment and they cannot escape 
from human control, in contrast to the image people have by watching 
horror movies’ (Anonymous 1984). In 1985, the birth of the first transgenic 
pigs and rabbits was reported by Palmiter and Brinster in Nature (Hammer 
et al. 1985). In spite of the optimistic tone of both Hammer’s article and 
the News and Views commentary, the results failed to be as impressive 
as the results achieved earlier in mice. The dramatic effect on growth in 
the mice could not be repeated in pigs and rabbits (Hammer et al. 1985; 
Lovell-Badge 1985).
In the years that followed, the experiments with farm animals continued 
to disappoint. The injection of human growth hormone into pigs had dis-
astrous effects. The Belstville pigs (named after the laboratory where the 
pigs were ‘created’) suffered from arthritis, impotence, and weak muscles. 
Sheep with added human growth hormone, that were bred in Australia, de-
veloped diabetes, abnormal kidneys, and malformed bones, and survived 
less than a year (Kohn 1994). Because of the technical difficulties and lack 
of public acceptance of transgenic meat, there was never a market for 
this form animal biotechnology. In 1993, the creation of transgenic farm 
animals for meat production was simply put off the agenda. ‘The sci-
ence wasn’t ready yet to make it economically feasible’, explained James 
Sherblum, President of a biotech company, to the reporter from The New 
York Times (Andrews 1993). But though the experiments with the farm 
animals were disappointing, those with the transgenic mouse continued 
to be successful.
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Gene targeting and controlled gene expression
The results of the early 1980s microinjection experiments were impressive, 
but the approach had some major disadvantages. If a DNA fragment was 
injected into the pro-nucleus of an implantation embryo, there was no 
control over the site where the foreign DNA has inserted. Furthermore 
there was no control over the activity of the DNA and the number of cop-
ies that could be integrated. These problems could be circumvented by the 
more complicated ES technology discussed earlier. The great advantage 
of the use of ES cells for the creation of transgenic mice was that a large 
number of techniques could be applied to manipulate the genome. For 
example, foreign DNA could be introduced in the ES cells by mutagenesis 
or with the aid of retroviral vectors. But, even more important, was that it 
gave the researchers the opportunity to select or screen for a clone with 
a rare genetic change from millions of cells in culture before constructing 
a mouse chimera (Robertson et al. 1986; Gossler et al. 1986; Bradley et al. 
1998). In 1987, the first successes were reported of experiments in which 
ES cells that were manipulated in vitro were transmitted in the germ line 
of chimera. The offspring of these chimeras were the first mice with a 
modification of a specific endogenous gene through the modification of 
a cell line in vitro (Hooper et al. 1987; and see also Kuehn et al. 1987 in 
the same edition of Nature). Both the group from Cambridge UK (Evans, 
Bradley, Robertson and Kuehn) and the group led by Hooper made an 
animal model for the Lesch-Nyhan syndrome with this technology. This 
rare disease, that only affects male individuals, is the result of heritable 
genetic mutation in the HPRT gene. The male mutant mice made by the 
researchers of this strain had similar biochemical defects as Lesch-Nyhan 
patients (Hooper et al. 1987; Kuehn et al. 1987).
‘They are knock-outs’
Halfway through the 1980s, a number of important discoveries and in-
ventions were made that would be of major importance for the further 
development of transgenic technology. In 1983, Kary Mullis invented the 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR), for which he received the Nobel Prize in 
1993. The PCR technique made it possible to make several copies of DNA 
sequences in a short time. A second development that was of great impor-
tance to mouse gene technology was the discovery by Oliver Smithies and 
Mario Capecchi (who worked independently of each other) of homological 
recombination technology. Homological recombination made it possible 
to turn specific genes off in a directed way (Smithies et al. 1985, 2001; 
Capecchi 1989, 2001). In 1985, Smithies and his team published an article 
in which they discussed how they could modify a specific human gene 
(in bone marrow cells) by means of homological recombination (Smithies 
et al. 1985), a breakthrough because at that time the prevailing view was 
that the mammalian genome was much too complex for incoming vector 
DNA to search, find, and recombine with a homologous target before the 
efficient non-homologous recombination pathway effectively inserted the 
vector into a random location in the genome. ‘How wrong this view was!’, 
remarks Bradley 13 years later (Bradley et al. 1998: 946). In 1987, both 
Capecchi’s group and Smithies’s group applied this technology (also called 
gene targeting) successfully to embryonic stem cells (Thomas and Capec-
chi 1987; Doetschman et al. 1987). Like Evans and Hooper, Capecchi and 
Smithies chose the HPRT gene for their gene targeting experiments. With 
these ES experiments, they laid the foundation for the possibility to correct 
gene defects or to eliminate, or to ‘knock out’, genes in mice (Koller et al. 
1989; Thompson et al. 1989). In 1989, Capecchi wrote a review about the 
‘new mouse genetics’, in which he claimed that through gene targeting, 
the potential existed to generate mice of any desired genotype (Capecchi 
1989). Soon afterwards, the first knock-out mice, mice whose β2-m gene 
was disrupted by targeted mutation, were born in Jaenisch’s lab at MIT 
(Zijlstra et al. 1990).
The new technologies used by these pioneers in mouse genetics did 
not only receive attention from the media. They also attracted researchers 
from other laboratories. ‘Now that scientists can create desired mutations 
in mouse genes almost at will, instead of working with mice that turn 
up occasionally with accidental mutations, they are excitedly planning 
systematic experiments to resolve longstanding questions in biology’, 
wrote Richard Saltus in 1990 in The Boston Globe (Saltus 1990: 29). But the 
method was at that time extremely complicated. In 1990 there were only 
a few laboratories that had mastered the techniques for making knock-out 
mice. These laboratories received a considerable number of requests from 
scientists who wanted to come and visit for week and learn the technique 
(Saltus 1990). Within a few years the ‘knock-out mouse’ became a familiar 
phenomenon, both within the scientific community and the public.
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Gene Control Switches
With the introduction of knock-out technology, the foundation was laid for 
an explosive increase of transgenic mouse models. In November 1992 The 
Washington Post communicated that researchers estimated the number of 
genes that had been examined with the knock-out mice to be 100 (Rens-
berger 1992b). In that same article, Capecchi explained to Rensberger that 
‘the he next challenge was likely to be in making mice whose genes are 
not knocked out from the start but with engineered “switches” – regula-
tory sequences spliced onto the end of a replacement gene – that can be 
thrown to knock them out at later stages of life, or even toggle them on 
and off’ (Rensberger 1992b: A3). The most important technological break-
throughs that followed were indeed refinements of this type of the existing 
method. In 1992, two groups published on the application of the Cre-Lox 
system in transgenic mice (Lakso et al. 1992; Orban et al. 1992). Using 
the Cre-Lox system, which originally stems from bacteria, it is possible to 
modulate genes in vivo in a controlled and site-directed approach. With 
the Cre-Lox system, genes can be knocked out in a specific cell type. The 
Cre-Lox system was already known, but only received particular attention 
when it was patented by DuPont in 1992.25 When in 1995, Rajewski’s team 
placed an interferon dependent promoter in front of the Cre-recombinase 
gene, the ‘genetic on and off switch’ was literally ‘found’ (Kuhn et al. 
1995). By using this promoter, the activity of a specific gene could be 
induced by administering interferon26. ‘This is real genetic engineering,’ 
said Ronald Evans from the Salk Institute when talking to a reporter from 
Science about these kinds of knock-out technologies. ‘As soon as you get 
to a certain state of technology, you can think of nice tricks and questions 
you wouldn’t normally think about, and that is fun’ (Barinaga 1994: 28).
‘They glow in the dark’
Another important breakthrough in mouse gene technology has been the 
development of bioluminescent and fluorescent genetic markers such as 
the green fluorescent protein (GFP) and luciferase. GFP, originally found 
25. This patent was the beginning of a fight that lasted for many years between researchers under the 
guidance of Harold Varmus, Director of the NIH, and DuPont concerning the right to use the Cre-Lox 
system for research in non-profit institutions (Marshall 1998).
26. For a more extensive review on the conditional control of gene expression in the mouse, see 
Lewandoski (2001).
in jelly fish, was discovered in 1962 by Osamu Shimomura and rediscov-
ered in the 1990s when scientists decided to use it as a marker for gene 
expression. In 1997, a Japanese research team led by Masaru Okabe used 
an enhanced version of this bioluminescent protein to produce transgenic 
mouse lines (Okabe et al. 1997). The spectacular photographs made by 
Okabe and his team showed green fluorescent mice. These mice produced 
by Okabe were used as a source of green cells in the context of cell trans-
plantation experiments. These and other experiments indicated that GFP 
could be a powerful in vivo tool for non-invasive real-time visualisation 
of gene expression in living animals (Yang et al. 2000, 2004, see Figure 
2). Another bioluminescent marker is luciferase, the protein responsible 
for bioluminescence in the firefly. The gene coding for this protein was 
also first transferred into mice in the late 1990s (Contag et al. 1998). The 
difference between luciferase and GFP is basically the type of emission 
(light versus fluorescent) and the need for a substrate. Only in the case 
of luciferase is a substrate needed. Before GFP and other bioluminescent 
markers became available, the measurement of gene expression in re-
sponse to physiological signals was extremely difficult. Every data point 
required killing and dissecting experimental animals and measuring the 
distribution of a reporter gene (Yang et al. 2000). The different types of vis-
ible light imaging are developed, patented and marketed by biotech com-
panies. For example, Xenogen, one of the industry leaders in the usage of 
bioluminescent markers, develops light-producing animal models. These 
LPTA® animal models are transgenic mice with a luciferase reporter driven 
by a specific promoter27. AntiCancer incorporated, based in San Diego, 
has pioneered the use of fluorescent markers such as green fluorescence 
protein. AntiCancer offers products such as oncobrite® and genebrite®, 
gene constructs that can produce fluorescent tumour cell lines28. Using 
imaging systems like these, researchers can observe tumour cells emitting 
light, they can keep track of their growth and calculate their growth rate. 
Subsequently, they can administer drugs and determine whether the light 
goes away. Since it is non-destructive, you can use the animal for an 
extended period of time. If the tumour cells develop resistance to the 
drug, this is indicated by the light coming back. The technique essentially 
records a glow from the inside of the animal (Stokstad 1999). The next 
27. <http://www.xenogen.com/wt/page/pdf_library#light_animals>.
28. <http://www.metamouse.com/oncobrite.html>.
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step is to use different markers with different colours at the same time so 
gene interaction or even protein-protein interactions or nerve cell activity 
can be observed in vivo (Ray et al. 2002). A spectacular example of this 
is ‘Brainbow mouse’ developed and patented by Jeff W. Lichtman, Jean 
Livet and Joshua Sanes working at Harvard University. In the brain of this 
mouse each nerve cell glows with a different colour. Brainbow mouse is 
genetically engineered so its neurons produce fluorescent proteins in a 
random combination of colours. As a result, the colours mix and give each 
cell a different colour (Cook 2006).
The year of the mouse
If 2000 was the year of the human genome, 2002 was the year of the mouse. 
In August 2002, a physical map of the mouse genome was published, fol-
lowed four months later by the initial sequence and comparative analysis 
of the mouse genome, both in Nature (Gregory et al. 2002; Waterston et al. 
2002). Using the C57BL inbred mouse strain, an international consortium of 
researchers had deciphered nearly the entire DNA sequence of the mouse 
(Travis 2003). According to 86 authors who did the job: ‘The sequence 
of the mouse genome is a key informational tool for understanding the 
contents of the human genome and a key experimental tool for biomedical 
research’ (Waterston et al. 2002: 520). It is clear that this breakthrough has 
to be valued in relation to the sequencing of the human genome two years 
before, as a prelude to studying the genomics of human disease. Nicholas 
Wade from The New York Times has an interesting perspective on the 
relatedness of man and mouse: ‘Now that the mouse’s genome has been 
decoded, revealing just as many genes as its host, the 25 million mice that 
work in the laboratories throughout the world may be demanding a lot 
more respect. It is the close cousinship that makes this vast labour force of 
furry little human surrogates so useful for exploring the human genome’ 
[italics mine]. The mouse genome-sequencing consortium wrote in similar 
vein: ‘The sequence of the mouse genome will have a huge impact on 
biological research and human health. It will provide critical information 
and reagents for use in mouse experimental models. It will become pos-
sible to unravel the mechanisms of complex mammalian biological proc-
esses and human disease’ (Gregory et al. 2002: 743). The mouse genome 
offers additional information and tools when compared with the human 
genome. The most important difference between the humane genome and 
the mouse genome is that ‘the mouse genome encodes an experimentally 
tractable organism’ (Bradley 2002: 512). By this, Bradley means to say that 
because the mouse, unlike man, is a laboratory animal, it is now ‘truly 
possible to determine the function of each and every component gene 
by experimental manipulation and evaluation, in the context of a whole 
organism’ (Bradley 2002: 512). The mouse has become the Rosetta stone 
for understanding human biology (Travis, 2003). One of the outcomes of 
a comparative genomic analysis was the enumeration of the total number 
of genes shared by man and mouse. The consortium estimated that the 
mouse has 27,000-30,000 protein-coding genes of which 99 percent 
have a sequence match in the human genome (Boguski 2002). It is this 
‘conservation of synteny’29 between mouse and man that constitutes the 
value of the mouse. It is also the source of imaginings of the future. Mark 
Boguski predicts that ‘the comprehensiveness and precision afforded by 
the genome sequences will allow effective cross-reference of locations of 
any genetically mapped traits in the mouse with genes in the orthologous 
regions of the human genome (and vice versa). This will greatly accelerate 
the isolation of disease genes. It will also be important for precise deletion 
(knock-out) of mouse genes to study their functions and for targeting hu-
man sequences to their syntenic locations in the mouse genome, allowing 
the mice to be ‘humanized’ for various traits’ (Boguski 2002: 515).
‘A fuzzy furry test tube’
During the transgenic revolution the traditional research methods in the 
study of genetics changed radically. The traditional approach, where the 
study of genes was based on whole organisms, implying the crossing of 
endless numbers of animals and mathematical calculation, was replaced 
by a molecular approach. Researchers were no longer limited to studies in 
patterns of inheritance based on phenotypes. The molecular technology 
allowed detailed studies of gene regulation in both in vitro and in vivo 
models. A specific change in the genotype made in vitro could now be 
observed in vivo. The gaze on the mouse turned from the outside of the 
mouse to the inside of mouse, and even entered the nucleus of its cells, in 
search of the animal’s genetic core, the heart of the matter. Researchers no 
29. In comparative genomics, synteny (a neologism meaning ‘on the same ribbon’; Greek: σύν, syn = 
along with + ταινία, tainiā = band) describes the preserved order of genes between related species. 
During evolution, chromosomal rearrangement occurs and hence even closely-related species have 
different patterns of synteny (Wikipedia).
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longer had to look ‘look through’ the animal towards its invisible genes: 
now, they could ‘really’ gaze at its genes resulting in a true molecular gaze 
on the mice.
At the beginning of the previous century, the mouse transformed from a 
research object into a tool. During the transgenic revolution, the mouse 
further developed into a high-bio-tech tool, a sophisticated or fuzzy test 
tube, a living laboratory. The animal as a furry envelope of genes be-
came a litmus-paper that allows us to see whether genes are successfully 
expressed. They became tailor-made animals; canvases upon which re-
searchers do genetic transplantations. Or, as one reporter put it, ‘molecular 
biologists now struggle to genetically manipulate their mammals into 
research masterpieces’ (Schrage, 1993). But, as the control over its genes 
increased, the ‘animal’ behind the genes gradually disappeared.
As the disappointing experiments with farm animals have shown, from 
a biotechnological perspective the mouse is a very special animal. No 
other mammal can be genetically manipulated so easily as the mouse. In 
the 25 years since its genome has been altered for scientific purposes, the 
mouse thus proved to be the perfect candidate for the development of 
animal biotechnology. One of the reasons why this is the case has to do 
with the inbreeding of mice. The inbreeding resulted in a unique popula-
tion of animals with unique genetic and embryonic characteristics, some 
of them highly convenient for animal biotechnologists (Beck et al. 2000). 
Earlier, the unique characteristics of the 129/Ev strain were discussed. 
Even today, the ES cells of these inbred mice are used for the production 
of transgenic mice. But also, the B6 and the FVB deserve particular atten-
tion. The FVB is well known for its large embryos. The large pronuclei 
of these embryos makes them very suitable for micro-injection. The B6 
has the unique property that its blastocysts are very easy to manipulate. 
These mice are therefore very important for the production of transgenic 
mice with the ES cell-mouse chimera route. The blastocysts of most of 
the other mice do not develop into healthy mice if cells of other mice are 
placed in them. Moreover, the female B6 mice have proved to be very 
good foster mothers. As Rader remarks: ‘The suitability of these animals 
for research was not determined, but engineered. These rodents’ physi-
cal bodies, as well as their representations, were not static. They were 
adapted and constructed for a scientific culture that valued genetically 
controlled answers to biological and medical questions’ (Rader 2001). 
Selection of the fittest in the lab means selection of those mice best 
adapted to living in a lab and most suitable for transgenic technology. It 
means selecting the most bizarre, easiest to manipulate, most extraordi-
nary mice. In retrospect, it is probably legitimate to say that the mouse 
could never have been that successful in transgenic technology had it not 
been for the extended process of inbreeding it had already undergone 
over the years.
Part Three: Transgenic mouse models
Animal models and human diseases
In the history of medicine, animals have always played an important 
role, but animals suffering from genetic diseases that paralleled human 
conditions have been of special value. Some well-known examples of 
animal models are: dogs with haemophilia caused by a defect in factor IX; 
hypercholesterolemia that is found in rabbits as a consequence of a defect 
in the low-density lipoprotein receptor; and pigs with arteriosclerosis as a 
result of genetic variations in apolipoproteins (Smithies 1993). A number 
of inbred mice strains are also well known as animal models for human 
diseases: for example the oncomice of the CH3 strain described earlier. But 
other mice that have emerged in the hundred years that they have been at 
home in the laboratory have also played important roles in the develop-
ment of medicine. For example, the obese mice that were discovered in 
1962, have been used in the study of the role of lipoproteins in obesity. 
The naked mouse and the SCID mouse have been of great value to both 
cancer research and the studies in immunology. The naked mouse has 
no thymus and cannot develop T cells for this reason. The SCID mouse 
does not have T and B cells. Because the naked mouse and the SCID 
mouse do not develop an adequate immune response to human cells, 
these mice can well be used for studying human tumours in vivo. This 
explains their unique value to research. However, useful animal models do 
not occur spontaneously that often. And, if it happens, their specific gene 
defects may be as difficult to identify and to characterise as their human 
counterparts. Another problem that arises with naturally-occurring animal 
models is that the affected animals often differ from unaffected control 
animals in other genetic factors besides the gene in question. These prob-
lems do not arise in the highly controlled transgenic mouse models. In 
42
Biotech Pioneers
43
The birth of the transgenic laboratory mouse
addition, mice are easier and less expensive to raise than many other 
species (Smithies 1993).
The promise of transgenic mouse models
Soon after the birth of the first knock-out mice, the value of the transgenic 
mice became clear, both within and outside the scientific community. 
With the transgenic knock-out technology, a technique became available 
that made it possible to selectively eliminate genes in order to mimic 
human diseases. From that moment onwards, the career of the transgenic 
mice was predominantly determined by the demand for reliable mouse 
models for human diseases. The knock-out technology spread rapidly 
through laboratories all over the world. In 1993, the Chicago Sun-Times 
was already talking about a routine: ‘Scientists now almost routinely 
knock-out animal genes in an embryo and plunk in human ones, includ-
ing mutations that mimic human traits or maladies. In effect, the scientists 
are creating miniature patients to examine some or the world’s deadliest 
and most baffling diseases. The creatures provide living laboratories in 
which scientists can study diseases that ethically cannot be inflicted on 
human subject’ [italics mine] (Cone 1993: 28). There has certainly been 
an explosion in transgenic mouse models for disease, as remarked in 
1993 by Caltech’s Daniel Kevles, co-author of the book The Code of 
Codes (Schrage 1993). It is clear that in the early 1990s the great potential 
of the mouse as a model was recognised. The expectations were high. 
‘From the California Institute of Technology to the Pasteur Institute of 
Health, these four-legged “biomedia” will ultimately determine which 
human diseases get cured and when. The better engineered the mammal, 
the better – and possibly, more cost effective – the medical options for 
humans’, wrote Michael Schrage in The Washington Post, after talking to 
researchers from GenPharm and Caltech (Schrage 1993: F3). To Kenneth 
Paigen, at that time the Director of the Jackson Lab, it meant a scientific 
revolution: ‘We suddenly have the ability to create tailor-made mam-
malian models of human disease which offers the opportunity to study 
complex physiological phenomena, such as the nervous system, cancer 
and aids, as never before’ (Connor 1993: 4) 30.
One of the first mouse models that was created was the mouse model 
for sickle cell disease. Sickle cell anaemia was one of the first diseases 
30. Conner is quoting Kenneth Paigen from Nature.
demonstrated to be a molecular disease (Bedell et al. 1997). The cause of 
the disease was found to be an alteration of the B-globuline gene. Since 
the gene was already known, sickle cell anaemia was an obvious candi-
date for a mouse model. In 1990, two groups reported about the sickle cell 
mouse model, one in Science the other in Nature. However these animals 
mimicked the sickle trait rather than the sickle cell disease31 (Ryan et al. 
1997). Subsequently, several other groups worked on the sickle cell mouse 
model. Several times it was claimed that the model was created, but none 
of these models modelled the severe haemolytic anaemia observed in hu-
man sickle cell disease. It was only in 1997 that, for the first time, a mouse 
was created that developed a severe haemolytic anaemia and extensive 
organ pathology similar to that observed in human patients (Ryan et al. 
1997). Nevertheless, in spite of the mouse model, to this day no cure for 
sickle cell disease has been found.
Another high-potential mouse model was the mouse model for cystic 
fibrosis. Cystic fibrosis is the most common lethal disorder of Caucasian 
populations. It is a recessive disease that is carried by 1 out of 22 individu-
als of European descent. One out of 3,600 (Dutch population) newborn 
babies is affected with the disease. It is caused by defective chlorine 
transport and excess mucus production by epithelial cells. In animals the 
disease does not occur, and therefore a naturally-occurring animal model 
is not available. In 1989, the gene coding for the protein responsible for 
this disorder (cystic fibrosis transmembrane conductance regulator – Cftr) 
was isolated. Since that time, several mouse models for CF have been 
constructed through gene targeting in ES cells (Bedell et al. 1997). The 
first mouse models were created within three years after the discovery of 
the CFTR gene. In August 1992, the group of Oliver Smithies and Beverly 
Koller was the first to report about the animal model for cystic fibrosis. In 
the scientific journal Science they described how they had created Cftr-/- 
mice with gene targeting. The animals displayed many features common 
to young human cystic fibrosis patients, but they usually died before 40 
days of life as a result of severe intestinal obstruction (Snouwaert et al. 
1992). Because of the early death of the animals, the mouse model was 
not very useful for studying the disease. A month later a Scottish group led 
by David Porteus reported about their animal model in Nature (Dorin at 
31. Although expressing the sickle cell mutant β-globulin, they did not become ill because of the 
interference of endogenous mouse major β-polypeptides (Bedell et al. 1997).
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al. 1992). They used an alternative splicing allowing a low level of residual 
Cftr expression. As a result, their mice suffered from a less severe form of 
cystic fibrosis and mimicked the pulmonary disease found in CF patients 
more closely (Bedell et al. 1997). In the years that followed, several ap-
proaches were used to successfully correct the intestinal and pulmonary 
defects in mice carrying the severe and leaky Cftr mutations described 
above. However, the majority of CF patients carry much more subtle Ctfr 
mutations, and strategies that interfere with such mutant proteins may have 
to be different from those required to correct defects resulting from the ab-
sence of normal protein (Bedell 1997). The search for a reliable CF mouse 
continued. As a result, a number of different mouse models of CF exist 
today. In 2001, researchers Davidson and Dorin wrote about 12 mouse 
models in their extensive review of CF. In their conclusion, they stated that: 
‘Despite some tantalizing similarities between CF lung disease in humans 
and mouse models of CF, under the experimental conditions described, 
the suitability of these models remains controversial and significant dif-
ferences are evident’ ((Davidson and Dorin 2001:15). This did not imply 
that the mouse models were worthless. As Davidson and Dorin wrote: ‘By 
recognizing the key similarities and differences, mouse models of CF might 
provide useful in vivo systems for the analysis of specific aspects of CF 
lung disease and for testing the validity of specific hypotheses’ (Davidson 
and Dorin 2001: 15-16). Studies with the different Cftr knock-outs have 
shown that the disease results from a failure to clear certain bacteria from 
the lungs, which leads to mucus retention and subsequent lung disease. 
But, so far, the mouse models have not yet led to a breakthrough in the 
treatment of cystic fibrosis in human patients.
That the creation of a reliable mouse model is not as easy as was initially 
expected was also illustrated by the Alzheimer mouse model. The first ani-
mal model for Alzheimer’s disease (AD) was presented in 1991, but later it 
turned out that this mouse did not develop Alzheimer’s at all (Cone 1993). 
And the mouse model presented in1993 also did not develop AD. Since 
then it seems as if every year the new model for AD is being presented. In 
2001, researchers concluded that because of phylogenetic differences, as 
well as fundamental differences in behavioural ecology, exact replication 
of AD in mice may not be attainable (Janus and Westaway 2001). But 
‘rigorous comparative analysis of cognitive behavior observed in various 
mouse models of AD should provide a framework for better understanding 
of molecular mechanisms underlying cognitive impairment observed in AD 
patients’ (Janus and Westaway 2001: 882). Today the number of transgenic 
research models for AD at JAX is 4132. A cure for AD has not yet been 
found.
What the stories of the sickle cell mouse model, the cystic fibrosis mouse 
model, and the Alzheimer’s mouse model demonstrate is that it is not that 
easy to make a reliable mouse model, as was initially expected. In spite of 
the high expectations, scientists already had to admit in 1993 that the use of 
transgenic animals had not led to substantial medical breakthroughs (Cone 
1993). ‘In an embarrassing public failure, scientists who initially reported 
that they had created mice with Alzheimer’s disease had to retract their 
findings, and other researchers remain slightly off the mark in mimicking 
various diseases’, wrote Marla Cone in a critical article in the Chigaco 
Sun-Times (Cone 1993: 28). The first scientific review article about animal 
models by Oliver Smithies that appeared in 1993 in Recent Developments 
in Genetics was also very modest about the scientific achievements so 
far. As Smithies wrote: ‘One of the biggest uncertainties when modelling 
human genetic diseases in mice is whether the resulting phenotype will be 
equivalent to that observed in humans’ (Smithies 1993: 113). Mice are not 
humans. Still, scientists maintain that these gene-altered rodents are the 
best hope they have (Cone, 1993). On the basis of that hope, the number 
of mouse models has increased exponentially.
The Knock-Out Mouse Project
A project that will most likely boost the growth in the number of mouse 
models is the Knock-Out Mouse Project (KOMP) (Austin et al. 2004; 
Collins et al. 2007). After the sequencing of the human and the mouse 
genome, the focus of attention of the genetics research community turned 
to elucidating gene function and identifying gene products that might have 
therapeutic value. An effective approach to study gene function in vivo 
is through knock-out technology. But, despite public and private sector 
initiatives to produce mouse mutants on a large scale, the total number 
of knock-out mice described in the literature in 2004 is still modest, cor-
responding only to about 10% of the about 25,000 mouse genes (Austin et 
al. 2004). In October 2003, a large gathering of members of the genomic 
community met at the Banbury Conference Centre to discuss the advis-
ability and feasibility of a ‘dedicated project to knock out alleles for all 
32. http://jaxmice.jax.org/list/ra1593.html
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mouse genes and place them into the public domain’ (Austin et al. 2004: 
921). Ambitious targets were set at that meeting by the mouse geneticists 
– 500 new mouse lines per year – in order to create a publicly available 
resource of knock-out mice and phenotypic data ‘that will knock down 
barriers for biologists to use mouse genetics in their research’ (Austin et al 
2004). Recently, Francis Collins reported that the first steps had been taken 
(Collins et al. 2007). The first step was the acquisition of 251 knock-out 
strains (mutant mice and frozen embryos) from two private collections 
of knock-out mice created and ‘owned’ by Deltagen Incorporated and 
Lexicon Genetics Incorporated. The second step was the supporting of 
Mutant Mouse Regional Resource Centres to repatriate and archive their 
320 mouse strains for broad distribution. The centrepiece of the KOMP ef-
fort, however, consists of two programmes that aim to create 8500 targeted 
mutations in ES cells in genes that have not yet been knocked out. To 
achieve this goal, two groups have developed high-throughput pipelines 
to target genes in mouse ES cell lines (Collins et al. 2007).
From model mouse to mouse model
If one listens carefully to researchers talking about their mice, one easily 
gets the impression that the mouse has really become the equivalent to the 
disease or gene defect it stands for. The mouse is always a mouse model, 
so it seems. In the early 1980s, the mouse was a model animal, an animal 
to practice on, in order to try out new techniques or ideas; an animal that 
could be replaced in principle by other species. Today the mouse is no 
longer an animal model; it has become more or less the disease itself. 
As a mouse model, the mouse serves two distinctive goals in biomedical 
research. First of all, it serves as a stand-in for us humans in clinical tests. 
For example, new therapies to treat human cancer can be tested in mice 
especially designed to develop spontaneous human tumours. Moreover, 
the mouse models are also used to study the development of genetic 
diseases. In mouse models, researchers seek to understand the complex 
mechanisms that, for example, lead to cystic fibrosis or Alzheimer’s. The 
first type of mouse models have proven to be very useful. Many anti-
cancer drugs are tested in such mouse models before going into the clinic. 
The value of the second type of mouse models is more difficult to asses. 
So far, these mouse models have not led to a cure for Alzheimer’s disease, 
sickle cell anaemia or cystic fibrosis. There is considerable uncertainty in 
predicting the phenotypes that will be displayed by the mutant mice. As 
Bradley wrote in 2002: ‘A knock-out mouse phenotype often shamelessly 
displays our collective ignorance about gene function’ (Bradley, 2002: 
514). However, the transgenic mouse models are presented by researchers 
as the promise to finding the cure for life-threatening diseases. In their 
battle against genetic human diseases, the genetically altered mouse is the 
best hope they have.
Although its gene pool has been enriched with (defective) human genes, 
the mouse itself remained a mouse. The disadvantage of the mouse model 
is that the human genes have to interact with mouse genes in the complex 
in vivo system the mouse is. In the mouse model, human genes will never 
behave exactly as similar genes would do in a human. No matter how 
many human genes are added to the mouse, the mouse is still a mouse 
and not a human. In fact, scientists who use mouse models do not study 
human diseases, they study the behaviour of (defective) human genes in 
transgenic mouse models. A mouse model can never be the biological 
equivalent of a human being. The question is whether problems related 
to the mousehood of the mouse models can be overcome by making the 
mouse more human. How many human genes do we have to add to the 
mouse genome in order to make it anthropomorphic enough?
Apparently this is a serious question for researchers. As an eye-catcher 
for job advertisement of the Amsterdam Medical Centre (AMC) in the NRC 
handelsblad of 18 November 2006, a photograph was presented of a young 
negro boy playing with an albino mouse (see Figure 3). The accompany-
ing text boldly stated: ‘If we have to change a mouse into a human in order 
to cure AIDS we will do so’. The story behind this advertisement was a 
donation of 900,000 dollars from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to 
a research group at the AMC. The mission of the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation Global Health Program is to encourage the development of 
life-saving medical advances and to help ensure they reach the people 
who are disproportionately affected. Funding research devoted to find a 
cure for AIDS is in line with this mission. For several biological reasons, the 
animal models now available are not suitable for HIV research. Although 
the available mice have a transplanted human immune system, part of 
their own immune system is still intact. The money donated by the Bill 
and Melinda Gates foundation will be used to develop a transgenic mouse 
model that will be more suitable for HIV research.
I find the advertisement highly provocative for several reasons, but 
what strikes me most is this: apparently, the advertisement suggests that 
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scientists in Amsterdam are claiming that they can change the mouse into 
a human being. This advertisement does not only illustrate the need for 
more humanlike mouse models, it also illustrates the strong motivation 
of researchers to continue on the path of changing the mouse into a 
human.
New frontiers: ES cells and human-mouse hybrids
The history of the laboratory mouse is far from completed. For the pioneer 
species in the new era of biotechnology now entering the 21st century, 
the story has only just begun. After the knock-out mouse project, the next 
technological frontier is already awaiting us: the growing possibilities of ES 
cells. Scientists are rapidly discovering the potential of ES cells. Pioneers 
in embryonic stem cell research Andras Nagy and Janet Rossant reported 
in 1993 about the production of completely ES cell-derived mice (Nagy et 
al. 1993). In 1999, Science reporter Gretchen Vogel discussed the results 
of experiments performed in Hawaii by reproductive biologist Teruhiko 
Wakayama, who cloned mice out of ES cell lines that had gone through 
more that 30 cell divisions (Vogel 1999). What will be the next step in 
ES cell technology? In his book Challenging Nature, Lee Silver discusses 
experiments with ES cells that can grow into egg and sperm cells. ‘The 
implication of such experiments is in theory that (human) ES cells could 
almost certainly engage in sexual reproduction with others (in a petri dish) 
to produce (human) embryos with unique genomes. A child born from 
the development of such an embryo would not have parents who had 
ever been born themselves (Silver 2006a: 143)! Another thought provoking 
possibility of ES cell technology is the creation of human-mouse chimeras. 
Mice are not only used as models to study the expression of human genes, 
but also the behaviour of whole human cells are studied within the mouse. 
The genealogy of the laboratory mouse started with the transplantation 
of human tumour cells into mice. I want to complete this retrospective 
with another form of human-mouse hybrids, the fusion of our brains and 
reproductive systems. The whole idea of making human-mouse hybrids 
stems from the recent interest in stem cell therapy. Stem cells, ‘a kind of 
universal clay’, have high promise as an all-purpose material for repairing 
many degenerative diseases of ‘old age’, such as Parkinson’s, cancer, and 
heart disease (Wade 2002a). Stem cells, like other biomedical materials, 
have to be studied in laboratory animals before they can be applied to 
human patients in the context of therapy.
The potential for good of ES cells seems unlimited, but when brain or 
reproductive cells are used to create human-mouse hybrids one might 
feel less optimistic. What if a human being is born from an ES cell that 
originates from a mouse, or what if a man-mouse hybrid with human brain 
cells starts thinking? These questions are not ‘far out’ questions based on 
science fantasies. They are legitimate questions in response to scientific 
experiments. In 2002, researchers transplanted neural stem cells derived 
from human foetal brains into neonatal NOD-SCID mice, in order to see 
whether human nerve cells could develop into functional cells in a ‘mouse 
transplantation model’ (Tamaki et al. 2002). The resulting animals had 
man-mouse hybrid brains. The human neural cells were distributed and 
showed neural differentiation in NOD-SCID neonatal recipients. This result 
supports the potential usability of neural ES cells in human brain trans-
plantation therapy. A therapy that, of course, needs to be tested in other 
man-mouse hybrids before being applied to humans. Will these mice de-
velop something similar to human cognitive functions? In December 2006, 
Fred Gage from the Salk Institute injected human embryonic cells into the 
brains of developing mouse foetuses still inside their mother’s uterus. The 
human cells became active human neurons that successfully integrated 
into the mouse forebrain, the place where higher brain function is local-
ised (Silver 2006b). Another useful application of human-mouse hybrid is a 
mouse that can produce human oocytes (unfertilised eggs). Tissues made 
from ES cells are likely to be rejected by the patient’s immune system. One 
way to avoid this problem is to create ES cells from a patient’s own tissue, 
by transferring the nucleus from the patient’s skin cell into a human oocyte 
whose own nucleus has been removed. However, these nuclear transfers 
are highly inefficient and require some 200 oocytes for each successful 
cloning (Wade 2005). Where do we get so many human oocytes from? 
Chimeric mice that make human ooccytes could be the answer (Wade 
2005). Imagine a mouse making human eggs cells mating with a mouse 
making human sperm cells. Would their baby be a human being?
Concluding remarks
What can we conclude from the history of the transgenic mouse? The most 
important conclusion is that this mouse is as much a man-made artefact 
as a biological species. The transgenic mouse is a living artefact. But, 
when saying this, it is important to note that the transgenic mouse was not 
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created ex nihilo. The history of the ‘man-made’ mouse did not begin with 
the birth of the first transgenic mice in the early 1980s. It was in the course 
of a long process of development that the laboratory mouse became in-
creasingly artificial, starting with the fancy mice that were brought into the 
laboratory at the beginning of the 20th century, and eventually giving rise to 
today’s mouse models. A crucial moment in the evolution of the laboratory 
mouse was, of course, the start of the intensive inbreeding programme. 
But the selection for distinct genetic properties, such as the high incidence 
of spontaneous tumours and the culture of teratocarcinoma and ES cells by 
the early embryologists, has also been of key importance to the mouse’s 
fate. Together all these human interventions in the mouse as a biological 
species have paved the way for the introduction of foreign DNA.
Another conclusion to be drawn from the mouse story is that the mouse 
is a unique animal. Its susceptibility to genetic modification seems without 
precedent among mammalian species. As a result of the unique genetic and 
embryological characteristics of the inbred mice, the mouse became the 
pioneer species in mammalian biotechnology. Biomedical science has had 
an enormous impact on the mouse genome. The mouse, in turn, has been 
the animal that has altered our scientific and medical landscape (Clarke 
2002). Transgenic mice can be found all over the world, and they have 
become part of the standard equipment of the modern biomedical labora-
tory. The genetically altered mouse models are the best tools scientists 
involved in these areas have. In the process of becoming a mouse model 
the mouse has lost much of its identity as a mouse. To some researchers, 
the mouse is basically a fuzzy furry in vivo test tube, to others it is a sur-
rogate for exploring human biology. Maybe it is both. After the transgenic 
revolution the mouse evolved more and more into a living test tube. As 
a result of the introduction of various human genes the laboratory mouse 
also evolved into a more humanlike species. This evolution has by no 
means reached its end. As long as scientists proclaim that, if they have to 
turn the mouse into a human in order to banish a life-threatening disease, 
they will do so, then mice will continue to become increasingly human.
The mouse story is not only a unique story about the scientific career of 
a particular animal species; it is also a story that mirrors the development 
of the life sciences. Being the pioneer species in biotechnology their his-
tory reflects how, at what pace, and in what directions, the life sciences 
are evolving. Mice that are born out of the ‘mating’ of two ES cell lines 
instead of real living mice, an experiment that, according to Lee Silver is 
theoretically possible, have a devastating impact on our perception of the 
mysteries of life. Moreover, biotechnologically or genetically engineered 
mice are living proof of the fact that scientists are gaining control over 
life. The successful experiments with transgenic mice have illustrated how 
easy it is to modify mammalian DNA. In addition, transgenic mice have 
showed that DNA is universal; all living species share the same DNA. DNA 
can be placed from any organism into another. Whether they derive from a 
human being, a jellyfish or a firefly, the mice express these genes as if they 
were their own. This not only questions our perception of species barriers, 
in particular the one between mouse and man, but also what it means to 
be ‘human’. If the mouse genome is malleable, and if DNA is universal, 
then the human genome is also malleable.
The history of the transgenic mouse also renders a number of bio-ethical 
concepts problematic, such as the concept of animal integrity in the context 
of genetic modification. The artificialisation of the laboratory mouse is an 
ongoing process, and the introduction of techniques to add or delete genes 
is simply one step in a broader development. At what point in this history 
does its integrity become affected? That question becomes rather difficult 
to answer. What is the use of a concept such as ‘integrity’ when looking 
at Brainbow mouse’s neurons illuminating in the dark? Other bio-ethical 
concepts that are becoming more and more problematic are related to our 
understanding of nature and what is natural. How should we understand 
the notion of a ‘natural species barrier’, as it appears that such barriers can 
so easily be transgressed? What is the status of ‘unique life forms’ created 
out of genetically modified ES cell lines? But perhaps one of the most 
burning ethical questions about the mouse gene technology is whether 
these technologies can, will, and should be applied to man. Therefore, the 
history of the laboratory mouse may actually be a prelude to, or anticipa-
tion of, posthumanism. We may use the history of the mouse in order 
to reflect on our own approaching future in an anticipatory manner. As 
the laboratory mouse is already a stand-in for future patients, it may also 
become a stand-in for future human (or post-human) individuals.
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Dualism, or dilemma thinking, is the enemy of compromise and the archenemy of 
the middle way. As long as people schematize the issue of genetic engineering of 
animals as “all is permitted” versus “nothing is permitted”, rational social progress 
on the issue is impossible. What is demanded therefore is a fair description of the 
issues, one that separates genuine moral questions from spurious ones, dissects out 
real concerns from obfuscatory rhetoric, and lays bare truly fundamental areas of 
concern.33
 Bernard E. Rollin
There invariably are moral claims of welfare, respect, justice and the human and 
natural good at play in particular situations of animal biotechnological practice, 
but the fabric or constellation of these claims may significantly shift from context 
to context. What might be ethically permissible in the biomedical laboratory might 
be prohibited on farms, in the market place, or in the wild. But in each context all 
things morally relevant need explicitly to be considered and given their due.34
 Strachan Donelly
Introduction
The social and moral debate on mouse biotechnology
Just a few years after the first transgenic mice were born (1980-1981), the 
debate over the moral and social issues of animal biotechnology gained 
momentum. When Bernard Rollin published the paper he had presented 
at the First International Conference on Genetic Engineering of Animals, 
he was surprised to discover that this was actually the first publication on 
the social and moral issues of animal biotechnology (Rollin 1995). With 
the publishing of this paper (entitled The Frankenstein thing) in 1986, the 
33. Bernard Rollin (1995) The Frankenstein Syndrome. Ethical and social issues in the genetic engineering of 
animals, Cambridge University Press, p. 11.
34. Strachan Donelly (1994) ‘Exploring ethical landscapes’, in The brave new world of animal biotechnology, 
Hastings Centre Report 24, p. S4.
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transgenic mouse ‘entered’ bioethical discourse. In his paper, Rollin argues 
that both scientists and the general public are usually unable to sort out the 
genuine moral issues emerging from the practice of animal biotechnology. 
Concerns that have nothing to do with animal suffering, in Rollin’s view the 
only genuine moral issue at stake, he refers to as ‘the Frankenstein thing’: the 
intuitive belief that animal biotechnology is one of those things ‘man is not 
meant to do’. Nine years later, Rollin published The Frankenstein Syndrome, 
ethical and social issues in the genetic engineering of animals, the book in 
which he further developed his ideas (Rollin 1995). Rollin was not only 
the first to write about animal biotechnology, he also became one of the 
most influential writers on the topic. His highly provocative ideas, notably 
about the creation of chickens that would be happy to live in battery cages 
because their nesting instincts had been eliminated by means of genetic 
modification, evoked many responses from the bioethics community.
In addition to Rollin’s The Frankenstein Syndrome, three other influential 
academic books on the social and moral aspects of animal biotechnology 
were published in the 1990s: The Bio-revolution: Cornucopia or Pandora’s 
box (Wheale and McNally 1990); Animal genetic engineering, of pigs, on-
comice and men (Wheale and McNally 1995); and Animal Biotechnology 
and Ethics (Holland and Johnson 1998). Together, these books give a good 
impression of how the debate on the social and moral aspects of animal 
biotechnology took shape. As the title of the first volume (The Bio-revolu-
tion, etc.) reveals, mixed feelings about animal biotechnology abounded 
in the 1990s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, scientists and experts from 
the food industry had high expectations about the genetic engineering of 
farm animals used for consumption. But, as the BST affair showed, public 
acceptance of farm animal biotechnology was very low (Rollin 1995). The 
contents of The Bio-revolution reflect these concerns about the genetic en-
gineering of farm animals. Animal genetic engineering, of pigs, oncomice 
and men also includes a section on the genetic engineering of laboratory 
animals and a section on the patenting of transgenic animals. In this book 
various bio-ethical notions that have become central to the debate on 
animal biotechnology are already discussed: the telos concept, the notion 
of intrinsic value, quality of life and animal integrity. These notions are 
also central in the overview of the ethical debate presented in Animal 
Biotechnology and Ethics in 1998.
In short, the ethical debate about animal biotechnology focuses on 
animal welfare and the supposed unnaturalness of animal biotechnology. 
Roughly, it comes down to two major questions: (1) Do the benefits of 
animal biotechnology outweigh the harm done to the animals?; and (2) 
Is animal biotechnology unnatural and therefore immoral? The benefits 
of the animal experiments are put forward by the proponents of animal 
biotechnology, usually the scientists themselves (e.g. Dzierzak 1995). 
Animal welfare issues, on the other hand, are raised by animal ethicists 
who strive for the protection of (laboratory) animals (e.g. Ryder 1990; 
Fox 1990). Finally, worries about the unnaturalness are expressed by 
authors who question the rights of humans to alter the blueprint of life, 
either because they feel creation or nature is sacred; or because they 
think that the genome of a species should be left in peace for holistic rea-
sons (Verhoog 1992; Fox 1990); or because they fear that in the long run 
humans will be incapable of controlling the outcome of biotechnology 
(Mayer 1995).
Three never-converging tracks
In an article about the invisibility of animals in animal experimentation, 
Jacky Turner speaks about ‘three never-converging tracks’. On the first of 
these tracks, animals are seen as ‘disposable mechanisms and materials for 
research’. On the second track, concern for animals as the ‘cute, the wild 
or the furry’ is the key issue, while on the third and final track a ‘muted 
discussion about whether we should be doing all this anyway’ is taking 
place (Turner, 1998). In the debate about animal biotechnology, three 
similar tracks emerge. On the first track, there is a discussion about the 
promises of biotechnology to cure us from life-threatening diseases; on 
the second track a discussion about animal suffering and animal welfare; 
and, finally, on the third track a discussion on whether we humans have 
any right at all to tamper with genes or to ‘play God’. Along these three 
‘never-converging tracks’ of animal biotechnology, different and even in-
compatible images of mice seem to appear. On the first track, the mouse 
appears as a high-tech laboratory tool, the best scientific model to study 
human diseases imaginable. On the second track, we see the mouse as 
an animal imaginable made of flesh and blood, a victim of science. A 
scientific ‘trial’ is literally a ‘trial’ in the sense of an ‘ordeal’. The third track 
is the most complicated one. It comprises both the mouse as a monster 
(resembling Frankenstein’s prototype) and a more positive, but equally 
challenging, image: that of the mouse as the pioneer species of the new 
world of biotechnology.
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If there are so many different and apparently incompatible mouse im-
ages, then is it possible at all to find an unequivocal answer to the ques-
tion; What exactly is the genetically engineered mouse? And, if not, can at 
least some consensus about the moral meaning of the genetic engineering 
of mice be reached? How should we deal with the genetically engineered 
mouse? What are the key issues that lie at the heart of the moral and 
social debate about animal biotechnology? How do researchers, in particu-
lar those who are members of animal ethics committees, deal with these 
issues?
In order to answer these questions, I will reconstruct the moral debate 
about animal biotechnology along the three different tracks mentioned 
above. In the following sections I describe the different mouse images 
that appear along these tracks in more detail. I base my reconstruction 
on two types of documents, two sources. On the one hand, I will focus 
on the writings of philosophers who participate in the debate, but I will 
also rely on publications by biomedical scientists. In this latter discourse, 
much emphasis is placed on animals as research tools, but also on animal 
welfare issues. I will flesh out how the articulation of the moral and social 
aspects of animal biotechnology differs on each track.
The first track is dominated by the scientific perspective. Here the ge-
netic engineering of mice is seen as a more or less standard laboratory 
technology that plays an important role in a scientific understanding of 
genetics and genetic diseases in particular. The animal suffering involved 
is taken as a necessary evil, to be mitigated no doubt (by technological 
means: that is, by ‘refinement’, see below), but in a manner comparable 
to the way scientists treat other instruments, that is with care. The moral 
significance of these mice is that they help scientists to unravel the genet-
ics of human diseases.
On the second track, we have the individual animal’s interests in mind, 
and welfare aspects become relevant. Genetically modified or not, these 
mice have the same needs and interests as ordinary mice. They feel and 
behave like ordinary laboratory mice. In discussing the mouse images 
on these two tracks, I will argue that the technology as such, that is, the 
modification of the mouse’s genome, does not seem to be of decisive 
moral relevance. It is the effect on the individual animal’s welfare that is 
morally problematic.
This takes me to the central point in my argumentation, a point that 
is put forward by Bernard Rollin. Why not, as he invites us to do, solve 
this problem with biotechnology and ‘genetically turn off’ the animal’s 
ability to suffer? It is here that moral objections that stem from the third 
track emerge. In discussing the ‘Rollin chicken debate’ (focusing on key 
authors such as Fox, Verhoog, Bovenkerk et al., and Rutgers and Heeger), 
I will argue that the current bioethical debate is stuck somewhere at the 
crossroads between the second and third track, unable to bring about any 
convergence between the two perspectives. According to Rollin, only wel-
fare issues are morally relevant. Other objections are, as he argues, merely 
aesthetic. Many other philosophers have strong objections to this way of 
reasoning, since there is clearly more at stake in animal biotechnology 
than animal welfare: issues such as ‘integrity’ or ‘naturalness’. But these 
ideas are intimately connected with our vision of nature. Therefore, they 
are difficult to explain and to discuss. In day-to-day practice, a utilitarian 
balance between human benefits and animal welfare seems to be the 
dominant ethical framework, for both biomedical scientists and members 
of animal experimentation committees. Yet, sooner or later, discontent 
with such an approach stimulates authors to open up alternative perspec-
tives: a third track. Why this is the case can be explained using Martijntje 
Smits’s monster theory. I will argue that, to many people, the genetically 
modified mouse, despite its general use in the biomedical laboratory and 
its apparent domestication, is still a ‘monster’.
Part One: Images of the mouse and their moral meaning
First track: The invisible mouse
As we saw in the previous chapter, scientists like to present the genetically 
engineered mouse as the best laboratory animal available (Clarke 2002). 
It is the top dog of the biomedical laboratory, an indispensable tool for 
investigators in many areas of biomedical research (Boguski 2002). With 
the help of transgenic mice, scientists can study human diseases in animal 
models that mimic these diseases more closely than any other scientific 
model imaginable, except Homo sapiens himself. In the words of Ken-
neth Paigan, former Director of the Jackson laboratories: ‘The mouse has 
become our surrogate. It is the creature we turn to do experiments, so 
important in reaching an understanding of ourselves, that are either techni-
cally impossible or morally inconceivable in human subjects’ (Paigen 1995: 
215). The genetically engineered mice embody promises of new therapies 
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and medicines that may cure us from life-threatening diseases. These mice, 
as the living promise of modern biotechnology, give hope to patients. 
According to some researchers, genetically engineered mice are our only 
hope to find a cure for cancer. That the mouse represents a promise is 
also noticed by philosophers. ‘They promise to transform scientific and 
biomedical research, medical therapies and health care, economic markets 
[…], if not the rest of our lives. They augur a new era of human existence 
and well-being’ (Donelly 1994: S14). From this perspective, these mice 
represent the faith we have in the progress in biomedical science and 
salvation from human physical suffering. The mice are sacrificed in order 
to improve our lives. In that sense, the genetically engineered mouse is 
a potential hero, an animal that (figuratively speaking) puts its life at risk 
and suffers for the benefit of all. If we find a cure for cancer, we owe it 
to the mouse. The mouse is one of scientist’s greatest allies (Clarke 2002). 
It is a brave soldier that helps scientists in their search to find cures for 
life-threatening diseases.
In contrast with the image of the mouse as a brave soldier, but using the 
same metaphor of the battlefield, the mouse also appears as ‘the unknown 
soldier’. Seen this way, the mouse is an animal without a name, without 
an identity, merely a means to an end. Turner speaks about laboratory 
animals as the disposable mechanisms and materials for research (Turner 
1998). This description is justified by the sheer number of mice involved in 
medical research and the scientific, statistical, and molecular gaze that so 
detachedly studies these animals. Researchers usually have no interest for 
the animal as such. They are only interested in specific parts, the expres-
sion of specific genes in particular organs. After the removal of these parts 
of interest, cells are examined in test tubes or Petri dishes, and gazed 
upon with the aid of microscopes. In the laboratory, the researchers study 
microscopic cells that, once outside the body, no longer refer to the mouse 
from which these cells were taken. The remainder (the dead mouse) is 
disposed of as mere waste material.
On the first track, that of the disposable mechanisms and mechanisms for 
research, a complex image of the genetically engineered mouse appears. 
On the one hand, the mouse is presented as disposable material, while, on 
the other, the genetically engineered mouse is praised as a hero, a brave 
soldier, the living promise of biotechnology. Both are extreme images of 
the genetically engineered mice and only show a part of the total picture. 
They reveal a great deal about the practice of biomedical science, but very 
little about the living animals that are used. In this process of technification 
and glorification, the living animals that are the central source of informa-
tion and research data in the biomedical laboratory become invisible. This 
process can be observed by examining the language used in scientific 
reports. As Turner states, ‘animals used in experiments are conventionally 
referred to in scientific reports with no more recognition of their sentient 
existence than if they were inanimate items of laboratory equipment’ 
(Turner 1998: 29). Maybe this is even more the case for the creation of 
high-tech genetically engineered mice. When Paul Orban and his group 
reported about the Cre-Lox technology, they explained that they ‘sought 
to generate a transgenic mouse system that would establish whether Cre 
could effectively mediate chromosomal DNA recombination’ [italics mine] 
(Orban et al. 1992: 6681). Masaru Okabe who created the first ‘green mice’ 
refers to his experiments as ‘the production of mouse lines’ [italics mine]
(Okabe et al. 1997).
This is not to say that scientists do not see the mice they use, but rather 
that, from a strictly scientific perspective, the mice themselves are irrelevant. 
Palmiter and Brinster, after creating the giant mice, promise that ‘optimiz-
ing the condition for integration and gene expression of foreign genes in 
mice should facilitate the […] application in other animals’ (Palmiter et al. 
1982: 614). The scientific value of the genetically engineered mouse is that 
of a system, a model, a mouse line, or, in brief, a tool. The challenge of 
the scientist is to make the mouse into the best molecular model or system 
of (human) genetics imaginable. Of course, this may imply that this system 
is to be handled with care, but basically for technical reasons. The geneti-
cally engineered mouse itself has disappeared under this ‘molecular gaze’. 
In the scientific journals, the mouse is referred to by a number, the code 
name that reveals its genetic modification. The genetically engineered 
mouse has become an artifact, a man-made laboratory tool.
Another aspect of the invisibility of the animals, that Turner observes in 
scientific writing is the assumption of the unavoidable necessity of animal 
experiments (Turner 1998). ‘Nearly every paper or research news article 
involving animal experiments makes a ritual bow in the first paragraph or 
the abstract to a human disease or health problem’, she writes. However, a 
surprisingly common ending to these articles is of the form: ‘The question 
remains, how relevant are these findings to human beings?’ (Turner 1998: 
33). In this respect, experiments with genetically engineered mice do not 
differ from other animal experiments. On the one hand, this has to do with 
60
Biotech Pioneers
61
Mouse ethics, the taming of a monster
stereotypical forms of legitimating animal experiments; on the other hand, 
this uncertainty about clinical applications is an inherent part of science 
in general and of animal experiments in particular. Animal experiments 
always precede clinical studies. The results of clinical tests on real patients 
cannot be built into reports of animal studies simply because they have not 
yet been conducted. After the conclusions are drawn, based on the animal 
trials, relevance of the research still remains an open question.
Most researchers involved in the genetic engineering of mice will no 
doubt have sincere motives. They will genuinely believe that one way or 
another their research efforts will help biomedicine to effectively address 
health problems such as AIDS or cancer. At the same time, they have to 
be realistic, in the sense that the creation of the ultimate research model 
that might lead to a cure for cancer or AIDS is still a long way off. A 
good example of an over-optimistic view on the progress of science as a 
result of mouse research is Mice make medical history, a response to the 
breaking news of the cracking of the mouse genome, published by Tom 
Clarke in Nature’s Internet news service: ‘An army of mice, perhaps 25 
million strong, each day helps researchers worldwide to study and devise 
treatments for human ailments such as cancer, heart disease, AIDS and 
malaria. Mice are helping to unravel mysteries of biology, such as why we 
grow old. Discoveries made using mice have netted 17 Nobel Prizes, and 
more will undoubtedly follow’ (Clarke 200235).
Second track: The mouse that suffers
On the second track, that of the wild, the cute and the furry, the geneti-
cally engineered mouse appears primarily as a victim of science, an animal 
that suffers from being subjected to biotechnology and deserves some 
form of protection against this practice. It is the image of the mouse made 
of flesh and blood, the effort to make visible again the animal that became 
invisible in the scientific representation of the mouse. On this track, what 
we see is the phenotype of the mouse; its genetic code no longer matters. 
We look at the consequences of the genetic modification, so to speak, 
from ‘the animal’s point of view’. One of the most important arguments 
against animal biotechnology is that the animals might suffer from it, that 
their welfare is at stake.
35. Accessed via the web, therefore the page number is not available: <http://www.nature.com/
news/2002/021202/full/021202-10.html>.
According to the members of the Joint Working Group on Refinement, 
the use of genetically modified mice is of serious concern from an animal 
welfare standpoint (Joint Working Group on Refinement 2003). This is not 
just because of the numbers of animals involved (current transgenic tech-
nologies are inherently inefficient in terms of the numbers of mice used in 
relation to the number of founder genetically modified mice ultimately ob-
tained, prior to these animals being conventionally bred). It is also because 
of the surgery and other invasive techniques associated with it and the 
deleterious effect that genetic modification can have on animal welfare. In 
particular, female mice used as providers of fertilized eggs or as embryo 
recipients undergo procedures, such as surgery, that can cause pain, suf-
fering, distress and lasting harm (ibid.). In the case of donor mothers, (by 
egg donation), discomfort is caused by superovulation and the subsequent 
killing to collect the eggs36. In the case of the foster-mothers, discomfort 
is caused by laparotomy after mating with sterile males. Discomfort also 
occurs when females that in nature are too young are forced to mate with 
often much bigger and aggressive males. The sterile males used to cause a 
‘pseudopregnancy’ with the foster mothers, have in many cases undergone 
vasectomy.
In addition, genetic modification as such can also compromise animal 
welfare by exposing animals to pain, suffering, distress or lasting harm. 
This may be intentional (as a result of the genetic modification introduced) 
or unintentional (through the disruption of gene function by random inte-
gration of the transgene into the genome, ibid.). Perhaps the animal will 
suffer pain as a consequence of the modification of its genome, or perhaps 
it will be seriously deformed. Transgenic mice are usually designed as 
animal models for a human disease. This means that the animals are ge-
netically programmed to become ill. Doing harm to the animal’s welfare 
is not only inevitable; it is the very aim of these interventions. As a result 
some mice will suffer from being genetically engineered. However, for the 
individual laboratory mouse, it will not make much difference whether it 
suffers as a result of a genetic modification or as a result of another type 
of animal experiment. The same rules of animal care apply to genetically 
modified and otherwise modified mice. From a ‘second track perspective’, 
36. In the context of the first track, where the mouse as a living being is invisible, killing animals is not 
regarded as harm or discomfort.
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the intrinsic value37 of a genetically engineered mouse is equal to that of 
an ordinary or ‘wild type’ (laboratory) mouse. To the individual mouse it 
is irrelevant whether it is transgenic or genetically modified: it ‘feels’ and 
behaves like a mouse and has mouse needs and interests.
Within scientific practice, there is a long tradition of discussing and 
developing ethical guidelines and codes of practice for the use of labora-
tory animals. This discussion is influenced by the works of animal ethicists, 
in particular by the works of Peter Singer and Tom Regan. To Peter Singer 
the most important reason to respect the rights of animals is that they have 
feelings and can suffer pain. Singer speaks about sentience in this respect: 
‘The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having 
interests at all’ (Singer 1989: 78-79). If a being is not capable of suffering, 
or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken 
into account. Tom Regan argues for animal rights on the basis of the prin-
ciple that an animal is an ‘experiencing subject of life’. According to Regan, 
those who are the experiencing subjects of life have inherent moral value 
(Regan 1989: 112). And, according to the definition of Regan, all mammals 
fall into the category of being a subject of life. Because the animal is aware 
of the fact that it lives, it has a moral status. In their writings, Singer and 
Regan have pointed out that animals have characteristics that justify us to 
consider animals as being morally respectable.
Long before Peter Singer published his Animal Liberation (1975), Russell 
and Burch formulated the most influential guiding principles for the use of 
laboratory animals. In order to ‘remove inhumanity’ from the laboratory, 
they introduced the three R’s: replacement, reduction, and refinement. ‘Re-
placement means the substitution for conscious living higher animals by 
insentient material. Reduction means reduction in the numbers of animals 
used to obtain information of a given amount and precision. Refinement 
means any decrease in the incidence or severity of inhumane procedures 
applied to those animals which still have to be used’ (Russell and Burch 
1959: Chapter 438). These key principles in laboratory animal ethics also 
apply to the genetic engineering of mice. When planning an animal ex-
periment with genetically engineered mice, scientists should always first 
37. The notion of ‘intrinsic value’ is used to indicate that mice, both genetically engineered and the ‘wild 
type’ have a moral status. To have a moral status means that it is not self-evident that people may use 
animals as they please. The use of animals has to be legitimized by ethical arguments (Verhoog 1992, 
see below).
38. Accessed via the web, therefore, a page number is not available.
investigate seriously whether it is possible to conduct an alternative ex-
periment that does not require the use of animals. Secondly, they should 
always try use the smallest number of mice that is statistically possible. 
And, last but not least, if no alternative is available, they should always 
seek to design the experiment in the most mouse-friendly way.
Some animal experiments involving biotechnology will, according to 
the three R’s, be more ‘mouse-friendly’ than others. If one compares the 
genetically modified mouse to the ‘wild type’ inbred mouse, the former 
is not always worse off. The new technologies are in many cases more 
mouse-friendly. Take, for example, clinical test where genetically modified 
mouse models are used with inducible promoters. These mouse models 
are more refined than the classical mouse models. They mimic human 
diseases better and are therefore more reliable. The onset of a disease 
can be studied in a controlled manner. An example of an improvement of 
technology that led to reduction of animal numbers is the use of fluores-
cence gene markers. This technique means that a visible marker is added 
to the gene of interest. The gene expression can be followed in such a 
mouse in real time over a longer period. Because the development of the 
illness can be followed in the same mouse over an extended period of 
time, researchers need smaller numbers of mice than before to answer the 
same question in a statistically reliable way. This is why Jeffery Burkhardt 
can argue that ‘biotechnology is perhaps the best for animals’ (Burkhardt 
1998: 117).
In spite of the positive effect on the number of mice needed for a single 
experiment, the estimate is that the number of mice used in biomedical 
research will nevertheless increase as a result of the genetic engineering 
technologies. Some predict that the new possibilities of gene technology 
will result in an explosion in the number of laboratory mice. For each gene 
there will be a scientist who wants to study its function in a knock-out 
or otherwise genetically modified mouse. In his commentary in Nature, 
on the publication of mouse genome sequence, Bradley predicts that ‘the 
avalanche of the (mouse) genome sequence will be followed by an explo-
sion of mutant mice’ (Bradley 2002: 514). That the genetically engineered 
mice will never offer an alternative to (replacement) animal experiments 
needs no further explanation. The genetically engineered mouse models 
are perhaps more refined and will result in the use of a lower number 
animals than the classical research models, but they are still based on 
using living laboratory animals.
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At the crossroads: ‘The Rollin chicken’ debate
The image of the living mouse, with mouse needs and interests and the 
ability to suffer from biotechnology, is hard to reconcile with the image of 
the laboratory mouse as a disposable mechanism or material for research. 
It is as if we are standing on two different tracks simultaneously, or at a 
crossroads. On the one track, we see an animal we have to take good care 
of as we keep it in captivity. On the other track, we see a valuable labora-
tory tool that helps us in our investigations into the mysteries of genetic 
diseases. The genetically engineered mouse is a living artifact. Between 
the ‘cute and the furry’ living animal and the ‘man-made’ laboratory tool 
there seems to be an unbridgeable gap. However, it is the responsibility 
of the researchers and the animal ethics committees to somehow make a 
trade-off between the two. The benefits of the experiments, the promise of 
the mouse experiments, have to be weighed against the animal suffering 
involved. The key question in laboratory animal ethics is: ‘Does the benefit 
of the animal experiment outweigh the harm done to animal?’ In order to 
cope with the tension between doing harm to the animal (wrongdoing) 
and the benefits of science (utility), the mouse is reduced to an abstract or 
idealized life form or, as Turner argues, made invisible. Another solution 
to the necessary animal suffering can perhaps be found in biotechnology 
itself. If, for the individual animal, only welfare issues are morally relevant, 
then why not, genetically turn off its capability to suffer? This would be a 
first-track solution to the second track-problem. This question lies at the 
heart of the ‘Rollin chicken debate’.
In order to ‘pass between the horns of the dilemma regarding chronically 
defective, suffering, genetically engineered animals’ and ‘the principle of 
conservation of welfare’ in the case of creating genetically engineered 
mouse models, Rollin suggests that it is necessary ‘to obliterate all subjec-
tive experience’, that is, ‘to totally eliminate consciousness’ in the mouse. 
One possible way of achieving such a mouse model could be by geneti-
cally engineering ‘these animals both to be a research model and to be 
born decerebrate’ (Rollin 1995: 205). With this ‘solution’ Rollin follows 
the same line of reasoning as he did in his ‘chicken’ example. In his 1986 
paper, he first suggested creating a chicken deprived of its nesting instinct 
by turning off of the gene that codes for the drive to nest. This gene can 
be substituted by a gene that will allow the chicken to be satisfied with 
merely laying her eggs in a cage. Such a chicken, Rollin argued, would 
not need a nest when laying eggs. Being happy to lay eggs in a cage, 
this chicken would not suffer from being a battery cage chicken (Rollin 
1995: 172).
To Michael Fox, however, the creation of such animals amounts to a 
highly disputable proposition.39 Expressing his disgust, he refers to Rollin’s 
chicken experiment as ‘a potentially misleading eugenic idealism’ (Fox 
1990: 34). In reply to Rollin, he introduces the telos concept. The telos or 
‘beingness’ of an animal is ‘its intrinsic nature coupled with the environ-
ment in which it is able to develop and experience life’ (Fox 1990: 32). 
What Rollin is suggesting to do with the chicken is telos-violating and 
therefore immoral. Interestingly, telos is also one of the key concepts for 
Rollin when discussing animal biotechnology. At first sight, he seems to 
have a similar definition of telos: ‘the set of needs and interest, physical 
and psychological, genetically encoded and environmentally expressed 
which make up the animal’s nature’ (Rollin 1989: 295). In 1995 Rollin more 
or less gives the same definition. ‘As ordinary people know well, animals 
too have natures, genetically based, physically and psychologically ex-
pressed which determine how they live in their environments. Following 
Aristotle, I call this the telos of an animal, the pigness of a pig, the dogness 
of a dog – “fish gotta swim, birds gotta fly”’ (Rollin 1995: 159). How is it 
possible that two philosophers using the same notion come to such differ-
ent conclusions about the moral acceptability of animal biotechnology?
The reason why these two authors articulate such diverging moral rea-
sonings concerning the chicken experiment is because they stand on two 
separate tracks. Rollin discusses the fate of the chicken while focusing 
on the interests of the individual animal. He is standing, so to say, on 
the track of the cute, the furry and the feathery in this respect. On this 
track, only animal welfare is relevant. Rollin’s chicken is, according to its 
re-engineered telos, no longer able to suffer. It is exactly for this reason 
that Rollin sees no moral objections to the genetic engineering of the 
chicken. ‘If genetic engineering is used to genuinely suit the animal to 
its stipulated environment, and therefore eliminate the friction between 
telos and the environment which clearly results in suffering, boredom, 
pain, stress and disease, and this conduces to the animal’s happiness, it 
does not appear morally problematic’ (Rollin 1986: 296). In 1995, he adds 
39. Fox notably refers to ‘the chicken thought experiment’, as the decerebrated mice were not mentioned 
by Rollin before 1990.
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that: ‘If the animal could be made happier by changing their natures, I see 
no problem in doing so […]. Telos is not sacred; what is sacred are the 
interests that follow from it’ (Rollin 1995: 171-2).
Fox, however, who refers to harmony and the unity between the animal 
and its environment, is standing on a third track, where the effects of 
animal biotechnology on the animal’s ‘nature’ are emphasised. The kind of 
animal proposed by Rollin is, in important respects, no longer a chicken. 
To Fox it is not only relevant that the animal is not suffering; it is also 
relevant that Rollin’s artifact no longer functions like a ‘normal’ animal in a 
‘natural’ environment. ‘The organism and its environment are one, and we 
recognize that unity and harmony as health and the full expression of the 
animal’s telos. The telos is in part preconditioned for and dependent upon 
a particular environmental niche and optimal conditions for its normal 
development and expression, which in turn means health and fulfillment 
for the animal’ (Fox 1990: 34). The debate between Fox and Rollin is 
not really a debate in the sense of ‘exchange or arguments’. Rather, they 
are arguing along the lines of two completely different, never converging 
tracks. We might consider this an example of what Lyotard (1983) has 
called a ‘différend’. On the one track, the focus is on the suffering and 
well-being of the individual animal, while, on the other, the focus is on the 
significance of the animal as part a larger whole, a natural world where 
different species have their unique place. A trade-off between the second 
and third track seems hardly possible.
The problematic position of Rollin at this bifurcation is well expressed 
by Henk Verhoog who asks: ‘How can we get to know that transgenic 
animals show abnormal behavior, or that they suffer, when the animal’s 
‘telos’ is changed through genetic engineering?’ (Verhoog 1992: 272). What 
is happening in Rollin’s example of the chicken without the urge to nest, 
is that the telos is replaced by a new telos which is intentionally designed 
by humans. But what is the meaning of telos if it does not refer to any-
thing outside human action? Something that belongs to the animal as such, 
something that is given? According to Verhoog this is where Rollin goes 
wrong. Taking the concept of telos seriously means that we have to refer 
to the idea of species-specific behaviour in a particular habitat. ‘To have 
a nature of its own is unthinkable without taking into account the species 
to which the animal belongs’ (Verhoog 1992: 272). Accepting that the 
animal’s species-specific nature may be changed by genetic engineering 
will in the long run undermine the very foundation of Rollin’s theory, 
Verhoog argues. If telos is simply the equivalent of the genetic program, it 
has no value in the moral assessment of animal biotechnology. Telos can 
only be of moral relevance if it refers to something outside the individual 
animal, something that is given by nature.
Precisely at this point something interesting occurs in Rollin’s line of 
reasoning. Somewhere between 1995 and 1998, he realises that the refer-
ence to nature (a notion that clearly has a normative dimension according 
to some philosophers) in his telos definition is problematic. In his 1998 
definition he therefore replaces ‘nature’ with ‘genetic program’. ‘The telos 
of an animal means the set of needs and interests, which are genetically 
based and environmentally expressed, and which collectively constitute 
or divine the form of life or way or living exhibited by that animal and 
whose fulfillment or thwarting matter to the animal’. In order to emphasise 
that only welfare is relevant he adds that ‘the fulfillment matters positively 
to the animal and brings happiness’ and that the ‘thwarting matters in a 
negative way and brings suffering’ (Rollin 1998:162). Nature is irrelevant, 
because, as he explains, ‘strictly speaking, as Aristotle points out, individu-
als do not have natures’. According to Rollin, we may see telos ‘neither 
as eternally fixed’ as did Aristotle, ‘nor as a stop action snapshot of a 
permanently dynamic process as did Darwin, but rather as something infi-
nitely malleable by human hands’ (Rollin 1998:157). For Rollin there are no 
fundamental moral objections against the genetic engineering of animals. 
The only relevant question is whether or not animals will suffer from the 
genetic modification. No wonder that Rollin speaks about win-win situa-
tions when discussing the creation of animals that have no consciousness 
(Rollin 1995: 183). To Rollin the third track is simply morally irrelevant. It 
is based on misguided emotions; it is ‘the Frankenstein thing’. This does 
not mean that Rollin sees no objections to this type of experiments. Only 
they are not moral objections, they are aesthetic objections (Rollin 1995: 
175; Rollin 1998: 168). People simply prefer to see chickens brooding on 
a nest.
Animal integrity and the species concept
With his ‘chicken experiment’ and his suggestion of creating a decerebrate 
mouse model for biomedical studies Rollin has challenged many philoso-
phers to point out what it is other than animal welfare that is at stake in 
animal biotechnology. Most people seem to reject this type of experi-
ments and do not believe that their objections are merely aesthetic. As 
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Bovenkerk and colleagues note: ‘Rollin’s concept of interest is too narrow 
to analyze our moral intuition’ (Bovenkerk et al. 2002: 17). In order to 
bridge the gap between, on the one hand, the existing moral theory (an 
animal ethics largely based on the notion of animal welfare) and, on the 
other, our moral intuitions (suggesting that creating this type of chickens 
is morally unacceptable), the term ‘integrity’ has been introduced in the 
animal biotechnology debate by Bart Rutgers and Robert Heeger. They 
defined ‘integrity’ has as ‘the wholeness and intactness of the animal and 
its species-specific balance, as well as the capacity of the animal to sus-
tain itself in an environment suitable to the species’ (Rutgers and Heeger 
1999: 45). The attractiveness of this notion, which is reminiscent of Rollin’s 
concept of telos (in particular, the older definition from 1989) and Fox’s 
definition, is that it applies both to the second track of the cute and furry 
(on which the individual animal’s welfare issues are taken into account) 
and to the third track (where the effects of animal biotechnology on nature 
as a whole are discussed). ‘According to the definition, integrity refers to 
both the individual and the species’ (Rutgers and Heeger 1999: 45). The 
notion of animal integrity has both dimensions: a concern for the welfare 
of the individual animal and a reference to its ‘given’ nature.
To philosophers like Verhoog, Rutgers and Heeger in the Netherlands 
and Alan Holland in the UK, the species notion is an important frame 
of reference in the moral assessment of animal biotechnology (Verhoog 
1992, Rutgers and Heeger 1999, Holland 1998). For Rollin, this remains 
a peculiar line of reasoning. ‘Can we harm or violate a species?’, he asks 
rhetorically (Rollin 1995: 35). His answer is clear: ‘Species cannot be 
harmed because they are not sentient, only members of some species 
(notably vertebrates) are’ (Rollin 1995: 35). Another difficulty of the spe-
cies notion is that there are many different definitions, and these are used 
simultaneously in the debate. According to the biologist Ernst Mayr, there 
are at least three different interpretations of the species concept (Mayr 
2002). The first is the traditional typological species concept, referred to 
by philosophers as ‘natural kinds’. In this definition, ‘species’ refers to a 
more or less constant type, separated from other species by a clear de-
marcation. In a second species concept, ‘species’ is understood as a group 
of organisms with the same properties and a common descriptive name. 
The third and most dominant species concept is what is called biological 
species concept, defined by Mayr as ‘groups of interbreeding populations 
that are reproductively isolated from other such groups’ (Mayr, 2002). In 
addition to the species concepts that stem from the natural sciences, there 
is a variety of species concepts that are not based on biology, such as the 
biblical notion of a species. In contrast to the Darwinian dynamic vision of 
a species, the biblical species concept is rather static.
Whether or not the violation of a species is regarded as problematic 
depends (amongst other things) on the choice of a particular definition of 
a species. When Rutgers and Heeger speak about species-specific behav-
iour, they refer to a concept of a species that belongs to Mayr’s second 
type. Verhoog proposes to view species as natural kinds. They all refer to 
species as a particular way of being and appearing, which animals of the 
same type share on the basis of their nature. If we perceive this nature as 
morally relevant, then the violation of a species is morally relevant. But, 
if we view the species as ‘a momentary organization of a certain chunk of 
information’ (Verhoog 1992: 273, quoting Shapiro), the genetic engineer-
ing of animals, in terms of violating species, cannot be regarded as morally 
problematic. When the definition ‘interbreeding population’ is used, as 
Rollin does, most forms of genetic modification do not violate the nature 
or integrity of a species. A genetically modified mouse with human genes 
inserted in its genome can still reproduce itself by mating with a wild 
type mouse. Therefore, to Rollin the violation of species is not an object 
for moral concern. But why should Rollin’s definition be more adequate 
and of greater moral relevance that the phylogenetic definitions, or other 
definitions, based on other theoretical frameworks? (Verhoog 1992: 276). 
To non-biologists, the species concept is not a biological concept, but 
rather a cultural concept, it refers to a particular recognisable entity that 
forms a meaningful whole that we can observe and recognise immediately 
for what it is, we simply see which individuals belong to a specific species. 
This assumes a totally different perspective on nature and on species than 
the ‘objective’ species concept of the natural scientist.
Part Two: The ‘thing’ about animal biotechnology
The mouse that challenges ‘nature’
If animal welfare were the only relevant aspect of animal biotechnology it 
would be difficult to object to a genetic modification if that modification 
had a beneficial impact on the animal’s well-being, or if the capacity to feel 
pain were to be eliminated, as in the extreme case of Rollin’s decerebrate 
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mouse. Yet, most people intuitively seem to have strong moral objections 
to this type of biotechnology. To most people the image of the Rollin 
chicken, or a decerebrate laboratory animal, is an abject image. That is 
not to say that they reject such an image merely for aesthetic reasons, as 
Rollin suggests. With his thought experiment about the chicken, Rollin did 
not offer convincing arguments in favour of his opinion that only animal 
welfare is relevant in the ethical assessment of animal biotechnology. On 
the contrary, the responses to his thought experiment have clearly illus-
trated that something else, less easy to define, is at stake in the genetic 
engineering of animals. Apparently, for Rollin, ‘hard to define’ equals ‘ir-
rational’. What is hard to define is discarded as morally irrelevant. Moral 
intuitions that lack ‘good reason’, that do not refer to objective values such 
as animal well-being, are simply delisted as subjective, as merely aesthetic 
judgments. But is it acceptable to disqualify moral assessments based on 
aesthetic judgments for this reason? Should we not rather say that many 
moral intuitions are to a certain extent aesthetically grounded? Another 
way to interpret these ‘subjective’ moral intuitions is to say that they clearly 
indicate that animal biotechnology still offers some ‘food for thought’.
What troubles participants in the debate about the Rollin chicken and 
the genetically engineered decerebrate mouse is that these animals are to a 
certain extent ‘unnatural’. They may argue that the integrity of such animals 
is violated, or that they no longer display species-specific behaviour, but 
these and similar articulations seem to express the basic sense that these 
animals (in our perception at least) are somehow ‘abnormal’ or ‘unnatural’. 
But what it is that people exactly mean by these and similar phrases is 
often difficult to explain. Terms such as ‘nature’ and ‘the natural’ may refer 
to many different things. Nature, in the broadest sense, is equivalent to the 
natural or physical world, and also to life in general.
The word ‘nature’ is derived from the Latin word natura, which means 
something like ‘the course of things’ or ‘natural character.’ In various con-
texts, notably in environmental philosophy, nature may mean something 
like the ‘natural environment’ or ‘wilderness’. But it may also refer to an 
essential quality of something, notably of living things. Many philosophers 
have written about nature. They agree on one issue: that ‘nature’ is a very 
complicated concept and may be used to highlight very different aspects 
of our complex relationship with nature. In medical ethics, ‘naturalness’ is 
usually discarded as being outdated. In environmental ethics, it is still in 
use, notably in order to refer to situations that are more or less unspoiled 
by human influence. In animal ethics, naturalness is usually replaced by 
concepts such as ‘integrity’. To discuss all these possible meanings here in 
detail would be quite outside the scope of my inquiry. What these writings 
have in common is that central to notions such as nature and the natural 
they refer to is that they are used to refer to something that is untouched 
by humans, something non-artificial, something given, not man-made, 
something that displays a life and an identity of its own. Nature and the 
natural are usually opposed to the artificial world, the world produced 
and reproduced by humans. The term ‘nature’ is used in contrast to no-
tions such as ‘culture’ and ‘technology’ that put humans in opposition to 
nature. ‘Natural’ is also used to indicate a moral quality. ‘Natural’ is usually 
regarded as better than ‘artificial’ (for instance in traditional aesthetics) or 
even ‘perverse’ (for instance, in traditional sexual morality). But there are 
probably ‘no terms in general currency in debates in applied ethics that 
are as intricately, subtly and bewildering ambiguous as the terms “natural” 
and “unnatural”’ (Burgess and Walsh 1998: 396).
For scientists involved in animal biotechnology, the concepts of nature 
or natural in relation to DNA are highly problematic. Humans have always 
influenced the living world and the natural order. Ever since the dawn 
of humanity, we have left our mark on the living world. This applies in 
particular to the laboratory mouse. The history of genetics is characterised 
by the manipulation of the mouse genome: in the first place, by the selec-
tive breeding of mice and, later, by the technologies of molecular biology. 
When the first transgenic mice were born in 1980, true ‘wild type’ labora-
tory mice had already ceased to exist. When talking about nature, I would 
like to argue that genetically engineered mice are as much man-made 
living artifacts as they are natural living beings. In fact, they are the result 
both of natural processes and of human technological culture, they are 
living artifacts. This, precisely, seems to be the paradox: How can a living 
animal be fundamentally unnatural?
The mouse as a monster
An interesting study of how society deals with these types of technologies 
that challenge the nature-culture dichotomy is Martijntje Smits’s Monster-
bezweringen (Taming Monsters, the English version, is forthcoming). In 
this book, Smits introduces the notion of a monster to refer to the products 
of technologies that make us feel uncomfortable. She gives the following 
description of a monster: ‘A monster is an ambiguous creature combining 
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seemingly incompatible elements. Due to its indefinite nature it evokes 
fear and uncertainty’ (Smits 2002: 2840). Techno-monsters challenge cultural 
categories that shape and give meaning to our world. Cultural categories 
are at the same time moral categories (Smits 2006). They are real to the 
extent that they are shared by members of a cultural group. They are the 
result of social learning processes. When new phenomena emerge that do 
not fit into one of the existing cultural categories, or rather: that seem to 
fit into two categories that are mutually exclusive, we speak of a category 
error. A monster is such a category error. It displays characteristics of 
different cultural categories. According to Smits, the monster is at a stage 
of semi-identity. Monsters generally evoke strong responses of rejection, 
followed by attempts to restore the order and correct the category error. 
This is not to say that only negative responses occur. In the positive sense 
such errors in classification can also be perceived as miracles or moments 
of transgression. Two cultural categories that as a result of technology 
are often the subject of category errors are culture and nature. In modern 
Western thinking, nature and culture form a central dichotomy: they are 
twin notions that, on the one hand, exclude and, on the other, presuppose 
one another. Modern monsters always entail confusions in terms of the 
culture/nature dichotomy (Smits 2002: 138).
The genetically engineered mice seem to correspond to Smits’s defini-
tion of a monster. As living artefacts they transgress the borders between 
nature and culture. As carriers of both human and mouse genes, they 
transgress the species barrier between mouse and man, a barrier that 
until recently was regarded as fixed and unchangeable. In which category 
do we want to place these mice? As we have seen, they are laboratory 
animals, that we have to take good care of, but also high-tech and highly 
valuable laboratory tools. They are victims of science but also potential 
heroes of biomedical salvation. And, last but not least, as pioneers in 
biotechnology, the mice represent a model for future human beings. Just 
like Smits’s monsters, the genetically engineered mice do not fit into any 
unequivocal cultural or moral category. The genetically engineered mice 
are what we, in the words of Smits, percieve as products of an uncomfort-
able technology. As monsters the genetically engineered mice ask for 
40. Quote translated from: Monsterbezweringen: ‘Een monster is […] dubbelzinnig wezen, dat 
elementen in zich verenigt die niet te verenigen lijken. En daardoor, door zijn onbepaaldheid, vaak angst 
en onzekerheid oproept’.
monster ethics, an ethics of ‘domestication’. How do we have to handle 
these monster mice?
The taming of monsters
According to Smits, monsters can be tamed, or domesticated, by accommo-
dating categories, or by gradually recognising that monsters (perhaps after 
some slight adaptations) can, in fact, be placed in an existing unequivocal 
category, or by adapting the monster itself to the existing categories. She 
describes four different styles of ‘monster treatment’: a dogmatic style of 
monster exorcism; a ritualistic style where the monster is adapted; a ro-
mantic style of monster embracing; and, finally, a pragmatist style in which 
the monster is forced to assimilate. The dogmatic style has the character of 
monster exorcism, because those who adhere to this style want to expel 
the monster. In the dogmatic style, cultural categories are taken to be strict 
and inflexible dichotomies. Cultural borders as well as current knowledge 
and morality are experienced as firmly established, as real. For monster 
exorcists, the categories form an unchangeable and objective order. As a 
consequence, in the perception of monster exorcists, there is no place for 
monsters. For this reason monsters must be eliminated. The exorcism of 
the genetically engineered mouse as a monster would be the total banish-
ment of animal biotechnology. In this way, the transgression of the border 
between nature and culture is effectively prevented.
The second option, ‘monster adaptation, aims at transforming the mon-
ster into a phenomenon that will better fit into categories’ (Smits 2006: 
501). This is the ritualistic style. Again in this approach cultural borders 
are not really questioned. Borders are not conceived as pliable, human 
constructions, but as a reflection of reality. The category classification is, 
however, less rigid, less inflexible and therefore more refined compared 
with the dogmatic style. As a result, in this style, slight inconsistencies can 
be fitted in more easily within the system. Strange new phenomena are 
not considered directly as undermining and threatening, but rather as not 
yet fully identified. When the ritualistic style is applied to the case of the 
genetically engineered mouse, the mouse will be adapted to existing cat-
egories. This can be done, for example, by denying that there is something 
really new or revolutionary in these mice: for example, by stating that 
genetic engineering is not an unnatural procedure, or that genetic engi-
neering is nothing but a high-speed version of more traditional processes 
of animal breeding or even of evolution as it occurs in nature. Another 
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approach would be the denial of one of the categories. This is what Rollin 
does when he claims nature to be an irrelevant notion in the discussion of 
animal biotechnology. When nature ceases to exist as a category there is 
no such thing as border-crossing behaviour of the genetically engineered 
mouse. It is highly questionable, however, whether something like ‘nature’ 
will go away simply by no longer mentioning it.
The third style of monster taming that Smits discusses is the pragmatist 
style. In this approach monsters are assimilated. Both monsters and cat-
egories can be mutually adapted to one another. Cultural borders are taken 
to be human conventions, flexible descriptions of reality. Categories are 
regarded as descriptive tools. They are much more flexible than in the first 
two models. Monsters are assimilated in a way that drastically reconsiders 
both the character of the monster and the conception of what it was a 
refutation of. Pragmatic monster tamers have a clear, opportunistic willing-
ness to reposition established borders, if that would be advantageous. A 
form of assimilation of the monster genetically engineered mouse would 
be the introduction of a new ethical or cultural category, that of the living 
artefacts. This implies that the well-established culture/nature dichotomy 
must be amended.
Finally, Smits discusses the romantic style. She describes this style as 
a form of monster embracement. Embracing of monsters is romantic, ac-
cording to Smits, because this style clearly distinguishes itself from the 
striving towards unequivocality and control that is so typical of the first 
two styles, and to a lesser degree of the third. In her discussion of the 
different styles of monster taming, Smits shows how fear gradually gives 
way to fascination. Monster embracers are fascinated by monsters. In their 
effort to understand the monster, they rely on intuition and spirituality 
rather than on the logic of classification. This style of monster taming is 
the least unequivocal style. Fascination for ‘living on the edge’, for catas-
trophes, and for the category of the obscene, can be mixed with feelings 
of abomination. Yet, although this style certainly has some sympathetic 
elements, the unconditional acceptance or even admiration of the mon-
ster is not very suitable for dealing with monsters on a societal level. An 
unrestricted acceptance of the monster would disrupt cultural and societal 
life and could lead to total madness. The dogmatic style is also rejected by 
Smits as an unsuitable way of dealing with monsters. It lacks openness for 
new phenomena that seems indispensable in a quickly evolving techno-
culture, and is therefore not realistic. With the current developments in 
biotechnology new phenomena will emerge almost continuously. The 
ritualistic style can also have possible violent consequences. The monster 
can be pressed into a category where it does not belong. That could be 
the cause of many problems. Important aspects of the monster can be 
overlooked by ritualistic denial.
The taming of the genetically engineered mouse
On the basis of Smits’s monster theory we can conclude that the way in 
which scientists and animal ethicists deal with the genetically engineered 
mice reveals a ritualistic style of monster taming. Genetically engineered 
mice are adapted to existing categories. They are reduced to the cultural 
category of laboratory animals. To the scientists, the genetic engineering 
of mice is nothing new. It is a continuation of a practice of selective 
cross-breeding of mice for medical science that has been done for quite a 
long time. Ever since the beginning of the previous century, scientists have 
used the mouse to unravel the mysteries of genetics. From the perspective 
of science, the genetically engineered mouse is a logical consequence of 
developments within molecular biological sciences. Today it is hard to 
imagine a biomedical laboratory without them. As a result, the average 
scientist will not question genetic modifications as such. In his or her 
perception, the genetically engineered mouse will simply be a laboratory 
mouse. For the use of genetically engineered mice in biomedical science 
the same ethical rules apply as to ordinary laboratory animals. These rules 
are described within laboratory animal ethics. The animal suffering has to 
be justified with good reasons. Between ethics committees and scientists 
there seems to be more or less agreement that animal biotechnology has 
to be reviewed and how this has to be done. In animal ethics committees, 
the fact that the mouse is genetically engineered usually will not play a 
significant role. In practice, they are treated the same way as ordinary 
lab mice. For each animal experiment a convincing justification has to be 
given. That every individual researcher literally has to justify his experi-
ments before an ethics commission might lead to bureaucracy and delay, 
but it is in general not perceived as unreasonable. A review by an animal 
experimentation committee has become a routine element within standard 
scientific practice. Most leading scientific journals demand a notification of 
ethical approval when animals are used. An ethical review by an animal 
experimentation committee provides the scientists working with these 
animals with an index of legitimisation.
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The focus of the ethical assessment is on the human intentions behind 
the genetic modification. What is the goal of the intervention? Does this 
outweigh the potential animal suffering involved? In practice, only by 
reducing the genetically engineered mouse to an ordinary laboratory 
animal, is an ethical assessment of animal biotechnology possible. For 
questions concerning laboratory animal ethics, such as how to balance 
animal suffering against future human benefits and how to achieve mini-
mal animal suffering, several reliable ethical frameworks and a number 
of specific codes of conduct for the genetic modification of animals are 
available (de Cock Buning and Theune 1994; Joint Working Group on 
Refinement 2003). To assess ethical questions about the unnaturalness of 
the mice, is, however, far more difficult. To some animal ethics commit-
tees, the fact that the genome is altered does not play a role. For example 
in the Dutch National Committee on Animal Biotechnology (in Dutch: 
CBD), questions about animal integrity are opened up for discussion. 
But in other countries this is not taken to be relevant. For example, 
in the UK, animal welfare legislation no distinction is made between 
genetically modified mice and non-genetically modified laboratory mice. 
But, even if taken into ethical consideration, in practice, notions like 
‘integrity’ and ‘unnaturalness’ are not easily captured by ethical frame-
works and balances. So questions about the so-called unnaturalness are 
usually avoided. They do not fit within the moral framework used by 
the ethics committees that have to make an assessment of animal experi-
ments in a case-by-case approach. On the other hand, there seems to be 
general agreement on the fact that the genetic engineering of animals is 
problematic and therefore ought to be restricted to research that serves 
biomedical purposes only.
So, in addition to the ritualistic style, a dogmatic style of monster taming 
can be observed. Outside the biomedical realm, genetically engineered 
‘monsters’ are banned. The presence of genetically engineered mice 
outside the scientific laboratory, where the category of laboratory animal 
does not exist, has been prohibited. This prohibition, a form of monster 
exorcism, is typical of the dogmatic attitude.
I will refer to this combination of attitudes as ‘the strategy of contain-
ment’. We have locked away the genetically engineered mice inside labo-
ratories, both in the literal sense and the figurative sense: they are simply 
seen as part of the ‘laboratory animal’ category. In the most literal sense, 
mice are locked away by strictly prohibiting their presence outside the 
laboratory. Laboratories where genetically engineered mice are produced 
and kept are working on the basis of very strict guidelines for genetically 
modified animal husbandry. In the figurative sense the genetically engi-
neered mice are locked away by refusing to consider their introduction in 
other domains such as pet keeping or wildlife preservation. As a result we 
can not speak of the domestication of the genetically engineered mouse 
monster. Outside the laboratory the genetically engineered animals are still 
not welcome (as yet).
Concluding remarks
Genetically engineered mice are highly ambiguous animals. This makes 
it hard to reach consensus about the ethical and societal aspects of their 
existence and use in bio-medical research. As I have argued, there are 
three different tracks in the debate about animal biotechnology. On each 
track, different mouse images appear, and all these images evoke different 
moral responses. On the first track, the genetically engineered mice can 
be seen as the ‘right tool for the job’ that will enable us to find a cure for 
life-threatening genetic diseases. From that perspective, these mice are 
presented to the public as potential heroes. For the scientists who work 
with them, these mice are very sophisticated models compared with tradi-
tional mouse models. They are ‘high-bio-tech fuzzy test tubes’ that allow 
us to gaze at human genes in an in vivo model. They are treated with care, 
but mostly because they are valuable laboratory equipment.
On the second track the mice appear as the victims of biomedical sci-
ence. They are often programmed to become ill and suffer from human 
illnesses. Their welfare is clearly at stake. In this respect, they are mice 
like other mice, ordinary living animals, with ordinary mouse needs and 
interests that ought to be respected and protected. Their suffering is an 
issue of concern.
On the third track the genetically engineered mouse emerges as a 
monster that challenges the nature-technology dichotomy. This mouse 
monster is a living boundary object, a boundary being. As a man-made 
living animal, the genetically engineered mouse belongs both to the world 
of artifacts and to the world of the living creatures that are part of nature. 
The genetically engineered mouse is a living artifact that can have a radi-
cal impact on our (genetic) self-understanding. Such mice embody future 
biomedical strategies and applications.
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However, the dominant view on the ethical aspects animal biotechnol-
ogy seems to be a utilitarian (or consequentialist) trade-off between animal 
welfare and human benefits. Why this is the case can be explained with 
the help of Smits’s monster theory. The genetically engineered mouse does 
not belong to one unequivocal cultural category. For scientists it is simply 
a lab animal. For outsiders it has aspects of monsterhood, as undisputed 
cultural categories do not yet exist to capture it. But, being there and be-
ing real, the genetically engineered mice ask for an immediate response. 
There is not enough time to develop new rules that may be seen as ap-
propriate by all for the new phenomenon. The ‘birth’ of this monster was 
not accompanied with clear-cut instructions for its use. The formulation 
of instructions for use calls for a time-consuming social learning process, 
which in the case of animal biotechnology still has a long way to go. For 
the time being, we have to rely on the limited sets of instructions that are 
available. In the case of the genetically engineered mouse, the rules that 
apply to the ‘wild type’ (inbred) laboratory animal are the best candidates. 
The use and treatment of these animals within science are regulated by 
laboratory animal ethical principles, such as the three R’s formulated by 
Russell and Burch. This ritualistic style of monster taming seems adequate 
as a temporary response from a practical point of view. We need a solution 
right now. Ethical assessment of animal biotechnology in a case-by-case 
approach by an ethics committee would otherwise be impossible. Scien-
tific practices need clear and workable solutions right now.
But the genetically engineered mice also engender difficult questions 
concerning, for example naturalness, for which no straightforward answers 
are available. By reducing these mice to the status of ordinary lab mice 
these difficult issues are simply avoided. As a result, not all the concerns 
that are raised by the introduction of these ‘monsters’ are addressed in the 
animal ethics committees. What we see is that, in addition to the reduction 
of the mouse to an ordinary lab mouse, the strategy of containment is 
applied to meet these concerns. Containment is an approach we apply to 
animals which we find both fascinating or useful and fearsome. The com-
bination of reduction and containment is therefore a fairly understandable 
monster strategy. It is a reasonably adequate solution for today, but highly 
unsatisfactory from a philosophical point of view that takes a broader 
perspective, placing current biotechnology in the context of its past and 
possible futures. This (temporary) approach only covers the moral ques-
tions that emerge on the first and second track. Issues arising on the third 
track, concerning our vision of nature, remain inarticulate. I believe this is 
a matter of great concern.
Of all the different tracks, the third track is by far the most problematic 
one. Mouse biotechnology confronts us with the fact that nature, animal 
nature and, by implication, human nature, is malleable. What is most 
troublesome about the genetic modification of mice is that a genetically 
engineered mouse is unnatural and that by changing its genetic make up 
we change something unique that has been the result of the long ‘natural’ 
process called evolution. We do thing with genes that would never have 
happened in ‘nature’. We are messing with ‘nature’. But how can a living 
being be unnatural? How can a living being be an artifact? It is not only 
nature but also our conception of nature and the natural that is under at-
tack, or at least under pressure. Our vision of nature seems adrift as a con-
sequence of biotechnology. But the difficulty we have in defining nature 
does not mean that we, like Rollin, should simply disqualify the concept 
of nature as a meaningless phrase when it comes to morally assessing bio-
technology. I rather believe it is the other way around. Biotechnology (and 
the biotech-evolution of the lab mouse) entails important lessons about 
nature that need to be further explored by philosophy. Biotechnology 
challenges us to redefine what nature is, what species are, and even what 
human nature is. We have to redefine what it is to be human. What is the 
status of our traditional understanding of our own species when DNA can 
so easily be transferred from one species to the other? But the impact of 
animal biotechnology as a technology, with considerable implications for 
our understanding of nature in general and our own (malleable) nature in 
particular, has remained more or less out of focus in the animal biotech-
nology debate. The technology as such, the impact of the knowledge of 
genes on our self-understanding, is not really debated by animal ethicists.
In short I wish to argue that the difficulties in addressing the question 
about the unnaturalness of genetically engineered mice reveal that the 
mouse is still considered to be a monster. Dealing with new phenomena 
such as genetically engineered mice calls for a social learning process. We 
need time to get used to monsters. Monsters need time to feel ‘at home’ 
with us. If one wants to follow a monster strategy that in the ideal situation 
leads to domestication, Smits recommends the pragmatist attitude. Instant 
improvisation and creativity are important characteristics of this style of 
monster taming. The pragmatist has an open mind to the constructed char-
acter of borders and different rationalities of the various parties involved. 
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Because of its ontological scepticism, the pragmatist approach displays 
openness to different perspectives. In the case of the genetically modified 
mouse, pragmatists have an open mind towards the promises the mouse 
holds for correcting debilitating genetic diseases. But the pragmatist is also 
aware that, as our understanding of the interaction of genetics and human 
personality increases, the technology also has the potential to radically 
alter human nature. As I discussed in the previous chapter, I believe the 
most important mouse image that may help us to address the complex 
issues arising on the third track is that of the mouse as the pioneer species 
guiding us and leading the way into the new world of biotechnology. In 
my view, seeing the mouse as a pioneer in the biotechnology revolution 
involves critical analysis of the future potential or the promise of animal 
biotechnology and the dynamics of power behind animal biotechnology, 
in combination with a critical analysis of what we mean by (human) na-
ture. We can do this by paying careful attention to imagination, and to the 
myths, metaphors, images and other half-conscious apparatus of thought 
that surround the moral and social debate on animal biotechnology (Midg-
ley 1992). What do people express when they say biotechnologists are 
‘playing God’? What is it people fear when they refer to ‘Frankenstein’s 
monster’. What monsters do they fear? And what can we learn by investi-
gating our ‘aesthetic’ objections to animal biotechnology? All this is to be 
explored further in the following chapters.
Chapter 3
Playing God or the promise of mouse 
biotechnology
And Pilate saith unto them, Behold the man!41
 John 19:5
In Simone de Beauvoir’s existentialist novel All Men Are Mortal, two creatures 
attain immortality: a man who intends to be an enlightened ruler and a circling 
mouse. Clearly, this was a mutant mouse — perhaps a descendant of the Chinese 
waltzing mice that were first described several thousand years ago. De Beauvoir’s 
would-be king chose the mouse as his companion for eternity for the same reason 
that we are pursuing mouse mutants today: the mouse provides us with an effec-
tive model of ourselves, be it for testing potions of immortality or for understand-
ing human disease and development42.
 William L. Stanford, Jason B. Cohn, and Sabine P. Cordes
Introduction
Ecce homo: the Passion of the Oncomouse
In 2000, a photograph of Ecce Homo, a sculpture by Bryan Crockett of a 
giant oncomouse, appeared in the New York Times (see Figure 4). Two 
years later, another photograph of Ecce Homo appeared in Nature Genetics 
as an illustration to an article by Dorothy Nelkin and Susanne Anker about 
the influence of genetics on art (Nelkin and Anker 2002). Ecce Homo is 
a dramatic interpretation of the transgenic oncomouse. Standing on its 
hind legs, the mouse is portrayed as a humanlike animal on a human 
scale. But perhaps the most shocking part of the sculpture is the title, Ecce 
Homo (Behold the Man!) (John 19:5). Bryan Crockett portrays the mouse 
as Jesus Christ. Crockett deliberately chose a realistic style for representing 
his oncomouse in order to evoke a sense of living. ‘Almost six feet tall 
41. The Holy Bible: King James Version (2000).
42. William L. Stanford, Jason B. Cohn and Sabine P. Cordes (2001) ‘Mouse Genomic Technologies; Gene-
trap mutagenesis: past present and beyond’, Nature Reviews Genetics.
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he is nude (as is the Oncomouse43) and his flesh is a very convincing 
pale skin tone. Upon further inspection, however, one realizes the mouse/
man is actually sculpted in flesh-colored marble. The lifelike sculpture and 
skin texture makes the sculpture oscillate between a living creature and a 
strong likeness, evoking the Pygmalion myth’ (Crockett 2001a).
In the catalogue of Paradise Now, the exhibition where Ecce Homo was 
first presented, Crockett explains his motivations for presenting a labora-
tory mouse as a religious icon. He is rather explicit about his understand-
ing of the God-playing activities of scientists. ‘Science has taken over the 
authority that religion once held. In this body of work, I am exploring 
the sacredness of the flesh and soul in a time when we have acquired 
the knowledge and tools to play God’ (Crockett 2001b). Crockett sees the 
practice of genetics as an analogy to the worlds of allegory and mythol-
ogy: ‘Like the Satyr or Minotaur, the Oncomouse is the literalisation of a 
cliché man/mouse’. But more striking is the explicit reference he makes 
to the Christ figure. ‘That is why I have chosen to reinterpret the ultimate 
figure of salvation, Christ, through the ultimate actor of contemporary sci-
ence, the Oncomouse. This sculpture is intended to be a monument to the 
test object of modern science, human kind’s symbolic and literal stand-in 
personified. This human-scale, fleshy mouse, sculpted with the pathos of 
classical sculpture, stands in a gesture reminiscent of Christ revealing his 
wounds’ (Crockett 2001a/b).
Now what is it that Bryan Crockett wishes to say with this sculpture? 
There is long tradition of presenting Ecce Homo in Christian iconography. 
But a comparison with other traditional Ecce Homos shows that Crockett’s 
Ecce Homo, apart from being a mouse and not a human figure, is not an 
Ecce Homo in the traditional sense. Crockett’s mouse is not sacrificing 
itself. The mouse has neither choice nor inner calling, and no free will 
is involved. The mouse is not willingly taking the burden of sin on his 
shoulders; it is playing the burden of sin back to his audience, so to say. 
There is a new iconography involved. It seems we have to conclude that 
Crockett is presenting us a new – modern secular version – of Jesus Christ! 
By presenting the mouse as a Jesus figure Crockett is not only suggesting 
43. Harvard/OncoMouse™ is not a nude mouse. The original Harvard/OncoMouse™ was a furry albino 
mouse (see Figure 6). Nude mice do exist in laboratories. They lack hair and an effective immune system. 
This last property makes nude mice, discovered in 1962, a very good candidate for cancer research 
because they do not reject human tumour transplants. However, this nude mouse is not genetically 
engineered.
that scientists are playing God, he is also suggesting (or at least invoking 
the suggestion) that mouse biotechnology leads to salvation. Where does 
such an idea come from?
The meaning of the playing God metaphor
‘Playing God’ is a phrase often heard in the biotechnology debate. Also the 
salvation to be expected from science is a familiar theme. In this chapter I 
want to go into two sets of questions. First, in what way is biotechnology 
related to religion? How can the variety of references to God and religion 
in the debate about biotechnology (‘playing God’, ‘salvation’, etc.) and 
particularly about mouse biotechnology be explained? Second, what feel-
ings and concerns are expressed by the playing God metaphor? Are these 
primarily moral concerns about messing with His creation, or does ‘God 
talk’ also reveal other more complex issues of moral concern?
In the following, I address these questions by examining the playing 
God metaphor and other forms of God talk in relation to the genetic 
engineering of mice. In my inquiry into the ‘religious aspects’ of the ge-
netically engineered mice I will use a variety of sources: research papers 
by scientists and philosophical discussions, but also art works by visual 
artists and their own comments on these works. I will begin with a number 
of observations made by Dorothy Nelkin, who did extensive research on 
gene metaphors in science and popular culture, including that of the ‘sa-
cred gene’. After discussing some of her examples of God talk in the life 
sciences, I will briefly reflect on the complex relationship between religion 
and science. To some, the two are in a state of war; to others, science 
can be understood as a religious pursuit, with the salvation of mankind 
as its ultimate goal. In order to illustrate how these different perceptions 
of science and religion influence the moral attitudes towards animal bio-
technology, I will subsequently discuss three philosophical positions that 
can be found in the playing God debate. Two extreme positions are taken 
by David Noble (who argues that we have to take science as salvation 
literally) and Ronald Dworkin (who takes the playing God metaphor to 
be nothing but the expression of a distinction we make between what 
is made by us and what is given by nature). An intermediate position 
is taken by Mary Midgley (who challenges us to take the myths we live 
by seriously and to search for the meaning that lies behind them). I will 
argue that, regardless of whether we take science as salvation literally or 
metaphorically, in both cases it reveals that biotechnology has a character 
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of promise. Biotechnology is a technology of hope. It is here that another 
dimension of God talk emerges. This dimension is a bio-political one. In 
order to explain the bio-political dimension of mouse biotechnology, I 
introduce the work of Nikolas Rose and Eugene Thacker, who both write 
about bio-politics. Using their theories on the futuristic dimension, that is 
the future-orientedness of biotechnology, I discuss the role of the mouse 
in what Rose refers to as a ‘political economy of hope’. Subsequently, 
by presenting another work of art representing a transgenic mouse that 
has also been published in Nature: namely, Mann und Maus by Katerina 
Fritsch, I will introduce the genetically engineered mouse as the flesh and 
blood promise of biotechnology. I will use both Ecce Homo and Mann 
und Maus to illustrate how scientists like to present our dependence on 
the mouse in our current quest to find cures for life-threatening diseases. 
Although the messages conveyed by these works of art differ, they are 
both powerful visualisations of the promise of the biotechnologically 
engineered mouse. And both invite us to look upon the moral and social 
aspects of mouse technology in a critical way.
Part One: Biotech and religion
God talk in the life sciences
‘God talk is in vogue’, writes Dorothy Nelkin in her posthumous essay on 
the confusion between science and religion. In this paper Nelkin discusses 
the motives of scientists engaged in biotechnology for using religious 
metaphors. ‘Geneticists call the genome the Bible, the book of life, or the 
Holy Grail. DNA is not just a biological entity in the rhetoric of science; it is 
a so-called sacred text, the core of essential humanity or the master code’ 
(Nelkin 2004:140). In this respect, according to Bill Clinton: ‘Today we are 
learning the language in which God created life. We are gaining ever more 
awe for the complexity, the beauty, and the wonder of God’s most divine 
and sacred gift.’ These words, spoken during the famous White House 
press conference announcing the completion of the first draft version of 
the sequence of the human genome, have since become famous (Collins 
2006). Similar examples of God talk can be found in various publications 
by Francis Collins, Director of the Human Genome Project44. ‘When you 
44. Francis Collins claims to be the ghost writer of Bill Clinton. He writes about this in his book: ‘Was I, a 
rigorously trained scientist, taken aback at such a blatantly religious reference by the leader of the free 
have for the first time in front of you this 3.1 billion-letter instruction 
book [the sequence of the humane genome] that conveys all kinds of 
information and all kinds of mystery about humankind, you can’t survey 
that going through page after page without a certain sense of awe. I can’t 
help but look at those pages and have a vague sense that this is giving me 
a glimpse of God’s mind’ (Swinford 2006). How sincere these feelings are 
can be concluded from the title of his autobiographical book about the 
cracking of the human genome, The language of God (Collins 2006).
One possible answer to the question why God talk is in vogue might 
be that both biology and religion address issues involved in the origin and 
future of (human) life. Thus, scientists involved in the life sciences may 
see themselves as engaged in a pursuit that is similar (to some extent) to 
religious enterprises of the past. Nelkin also gives another explanation. 
She takes it to be the response of scientists to tensions between science 
and religion. ‘By drawing on powerful images of Christianity, scientists 
are seeking to attract converts – to convince the public and many sceptics 
of the power of their ideas’ (Nelkin 2004: 150). This is an interesting 
hypothesis, because usually it is the critics of modern biotechnology who 
refer to God and the Bible, expressing moral doubts about ‘tinkering’ 
with genes, rather than the scientists themselves. Experiments in genetic 
engineering such as the creation of transgenic organisms have evoked 
objections from people who are convinced that scientists are playing 
God and are ‘tampering’ with God’s creation (Nelkin 2004: 142). In other 
words, we are faced with the interesting situation that both advocates 
and opponents of biotechnology have recourse to God talk or religious 
language, either to stress the importance and legitimacy of their scientific 
work, or to articulate moral arguments against scientific practices such as 
genetic engineering. There appears to be a thin line between ‘doing God’s 
work’ and ‘playing God’. Regardless of whether we value this as positive 
or negative, God talk conveys the general feeling that something important 
– boundary breaking – is happening within the life sciences.
world at a moment such as this? Was I tempted to scowl or look at the floor in embarrassment? No, not 
at all. In fact I had worked closely with the president’s speechwriter in the frantic days just prior to this 
announcement, and had strongly endorsed the inclusion of this paragraph. When it came time for me 
to add a few words of my own, I echoed this sentiment: ‘It’s a happy day for the world. It is humbling 
for me, and awe-inspiring, to realize that we have caught the first glimpse of our own instruction book, 
previously known only to God’ (Collins 2006).
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Science as salvation
There is an ambiguous relationship between religion and science. Paul 
Fayter of the Canadian Council of Churches (CCC) explains this in the CCC 
booklet on the OncoMouse patent case as follows: ‘The most common 
view held of how “Science” relates to “Religion” can be called the conflict 
thesis or the warfare model. In this view – an ideological invention of late 
nineteenth century anticlerical scientists – religion and science represent 
two independent autonomous and inevitably opposing domains: ‘Science 
stands for the progressive light of reason; religion, for the dark ignorance 
of superstition. The church […] has done little more than to oppress and 
persecute scientists throughout history’ (Fayter 2003: 10). This model of 
conflict is also described by Mary Midgley. According to her, the idea 
of a conflict arose at the end of the 19th century when science was re-
garded, not merely as a depository of scientific facts, but rather as a kind 
of world-view, ‘a philosophical conception of the world and the forces 
within it, directly related to the meaning of human life’ […] ‘People like 
T.H. Huxley meant by science a vast interpretative scheme which could 
shape the spiritual life, a faith by which people might live’, she explains. 
‘This [scientific] faith was a competitor with existing religious faiths, not 
a way of having no faith at all’ (Midgley 1992: 52). But the idea that the 
battle between science and religion is won by science – that science in 
some sense has disproven religion and reigns instead of it – Midgley finds 
extremely odd. It would suggest that the two are competing for the same 
job. When discussing the spiritual and intellectual ambitions of modern 
scientists, Midgley deliberately talks about salvation and not about the 
value of science. The point of using the dramatic word, ‘salvation’ is ‘to 
show how much the whole thing matters and especially to draw attention 
to the high ambitions underlying the strong claims about the value [of 
science]’ (Midgley 1992: 51). It is to bring out the vital importance to all 
of these various faiths on which we all depend, faiths without which we 
would be lost. The cry for salvation is a response to confusion, confusion 
about the fact why we are here and how to make sense of it all (Midgley 
1992). To Midgley the faith in, and the very idea of, salvation through 
science is about myths and metaphors, visions or categories that help us to 
understand the physical world. So when ‘scientific facts clash with beliefs 
formerly held significant it is not to declare war, nor to bend the facts. It 
is to rethink the significance, to look much deeper into what underlies the 
symbols’ (Midgley 1992: 54).
Another critique on the warfare interpretation is that it ignores the fact 
the modern sciences are deeply rooted in Christian belief. According to 
Midgley, the idea that we can reach salvation through science is ancient 
and powerful (1992:1). In the 17th century, when modern science first 
arose, it was an entirely natural thought. The great thinkers of that time 
took it for granted, it was central to their endeavour. Nature was God’s 
creation, and to study it was simply one of the many ways to celebrate His 
glory (Midgley (1992:1). This point is also made by Fayter who claims that 
‘foundational for the new views of nature in the seventeenth century were 
theistic assumptions. […] These assumptions included the intelligibility of 
the physical world; the reliability of human reason; the orderliness of 
nature; and the universal uniformity of natural law’ (Fayter 2003: 1).
A rather radical elaboration of this latter point of view can be found 
in The Religion of technology: The divinity of man and the sprit of inven-
tion by the historian David Noble (Noble 1997). Noble does not regard 
the cry for salvation as a metaphor or myth as Midgley does, he takes it 
literally. In the first half of his book, Noble describes how the roots of 
modern technology reach back to the 9th century when the useful arts first 
became implicated in the Christian project of redemption. Going through 
history he illustrates his arguments with examples of influential Millenar-
ian45 thinkers. The book starts with the, in those days radical, thoughts 
of the 9th century Carolingian philosopher John Scottus Eriugena, who 
was the first to identify the arts as vehicles of redemption (Noble 1997: 
17) Subsequently, in the mechanics-minded world of the 12th century, the 
spiritualisation of the arts was undertaken by Benedictine monks (Noble 
1997: 18) It was at this time that the ‘development of technology gave 
some assurance that mankind was on the road to recovery [from the Fall]’ 
(Noble 1997:21). The Franciscans carried the Millenarian message though 
the 13th and 14th century into the modern age, where it is reflected in the 
mentality of, for example, Columbus (Noble 1997: 31-34). According to 
Noble the discovery of the New World brought new life into the promise 
of mankind’s redemption through science: ‘After Columbus, paradise be-
came more than just a vision, it became a place’ (Noble 1997: 38). In the 
chapter Heavenly virtuosi, Noble describes how 17th century scientists like 
Boyle and Newton were also deeply inspired by Millenarian prophecies. 
45. Millenarism is, according to Noble, in essence the expectation that the end of the world is near, and 
that, accordingly, a new earthly paradise is at hand (Noble 1997: 23).
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The notion of a ‘heavenly virtuosi’ refers to scientists who were involved 
in projects aimed at the recovery of prelapsarian Adamic perfection: a 
return to the state of innocence before the Fall. To illustrate his point, 
Noble quotes Boyle, who believed that scientists had a privileged relation-
ship with God and that the scientific virtuosi (in the new Millennium) will 
have a greater knowledge of God’s wonderful universe than Adam ever 
had (Noble 1997: pp. 62-67). By studying nature, these modern scientists 
would come closer to God.
The eighth day of creation
In the second half of his book Noble focuses on contemporary technolo-
gies. Biotechnology is one of these technologies. In the chapter Powers of 
perfection; genetic engineering, Noble discusses the development of mo-
lecular biology, referred to by Horace Judson (and many others inspired 
by him) as the ‘the eighth day of creation’, and the Human Genome Project 
(HGP). In brief, Noble argues that genetic engineering allows us to become 
a co-creator and to free humans from the deficiencies of the human condi-
tion after the Fall. As such the HGP and the development of mammalian 
genetic engineering technologies (now predominantly developed in mice 
but, in theory, also applicable in man) can be seen as radical attempts 
to transcend the limitations of fallen creation. In the words of Noble: ‘If 
the new technology endowed bioengineers with Adamic dominion and 
God-like powers over nature, enabling them to ‘improve’ upon presum-
ably lesser living organisms according to their own lights, and interests, 
it also, and perhaps most important, enlarged the prospect for their own, 
human perfection. (Noble 1997: 184) According to Noble, the HGP is not 
about humble science devoted to incrementally advancing knowledge 
of human genetics or to incrementally improving the human condition. 
Rather, it has a profile reminiscent of Millenarian prophecies. In the eyes 
of its director, Francis Collins, it is nothing less than ‘the most important 
and the most significant project that humankind has ever mounted’. Other 
prominent scientists involved in the HGP are also openly religious and do 
not hesitate to reveal their Millenarian motives. Noble quotes, for example, 
Warren Weaver and Arthur Paecocke, who write and speak about their 
divine mandates, but also Robert Sisnheimer who in 1994, years before the 
completion of the sequence of the human genome, had already written 
that: ‘Today we might say that we have discovered the language in which 
God created life…. After three billion years, in our time we have come to 
this understanding, and all the future will be different (Noble 1997: 190 
quoting Sinsheimer 1994). As Noble summarises, ‘most genetic engineers 
[...] act as if their physical enterprise was indeed a project of perfection, as 
if their accumulated knowledge and techniques might ultimately restore 
mankind to its pristine condition, freed from its myriad deliberating defects 
inherited from the Fall’ (Noble 1997: 200).
It is unlikely, however, that those participants in the biotechnology de-
bate that adhere to religious convictions will share these grand schemes. 
They will rather feel uneasy about such a project, whose scientific results 
may entail profound social problems and threaten cherished values and 
beliefs, in particular those about God the creator and His sacred creation: 
Nature. On various occasions (Galileo, Darwin, etc.), science has chal-
lenged Christian views on creation and the nature of God. But in response 
to scientific progress, our understanding of God and His relationship 
with creation has also changed. In his Religion in the age of science, Ian 
Barbour describes eight different models of God’s role in Nature, ranging 
from the omnipotent classical ruler to an interpretation of God as a process 
leader, a wise teacher who desires his students to choose for themselves 
and interact harmoniously (Barbour 1990). Two of these models are of 
particular importance to the understanding of the relationship between 
science and religion; the classical model and the mechanical model. The 
classical model describes God as divine omnipotence, a God who governs 
and rules the world, who is himself eternal, unchanging and impassible, 
unaffected by the world. This monarchical model is challenged by the 
scientific evidence of evolution and the discovery of continuous change 
in nature. In addition, there is no place for human freedom in this model. 
The growth of science in the 17th century led to a mechanical model of 
God as a clockmaker, the designer of a mechanical nature. But this view 
of God as the inactive God of deism who started the mechanism and then 
let it run leaves little place for continuous creation, personal encounters, or 
the biblical view of God as acting in history. Other models of God can be 
understood as intermediary positions between these two extremes.
These models do not only reflect the different ways we can view God 
in his relationship with nature, they also reflect different visions of nature 
as such. James Procter distinguishes five different visions of nature: evo-
lutionary nature; emergent nature; nature as sacred; malleable nature; and 
nature as culture (Procter 2004). Is nature sacred and therefore not to be 
disrupted by men? Do we have to interpret nature as finished, or do we 
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have to view nature as the result of an ongoing evolutionary process? If 
nature is changing, is it also malleable by us? These questions lie at the 
heart of the biotechnology debate. In contrast to classical biology, bio-
technology is not about simply understanding the secret (or sacred) laws 
governing the living world. By changing the genetic code biotechnologists 
can change the essence of living beings. Biotechnology almost by defini-
tion presupposes a vision of nature as malleable, malleable by man. When 
we change ‘nature’s essence’, DNA, we become co-creator.
Playing God versus doing God’s work
The vision of malleable nature implies that we distance ourselves from 
the view that creation is in principle finished, as well as from the idea that 
God bypasses human beings in arranging everything. In this view, the 
history of God’s creation is one in which humans have co-responsibility 
(Drees 2004). Concerns about human interference in life or nature are 
often articulated in terms of ‘playing God’. These concerns are not always 
religious in a strict sense. They can often be understood as metaphorical 
ways of expressing moral concerns for which a proper (secular) ethical 
vocabulary does not readily exist. It is not necessary to be a religious 
person to understand the symbolic or moral meaning of the statement that 
scientists involved in genetic engineering are playing God. In her book 
about the myths we live by, Midgley illustrates how the language in which 
some scientist express themselves seems to reveal that: ‘The mystics of 
the genetic revolution see themselves as experts engaged in completing 
nature’s work and especially in the business of ultimately perfecting hu-
manity’ (Midgley 2003: 110). Furthermore, she points out that a powerful 
image lurks behind the use of the verb ‘engineering’: the simple analogy 
with machines. ‘Those who use the analogy [of engineering] seem to be 
claiming that we have a similar understanding of plants and animals as 
we have of machines and industrial plants into which we might put new 
components. But we did not design these plants and animals. This is 
perhaps an importance difference’ (Midgley 2003: 114).
Ronald Dworkin takes a different position in the playing God debate. 
He explains the use of the playing God metaphor as the expression of 
a distinction we make between that which is given and that which lies 
within our hands (Dworkin 2000)46. Everybody intuitively feels there 
46. A Dutch translation of the original paper that appeared in Prospectus Magazine is used.
is a dividing line between, on the one hand, what we are or nature is 
(regardless of whether this is the work of God or a blind process) and, 
on the other hand, what we create when we change what is given by 
nature. This distinction, argues Dworkin, is the backbone of our morality. 
Biotechnology, like no other technology, challenges this distinction. The 
biotechnologists who ‘play God’ are involved in matters that go beyond 
the way we traditionally understand concepts like nature, the unity of life, 
or species barriers. To play God is to play with fire. But is this a reason to 
put a hold on biotechnology? According to Dworkin, the answer should be 
No. To play with fire is what we mortals have done ever since Prometheus. 
We play with fire and accept the consequences, because the alternative is 
an irresponsible cowardice in the face of the unknown (Dworkin 2000).
This provides me with an answer to the first set of questions about the 
way biotechnology is related to religion and how the variety of references 
to God and religion in the debate about biotechnology can be explained. 
In summary, I believe God talk reveals that there is an important relation-
ship between religion and biotechnology, either in a metaphorical sense 
or in a literal sense. This explains why moral or social concerns about 
biotechnology are often expressed in religious language. Biotechnology 
is about changing creation, changing the essential code of life, the sacred 
script. These terms already convey a more or less religious world-view, 
even if they are used metaphorically. With biotechnology we cross the 
Rubicon, so to speak. Yet, instead of simply accepting what is given, by 
God, nature or life itself, we may also see ourselves as co-creators of life or 
nature. Behind the playing God metaphor (or the playing God accusation) 
lies a complex history of interaction between science and religion and 
the quest for salvation, either literally in the sense of returning to a state 
of original perfection, or metaphorically in the sense of leading towards 
a better life. With respect to the point I wish to make, it does not matter 
whether biotechnologist are metaphorically speaking about doing God’s 
work (the positive interpretation) or playing God (a phrase that usually 
carries a negative connotation). What does matter to my argument is the 
assumption that seems to underlie all biotechnology: the promise that man 
can in fact improve life, the work of God or Nature. In the following, I will 
elaborate the argument that scientists claim to do so, in the first place, by 
manipulating the mouse genome.
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Part Two: The healing powers of genetically engineered 
mice
The promise of mouse biotechnology
Improving the conditions of human life is the driving force behind medi-
cine and biomedical research. All over the world, scientists are studying 
human biology and diseases in biomedical laboratories. In their search for 
‘salvation’ – knowledge of the genome that will lead to longer, healthier 
and happier lives – scientists are ‘assisted’ by an army of perhaps 25 
million mice (Clarke 2002). Many of these lab mice are genetically modi-
fied. Transgenic mice, also known as ‘mouse models’, are created in order 
to study human diseases. Mouse genes analogous to human genes are 
knocked out, and certain genes that possibly predispose for human dis-
eases are knocked in. And, according to Kenneth Paigan, who was the 
Director of Jackson Laboratories in 1995: ‘There is every reason to believe 
that these efforts will have great impact; that over time they will lead to 
new strategies, new therapies, new means of alleviating ills, and new 
methods of preventing disease’ (Paigen 1995: 215). Also some patients’ 
groups praise the healing powers of genetically engineered mice. For 
example, the Patients’ Voice for Medical Advance, the national voluntary 
patients’ group that supports the humane use of animals and the ethical 
use of biotechnology in medical research in the UK, explicitly promotes 
mouse biotechnology on their website, in the first place as a response to 
animal activism47. ‘Transgenic mouse models enable researchers to study 
the complex interactions, at every stage of life, within a whole living en-
vironment. It is remarkable that, during the last 20 years or so, the genes 
responsible for nearly all the relatively common inherited diseases have 
been located and isolated. For example, Duchenne muscular dystrophy, 
cystic fibrosis, haemophilia, neurofibromatosis, Huntingdon’s disease, in-
fantile spinal muscular atrophy, and many others. Genetic research, using 
mostly mice, is set to revolutionise our medical understanding and give 
hope of finding cures where previously hope could hardly be offered’ 
(Patients’ Voice website accessed on 1 May 2007). For many diseases these 
mice are the only hope patients have.
47. See <http://www.simr.org.uk/pages/research.11.html>. However, a quick search on the Internet 
reveals that most patients’ groups remain silent about the use of mouse biotechnology.
A beautiful visual image of the promise and hope for the genetically en-
gineered mouse can be found in Joseph L. Goldstein’s ‘reading’ of Mann 
und Maus [Man and Mouse], a sculpture by Katerina Frisch: ‘The rise of the 
mouse to such exalted status in biomedical research is symbolized aptly 
by Katharina Fritsch in her large polyester sculpture Mann und Maus. 
Here, a gigantic mouse (in black) sits enthroned on top of a male figure in 
bed [see cover image]. The rigid division of the sculpture into black and 
white emphasises the obvious importance of the dominant animal model 
for human biology. Despite being dominated by the gigantic mouse, the 
man seems completely relaxed as he dreams of the many new advances 
in basic research and clinical medicine that will emerge from the new 
mouse technology. Curling its long tail like a question mark over the end 
of the duvet, the mouse wonders how long it will take for these new basic 
advances to be translated into clinical practice’ (Goldstein 2001: 1079)48.
What is striking about this interpretation of Fritsch’s mouse sculpture 
is the complete confidence Goldstein seems to have in the fact that the 
promise of mouse biotechnology will become true. Sooner or later, basic 
advances in mouse biotechnology will be translated into clinical practice. 
It is a clear example of Eugene Thacker’s statement that ‘a certain type of 
futurological, forward thinking is a key component to the continued devel-
opment of the biotech industry and its future applications in medicine and 
health care’ (Thacker 2001: 156). Thacker predicts a ‘future biotechnology 
in which medicine is both curative and preventive, in large part due to ad-
vances in both molecular sciences and information technology’ (Thacker 
2001: 155). Nikolas Rose also speaks of a future-oriented technology when 
discussing biotechnology. ‘The key feature of [the] new technologies of 
life is their forward vision: they seek to optimize the vital future by ac-
tion in the vital presence’ (Rose 2007: 8). Rose discusses two of these 
future-oriented technologies: those of (genetic) susceptibility and those 
of (genetic) enhancement. ‘Technologies of susceptibility aim to identify 
and treat persons in the present for ills from which they are predicted to 
suffer in the future’ (Rose 2007: 8). Technologies of enhancement, Rose 
argues, are likewise future-oriented: ‘Almost any capacity of human beings 
48. Please note that this is Goldstein’s interpretation of the sculpture and not Katerina Fritsch’s. According 
to the artist, the sculpture is about the relation between men and women: ‘Insofern hat das ganze Bild 
naturlich mit den Beziehungen zwischen Mann uns Frau zu tun, mit gescheiterten Liebesbeziehungen’ 
(Blazwick 2002).
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– strength, endurance, attention, intelligence and lifespan itself – seems 
potentially open to improvement by technological intervention’ (Rose 
2007: 9-10)49. Both Thacker and Rose present a vision of biotechnology 
that is in line with the idea of salvation through science. Biotechnology is 
about faith and hope. A key characteristic of biotechnology, in particular 
mouse biotechnology, is its high degree of science fiction. It is a science of 
promises and hope, a science well visualised by Mann und Maus, but also 
one that deserves some critical evaluation. ‘The “science fiction” in tech-
noscience does strategically utilise extrapolation and speculation. It does 
create visions of future worlds in which advanced science and medicine 
have developed new relations to diseases and to the body, and in doing 
so it does make a comment on the ways in which future biotechnology is 
largely dependent upon technological development to achieve this future 
vision’ (Thacker 2001:157).
Bio-economy or the ‘other’ promise of the genetically 
engineered mouse
The genetically engineered mice do not only promise better health, they 
also promise profit. That there are commercial interests involved in trans-
genic mice became clear on 12 April 1988 when, after a four-year process, 
for the first time in history a patent was granted on a higher form of life. 
In the years that followed, Harvard/OncoMouse™, the mouse involved, 
has beyond doubt become the best-known (see Figure 6). transgenic 
mouse. This mouse, expressing the MMTV myc oncogene, was developed 
in the laboratory of Harvard professor and geneticist Phil Leder in the 
early 1980s. The patent for the transgenic Harvard mouse was granted to 
Phil Leder and the company DuPont that donated 6 million dollars to the 
research (Blaugh et al. 2004). It concerned all transgenic mice carrying a 
gene construct for the development of spontaneous mamma tumours. The 
patent was related not only to the use of the mouse created by Leder but 
to all mammals (with the exception of human beings) that carry foreign 
tumour genes. DuPont’s commercial idea was to sell these mice for $50 
each (Andrews 1989). Harvard researchers would be exempted from these 
costs (Schneider 1988a, 1988b). The patent created a stir in academia and 
industry. To the scientific community, it meant a threat to research because 
the patent included all non-human transgenic organisms that express a 
49. In the next chapter, I will discuss the scientific arguments for these statements in more detail.
cancer-causing transgene. With this patent, DuPont got a tight grip on all 
research involving oncomice, including the mice that were created by the 
researchers themselves. It took more than ten years to come to a workable 
agreement between DuPont and academia on the free use of oncomice 
(Marshall 2000, 2002; Smaglik 2000; Blaugh et al. 2004). To the industry 
it indicated that the transgenic mouse technologies can offer interesting 
business opportunities.
OncoMouse™ also created a stir in society. The public was more upset 
about the fact that this mouse was supposedly a human invention than 
about DuPont’s aggressive licensing policies. The trade mark was taken 
to be the ultimate sign of human arrogance towards the creation of God 
or Nature. This was even more upsetting than the fact that species barriers 
had been crossed or humans had interfered in the mouse genome. In 
1995, representatives from virtually every major religion in the US started a 
campaign against the patenting practices of genetic engineering (Andrews 
1995; Stone 1995). In interviews they claimed not to be opposed to the 
practice of biotechnology as such. It was the patenting of human genes or 
organisms to which they were opposed. Their major criticism on patenting 
was that it would reduce the ‘blueprint of evolution’ to a marketable com-
modity (Andrews 1995). OncoMouse™ became the topic of wide public 
moral and religious debate, but also a source of inspiration for artists 
and philosophers. In the process, OncoMouse™ became the cultural icon 
of the transgenic lab mouse. Interestingly, playing God as such was not 
necessarily the problem but the doing it for profit was.
At the very moment Harvard and DuPont were granted their oncomouse 
patent, 21 patents filed for other animal biotechnology applications were 
pending. A year later in April 1989, the number was already up to 65 
patents pending. They were filed by hospitals, universities and commercial 
companies (Andrews 1989). It took the Patent Office five years before they 
granted another patent on a transgenic mouse (Anonymous 1992; Andrews 
1993). In December 1992, three patents were granted on transgenic mice 
intended for biomedical research. At that time, more than 180 applications 
were awaiting Government action for animal patents (Andrews 1993). 
While the research community and biotech entrepreneurs were anxiously 
awaiting the next patents on genetically modified animals, Harvard/Oon-
coMouse™ turned out to be a commercial failure for DuPont (Marshall 
2000). Cancer researchers preferred to develop their own cancer mice and 
mutually exchange them rather than pay for the expensive licences. But the 
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creation of new oncomice is also protected by the DuPont patent. Initially 
this caused no problems. But, in the mid-1990s, DuPont started to claim its 
rights and requested researchers to put a halt to their oncomice activities. 
Harold Varmus, Director of the NIH, negotiated with DuPont about this 
restrictive patent. And in 2000, they came to an agreement concerning the 
use of oncomice in non profit institutions (Marshall 2000)50.
Transgenic mice did not only give rise to a battle over legal rights on 
technologies and animals between commercial companies and academic 
researchers, they also gave rise to legal battles between companies. As 
Marla Cone writes in the Chicago Sun-Times ‘by blurring the lines between 
people and animals, this latest explosion in genetic engineering is not only 
transforming medical and developmental biology, it is raising disturbing 
legal economic and moral quandaries. Everyone, it seems, is claming to 
invent, patent, and market a million dollar lab mouse, and at times the busi-
ness has degenerated into furious mouse wars’51 (Cone 1993) According to 
the New York Times reporter Lawrence Osborne: ‘The mouse industry is a 
lucrative fad, driven by money and by corporate greed’ (Osborne 2000). 
A big industry that, according to The Observer’s Mike Bygrave, is based on 
hope and promise, very powerful driving forces (Bygrave 2002). In 2006, 
more than 6000 patents had been granted on transgenic animals, mostly 
mice (Silver 2006a). The knock-out mouse project, a coordinated project 
to systematically knock out all mouse genes, launched after a meeting 
of the world’s key mouse geneticists in 2003, can be seen as a response 
from the scientific community to the growing influence (or obstruction) 
of privately-owned commercial companies in mouse biotechnology. One 
of the aims of this project now in progress is to create a publicly-available 
databank resource for genetic and phenotypic data derived from knock-
out mice (Austin et al. 2004). The first effort involved the acquisition of 
50. Similar problems arose with a patent for Cre-Lox the system owned by DuPont, granted to DuPont 
in 1992. This patent was the beginning of another battle of many years fought between the research 
community led by Harold Varmus and DuPont (Marshall 1998). Problems started in 1995, when DuPont 
started to approach researchers who were using the Cre-Lox system to sign a contract that limited 
their activities. Jackson Lab negotiated this for about 2 years with DuPont, but was not able to reach an 
agreement. Varmus, however, succeeded after a year of negotiation. Since 19 August 1998, researchers 
who work for non-profit institutions are allowed to use the Cre-Lox system, but DuPont preserves the 
commercial rights (Marshall 1998).
51. One of the three patents the US patent office granted in 1993 was related to a transgenic mouse 
designed with a human immune system. The patent was granted to Genpharm international, but the 
company Cell Gensys claimed that technology had been stolen from them (Coghlan 1994).
251 knock-out strains, the most relevant mouse models, and the extensive 
phenotypic data from Deltagen and Lexicon Genetics, two commercial 
companies (Collins et al. 2007).
As this strategic activity around the mouse illustrates, in the past 20 years 
the promise of mouse biotechnology has become a complex dynamic 
network linking together many different actors. These can be ‘actual or 
potential sufferers [from disease hoping] for a cure, scientists and research-
ers seeking a breakthrough that will [allow them to] make their name 
and advance their career, doctors and health care professionals wanting 
a therapy that will help treat their patients, biotech companies aiming 
for products that generate profit, governments looking for industrial and 
commercial developments that will generate employment and stimulate 
economic activity and international competitiveness’ (Rose 2007: 14). In 
short, this is a network that exemplifies what Rose refers to as a ‘political 
economy of hope’.
A critical perspective on the political economy of hope
It is in the light of this political economy of hope that I wish to reinterpret 
Crockett’s Ecce Homo. His sculpture presents the genetically engineered 
mouse as a quasi-religious icon of hope. Crockett is suggesting that 
biotechnologists, by giving us OncoMouse, are promising some sort of 
salvation, just like God the Father did when he granted us Jesus, His Son. 
Crockett is not the first visual artist to compare OncoMouse with the Christ 
figure. As a response to the first draft of ‘Mice into Wormholes’ by Donna 
Haraway52 in 1994, the artist Lynn Randolph painted a transspecific hu-
man mouse hybrid ‘The Laboratory, or the Passion of Oncomouse’. In this 
picture OncoMouse is portrayed as half-human half-mouse with clearly 
recognizable human breasts. In contrast to Crockett’s Ecce Homo this 
mouse is definitely a ‘she’. The reference to Christ is made by the crown 
of thorns she is carrying. In contrast to Crockett’s Ecce Homo this female/
man/mouse is not visibly suffering. She seems to be obedient and awaiting 
her destiny in peace. Haraway describes Randolph’s picture as follows: 
‘She is a Christ figure, and her story is that of the Passion. She is a figure 
in the sacred-secular dramas of technoscientific salvation history, with all 
52. Reprinted in revised form as Chapter 2: ‘FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouse™. Mice into Wormholes: 
A Technoscinece Fugue in Two parts, in Haraway D. (1997) Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium. 
FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouse™ New York London: Routledge.
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of the disavowed links to Christian narrative that pervade US scientific 
discourse. The laboratory animal is sacrificed; her suffering promises to 
relieve our own; she is a scapegoat and a surrogate’ (Haraway 1997:47). 
Elsewhere, Haraway points out that ‘although her promise is decidedly 
secular, she is a figure in the sense developed within Christian realism; S/
he is our scapegoat; s/he bears our suffering; s/he signifies and enacts our 
mortality in a powerful historically specific way that promises a culturally 
privileged kind of salvation – a ‘cure for cancer’’ (Haraway 1997: 79). 
Haraway chooses to interpret her oncomouse within a feminist techno-
science discourse. Her OncoMouse is a model for breast cancer that may 
in principle affect all women. ‘If not in my own body, then surely in those 
of my friends, I will some day owe to OncoMouse™ or her subsequently 
designed rodent kin a large debt. […] Whether I agree to her existence and 
use or not, s/he suffers, physically, repeatedly and profoundly that I and 
my sisters may live’ (Haraway 1997: 79). Crockett chooses a similar per-
spective on the transgenic oncomouse. ‘Because the lab mouse has been 
used to test almost every product, disease and other facet of human life, I 
have chosen to interpret this ultimate actor of modern science through the 
ultimate figure of salvation, Jesus Christ’ (Crockett 2001b). To Crockett the 
transgenic laboratory mice as scientific models represent modern science. 
These mice represent mankind in a deeply symbolic way. But, according 
to Crockett: ‘This all happens out of the public eye, invisible yet also 
somehow present’ (Rapaport 2006).
In addition to Ecce Homo Crockett made Pinkie, a marble sculpture of 
a baby mouse representing the Christ-child. The scale of Pinkie is that 
of a fleshy human baby, sculpted with the pathos of classical sculpture. 
Pinkie/Christ’s hand reaches upward in a gesture of blessing. What does 
Crockett want to tell/show us with these monstrous mice? According to 
himself, he is not opposed to ‘genetic tampering’, but he believes ‘that it 
will force us to come to terms with the metaphysical meaning of science’ 
(Crockett 2001b).
In 2001 Crockett takes a step further in his artistic exploration of the man/
mouse metaphor in his project Cultured. This group of marble sculptures, 
in the same style as Pinkie, represents seven newborn mice personifying 
the Seven Deadly Sins: lust, anger (wrath), gluttony, pride, sloth, greed 
and envy (see Figure 5 a-g). The figures are representatives of actual mice 
that are engineered to study human diseases. Gluttony was based on the 
ob-mouse, that is: the obese mouse engineered by Jackson Laboratory in 
Maine to study obesity and diabetes. Anger is pumped up on testosterone, 
and Lust is a mouse genetically altered to have an extremely sensitive skin. 
Pride refers to the vanity of cloning. Greed manifests the extra chromo-
some that predisposes to Down’s syndrome. Sloth has malformed legs as a 
result of arthritis and the effect of thalidomide. Envy, with its tiny human 
shaped ears, refers to the human ear that was grown on a laboratory 
mouse, as well as to the replication of a human immune system in mice 
(Johnson 2002; Rapaport 2006; Leffingwell 2002). With Cultured, Crocket 
sets a double agenda. He wants to make ‘these invisible little workers/
prisoners more anthropomorphic or human’. But, by choosing the theme 
of the seven sins he also merges religious ideas with scientific ones (Rapa-
port 2006). Ecce Homo, Pinkie and Cultured refer to both technoscientific 
practices and to religion. Therefore, the work of Crockett can be placed 
in the tradition of Christian iconography, as well as in the public debate 
on biotechnology. It is an explicit religious interpretation of the scientific 
practice of biotechnology.
The message of Ecce Homo the OncoMouse
Someone who gets to meet real oncomice in a laboratory after having seen 
Crockett’s mice, may well be disappointed. Compared with the grotesque 
and monstrous Ecce Homo, real oncomice are sweet little mice. There is 
nothing special about them. They are neither huge nor nude. They do 
not stand on their hind legs. They develop tumours and become visibly 
ill. But you cannot tell by simply looking at them that these mice carry 
human genes so that they may mimic human cancer. The trade mark 
is not imprinted on their fur. They look like normal lab mice and they 
behave like normal lab mice. The technology behind these mice is invis-
ible to the naked eye. Not only are their genetic mutations invisible, the 
mice themselves, who live in laboratories specialised in the containment 
of hazardous material, remain (as Crockett also pointed out) invisible to 
the public eye.
When Ecce Homo and, subsequently, Pinkie and Cultured entered 
the public arena through their exhibition in art galleries and reviews in 
art magazines, newspapers and even Nature (Nelkin and Anker 2002), 
the transgenic mice on which they were modelled also became visible 
to broader audiences. But Crockett dramatically added meaning to the 
original oncomice. He gave his OncoMouse a human size and a human 
posture. Standing on its hind legs Ecce Homo, the mouse/man mouse 
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model, literally resembles Man. Being at eye level, Ecce Homo can interact 
with his audience in a way that would not be possible for a mouse on a 
mouse-scale. The pathos of the sculpture reveals how transgenic mice like 
Ecce Homo are used by us humans; they are similar to us, but also victims 
of science.
How does Crockett help us to understand the moral meaning of animal 
biotechnology? Notwithstanding his pathos, Crockett refuses to take a po-
sition on animal biotechnology from a bioethics or animal rights point of 
view. In my opinion, this explains why his work is so powerful in pointing 
out the important issues at stake. Rather than entering the debate over the 
use of animals in laboratory experiments with a clear-cut moral message, 
Crockett’s sculptures visualise the time-old conflict between religious doc-
trine and scientific rationality. By explicitly referring to the Christ figure, 
Crockett seems to indicate we have chosen science as a substitute for faith 
in an era of dwindling spirituality, and he seems to be questioning this 
choice (Gladman 2002). This observation takes us to Crockett’s statement 
that man has to come to terms with the ‘metaphysical meaning of science’. 
Ecce Homo the OncoMouse can be interpreted as an icon of our overall 
optimistic faith in salvation by technoscience. But it also echoes the rheto-
ric of saving lives that is so stereotypically conveyed by moral justifications 
of (animal) biotechnology. Animal biotechnology is only permitted when 
experiments are useful and necessary. Whether an experiment is useful 
and necessary usually depends on how much it is expected to contribute 
in finding a cure for a life-threatening disease. It is about what we want to 
believe and what we are told.
If a secular equivalent of redemption can be found in the promise of 
biotechnology to save us from life-threatening diseases, what would be 
the equivalent of the Fall from Eden? By portraying his cultured transgenic 
mice as the Seven Deadly Sins, Crockett seems to explicitly reflect upon 
this question. The sculptures are not about sick mice, they are about us, 
humans. They urge us to have a closer look at the relationship between 
his transgenic mice and the human individuals they are actually model-
ling. These mice are mouse copies of obese people, people who want to 
regenerate some of their degenerating tissues, or children of mothers who 
took thalidomide while pregnant. Thalidomide was a widely used seda-
tive to prevent morning sickness in pregnant women in the early 1960s. 
By the time it became clear what the effect of thalidomide actually had 
on embryonic development, more than ten thousand thalidomide-induced 
teratologies (short limbs) had been found (Leroi 2003: 118-121). The medi-
cal examples that the mice represent are carefully chosen by Crockett. 
These illnesses are the result either of ‘bad’ or ‘immoral’ (unhealthy or 
risky) human behaviour or of scientific mistakes. Also many forms of can-
cer, the raison d’être of OncoMouse™, are related to (unhealthy) lifestyles. 
There is a general consensus on the existence of a relationship between 
smoking and lung cancer, sunbathing and skin cancer, unhealthy diet 
and colon cancer. They all represent diseases that are caused by morally-
questionable lifestyles. It seems that Crockett wants to argue that these 
mice designed to model these forms of cancer are literally sacrificed for 
our sins. With Cultured, in my opinion, Crockett adds a very critical note 
to the heroic statement that with transgenic mice scientists are finding 
cures to life-threatening diseases. Genetic diseases are the result of genes 
and behaviour. Transgenic mice will not change our behaviour.
But Ecco Homo the OncoMouse™ and Cultured are not only about 
human sins and faith in redemption by science and technology. They are 
also critical reflections on the commodification of life and the trade marks 
that the transgenic mice are carrying. OncoMouse™ is not just a transgenic 
mouse; it is the first patented animal. The sculpture of Ecce Homo does 
not only comment on the promises made by the scientists, it also com-
ments upon the promises made by DuPont and all the other commercial 
companies involved in the worldwide transgenic mouse business. In 
advertising their commercially available OncoMouse™, DuPont promised 
‘better things for better life’. It is hard to believe in the sincerity of this 
promise, given the problems that the patenting of OncoMouse™ and other 
biotechnologies entailed for the non-profit-scientific community.
Concluding remarks
Ecce Homo the OncoMouse can be interpreted as a modern icon of our 
optimistic faith in salvation through technoscience. To many people, re-
ligious or not, the idea that science can and will bring about a form of 
salvation, a longer, healthier and even happier life, is a tempting one. The 
whole biotech industry is based on this hope and promise. Nevertheless, 
I do not think I can subscribe to Nelkin’s statement that ‘by drawing on 
powerful images of Christianity, scientists are seeking to attract converts 
– to convince the public and many sceptics of the power of their ideas’. I 
do not see God talk simply as a matter of strategic rhetorics. Rather I am 
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convinced that God talk illustrates how biotechnology itself has become 
a belief system, albeit a belief system that includes a number of varieties. 
To some, biotechnology means hope to find a cure for life-threatening 
diseases. To others, breakthroughs in mouse biotechnologies represent the 
promise that a healthy biotech industry will provide jobs for the people 
who work there and revenues for the shareholders. Lessons learned about 
the malleability of nature challenge long-held beliefs about creation. So, 
in this sense too, biotechnology is becoming a belief system, one that 
replaces traditional beliefs in God. To the extent that God has left the 
scene, he left behind a rather unsettling imaginative vacuum that is now 
being occupied by biotechnologists (Midgley 2004). According to Midgley, 
this has to do with the persistence of the idea of the world as machinery, 
but now in the absence of a designer: ‘Where there is no designer the 
whole idea of a mechanism begins to grow incoherent. Natural selection 
is supposed to fill the gap, but it is a thin idea, not very satisfying to the 
imagination’ (Midgley 2003: 118). We need something to believe in, some-
thing that will help us to coherently frame our imagination, something that 
entails a vision of nature.
This takes me to the answer to the second set of questions about the 
feelings and concerns that are expressed by the playing God metaphor. 
Are these primarily moral concerns about messing with His creation or 
Nature, or does ‘God talk’ also reveal other more complex issues of moral 
concern? In summary, I believe God talk reveals much more than moral 
concerns about messing with His creation. It also expresses concerns about 
power, or to put it more specifically, about the distribution of power. Who 
is promising salvation through biotechnology? If this is really the first time 
‘a living creature understands its origin and can undertake to design its fu-
ture’, it is an important question which living creature it is that understands 
itself. Who is playing God? As Midgley points out, it cannot be human 
beings in general. Most people have no idea how to do it. This means 
that the biotech revolution is creating a new type of elite. These are the 
biotechnologists, the only people who are able to make the changes in the 
DNA of living organisms (Midgley 2004). This elite, with unprecedented 
knowledge concerning matters of life and death, can play a dominant role 
in a political economy of hope.
The danger of biotechnology turned into a belief system is that, by 
doing so, it may become less susceptible to critique. If one sincerely be-
lieves that mouse biotechnology will lead to some sort of salvation: for 
example, by saving lives that would otherwise be lost, every mouse and 
every amount of funding invested in mouse research becomes important 
and necessary – a belief which is almost impossible to question. Such 
a belief may stand in the way of a sound moral and political debate on 
what animal biotechnology is really about, the animal suffering involved, 
and the implications of biotechnology for our own human future and 
other bio-political issues. What is it exactly that mouse biotechnology is 
promising? For example, one of the critical points Crockett seems to be 
making is that biotechnology will encourage a hedonistic lifestyle. What 
effect will the genetically engineered mice have on our lifestyle if ‘sins’ 
related to the western way of living, such as the consumption of unhealthy 
food, smoking, stress and pollution, can be compensated with research 
on genetically engineered mice? If research on the mouse and the human 
genome is directed towards correcting or overcoming genetic errors, what 
will be the future standards of health and quality of life? Will ‘health’ 
simply mean to be free of life-threatening diseases such as cancer, or will 
it also come to imply freedom from ‘genetic errors’ involved in obesity or 
colour blindness? This is an important question because, as Rose observes, 
biotechnology implies a shift from technologies of health to technologies 
of life. ‘Contemporary medical technologies do not merely seek to cure 
diseases, but to control and manage vital processes of the body and mind’ 
(Rose 2007: 8). How will our perceptions of genetic diseases evolve when 
our understanding of the genome and of the complex interactions between 
genes (of both mouse and man) increases? What will we look like in the 
future when: ‘Interventions are demanded by customers making choices 
on the basis of desires shaped not by medical necessity but by the market 
and consumer culture’ (Rose 2007: 10). If scientists are playing God, what 
is their (or the market’s) Divine plan? Are genetically modified mice to be 
seen as monstrous anticipations of what we will become ourselves?
Figure 1 A giant mouse (left) grown from an egg injected with rat growth-
hormone genes weighs nearly twice as much as its normal sibling. Photo: Ralph 
Brinster, University of Pennsylvania School of Veterinary Medicine, taken from 
Palmiter, R.D, Brinster R.L et al. ‘Dramatic growth of mice that develop from eggs 
microinjected with metallothionein-growth hormone fusion genes’, Nature, Vol. 
300, pp. 611-615, 16 December 1982. Courtesy of Ralph Brinster.
Figure 2 Fluorescent green mice. Images taken from p. 8652 Yang, M., Reynoso, J. 
Jiang, P. (2004) ‘Transgenic nude mouse with ubiquitous green fluorescent protein 
expression as a host for human tumors’, Cancer Research, Vol. 64, pp. 8651-8656. 
Courtesy of AntiCancer Inc.
Figure 4 Ecce Homo by Bryan Crockett. Courtesy of Bryan Crockett.
Als we een muis in een 
mens moeten veranderen 
om aids te genezen, 
doen we dat.
Het ideale proefdier voor onderzoek naar hiv- 
infecties? Dat is de mens zelf. Onderzoekers waren 
tot nu toe echter aangewezen op apen. Niet ideaal.
Hoogleraar Spits en onderzoeker Weijer wilden 
sneller tot resultaten komen. De celbiologen van het 
AMC lanceerden nieuwe ideeën om een muis een 
cruciale menselijke trek mee te geven: de vatbaar-
heid voor het aidsvirus. Daarvoor moesten ze het 
dier een ‘menselijk’ afweersysteem geven. Met finan-
ciële hulp van Bill Gates wordt nu in internationaal 
verband gewerkt om de ideale muis te maken voor 
hiv-onderzoek. Zodat virologen snel meer te weten 
komen over het virus dat miljoenen doden op zijn 
geweten heeft. Om vervolgens vaccins te kunnen 
testen, waarvan uiteindelijk vele mensen, met name 
in ontwikkelingslanden, profiteren.
Groot denken. Durven dromen. Internationaal samen- 
werken. En je nooit laten beperken door ‘kan niet’ 
of ‘lukt toch niet’. Dat is de mentaliteit die lééft in 
het AMC. Als ook jouw zorg niet stopt bij de 
muren van je ziekenhuis en je je ambitie serieus 
neemt, dan bén je AMC’er. Kijk wat jij kunt doen op 
www.amc.nl/werken.
AMC_muis_260x192_metro.indd   1 29-09-2006   13:55:09
Figure 3 “If we have to change a mouse into a human to cure aids we will do 
so.” From the recruitment campaign ‘It is your world’ (Het is jouw wereld) of the 
Academic Medical Centre (AMC), Amsterdam.
Figure 6 Harvard/OncoMouse created by Phil Leder at Harvard. Courtesy 
of Phil Leder.
Figure 7 Doogie the smart mouse created by Joe Tsien at Princeton. Courtesy of 
Joe Tsien.
Figure 5 Cultured by Bryan Crockett, The Seven Deadly Sins, clockwise: a Lust, b 
Anger (Wrath), c Gluttony, d Pride, e Sloth, f Greed, and g Envy. Courtesy of Bryan 
Crockett.
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Figure 9 From the Transgenic Mice Series by Catherine Chalmers: a Rhino, and b 
Obese. Courtesy of Catherine Chalmers.
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Figure 8 the GFP Bunny project: 
a Alba, and b Eduardo Kac 
holding Alba in his arms.
b
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Chapter 4
The ‘Frankenstein thing’ or the monsters we fear
We have a choice of what myths, what visions we will use to help us understand the 
physical world. We do not have a choice of understanding it without using myths or 
visions at all. Again we have a real choice between becoming aware of these myths 
and ignoring them. If we ignore them, we travel blindly inside myths and visions 
which are largely provided by other people. This makes it much harder to know 
where we are going.53
 Mary Midgley
Introduction
Of Monsters and Mutants
In their book The Molecular Gaze, Suzanne Anker and Dorothy Nelkin 
discuss monsters in relation to bioart, a new form of contemporary art 
involving techniques borrowed from biology. In the chapter mutation, 
manipulation and monsters: the new grotesque in arts, they describe how 
research in genetics and, especially, the possibilities of genetic manipula-
tion have resurrected a long-standing interest in monsters and mutants in 
popular culture and the visual arts. ‘The monsters and mutations of con-
temporary culture and visual art are expressing the ethical dilemmas and 
the ambiguities that are inherent in science and technology – activities that 
can cure or kill, create or destroy, provide benefits or cause harm’ (Anker 
and Nelkin 2004: 76). In their discussion of the (artistic) imagination and 
biological science underlying popular visions of the monstrous, they not 
only show how the definition of the monster is time-dependent, but also 
how closely it is related to developments in (molecular) biology. ‘Once 
called “freaks”, today’s “monsters” are construed as beings with mutations 
that are expressed as bodily aberrations. As genetics guides one’s vision of 
the normal, anomalies have turned into congenital deformities, oddities into 
specimens and monsters into mutations’ (Anker and Nelkin 2004: 47).
53. Mary Midgley (1992) Science as salvation. A modern myth and its meaning, London and New York: 
Routledge, p. 13.
Figure 10 Genpets™ made by Bio-Genica by Adam Brandejs.
Courtesy of Adam Brandejs.
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Since the discovery of the homeobox genes in 1984, molecular biology has 
become a dominant discipline within the field of developmental biology. 
Today, most developmental disorders that lead to phenotypic abnormali-
ties can be explained on the basis of genetic defects or mutations (Leroi 
2003). This process the ‘geneticisation’ of developmental biology entailed 
a ‘demystification’ of the monster. Freaks that were traditionally seen as 
monstrosities lost their mystical character. They are no longer monsters, 
they have become genetic mutants.
But, as Anker and Nelkin point out, in spite of these new insights 
from modern biology, the term ‘monster’ did not loose its archetypical 
significance. With the aid of modern biotechnology, humans are capable 
of altering the ‘blueprint’ of life and recreating living organisms. During 
the molecular revolution, the life sciences reduced the naturally occur-
ring (mystic) monsters to genetic mutants. At the same time, with the art 
of genetic engineering, scientists are creating a new class of potential 
monsters. Therefore, classical definitions of the monster are no longer 
adequate. Monsters are no longer the effect of Divine interventions or 
nature’s contingencies. Today’s monsters are human creations. That is why 
Anker and Nelkin argue that the monster metaphor is more relevant than 
ever. ‘The growing possibilities of altering the body, tampering with nature, 
and manipulating reproductive processes are clinically and philosophi-
cally seductive, yet troublesome as well. They promise control and even 
perfection, but they do also evoke fundamental questions of authenticity, 
identity and bodily integrity – the same questions that, two centuries ago, 
inspired Mary Shelley to create Frankenstein’ (Anker and Nelkin 2004: 
3). If the questions are the same as two centuries ago, what has changed 
since 1818?
Is Frankenstein no longer a myth?
If we have to believe Anker and Nelkin, the life sciences have changed 
in such way that ‘Mary Shelley’s novel is no longer a myth’ because bio-
technology has given all the resources we need ‘to engineer the human 
body for cosmetic as well as therapeutic purposes’ (ibid.: 71). And, as they 
write in the closing paragraph of their chapter on monsters, the continu-
ing tampering with genes might lead to ‘a gruesome parade of horribles’. 
How can we interpret this horrific vision of biotechnology? This is an 
important question, because Anker and Nelkin do not stand alone with 
their reference to Frankenstein. Frankenstein’s monster is more or less 
In the 16th and 17th centuries, monsters were virtually everywhere. 
Princes collected them; naturalists catalogued them; theologians used 
them for religious propaganda; scholars charted their occurrence and their 
significance in exquisitely illustrated books (Leroi 2003). In those days, 
monsters were human beings with developmental deformities like those 
associated with Siamese twins and Cyclops – physical deformities which 
were taken to be a punishment by God. The ontogenesis of monsters was 
taken to lie in unnatural acts that offended the Divine laws. Thus, despite 
the monster’s bodily malformation, the issue at stake in the phenomena of 
monstrosity was not physical, but moral (Graham 2002).
The etymological roots of the term ‘monster’, derived from the Latin 
monere (to warn) suggest that abnormalities of this kind were taken to be 
dangerous (Anker and Nelkin 2004). Associated with grotesque deformity, 
gross incongruity, and inhumane cruelty, monsters represent a threatening 
force, a terrifying and convincing deviation from the natural, as well as 
something that draws public attention and must be exposed to the public 
gaze. An alternative etymological reading starts from the French montrer, 
or the Latin monstrare, to point out, or show forth, as the origin of the term 
‘monster’54. A monster is something to be shown, to be displayed, precisely 
because it is so different and frightening. Following this etymology, the 
purpose of a monster is to reveal the Divine Will (Graham 2002). Although 
those who warn us about Divine Will evoke fear, they also attract curiosity. 
The fear of monsters is often accompanied with fascination. Freak shows, 
the public exhibition of human oddities such as dwarfs, giants and Siamese 
twins, were a popular form of entertainment from the late 17th century 
onward to the early 20th century. At the start of the 17th century, natural 
philosophers like Francis Bacon began to take a more scientific perspec-
tive on monsters. Teratology, ‘monster studies’, replaced the old medieval 
wonder books. Scholars no longer explained abnormalities in terms of 
Divine punishment, but in terms of natural causation (Leroi 2003).
Monsters have always been, and still are, of great value to biology. 
Monster research is of particular importance for developmental biology. 
By studying anatomical abnormalities, developmental biologists gain 
insight into the complex mechanisms underlying normal development. 
54. Graham (2002). On the true origin of the term there is no agreement. The Oxford English Dictionary 
takes monere to be the origin [OFr. monstre f. L monstrum, orig. a divine portent or warning, f. monere 
warn.]
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stone and the elixir of life’ (Shelley 2002: 42). He is very clear about what 
it is he is after. He dreams about the glory awaiting him if he ‘could banish 
disease from the human frame and render man invulnerable to any but a 
violent death’ (ibid.: 42). Victor is soon captured by the spirit of scientific 
discovery. He describes enthusiastically how ‘in other studies you go as far 
as others have gone before you, and there is nothing more to know; but in 
scientific pursuit there is continual food for discovery and wonder’ (ibid.: 
52). What exactly he is doing in his laboratory and elsewhere remains 
somewhat unclear, but it involves ‘collecting bones from charnel-houses’ 
and disturbing ‘the tremendous secrets of the human frame’ with ‘profane 
fingers’ (ibid.: 55). One dreary night in November, he finally succeeds with 
his experiments. He puts life into a humanlike creature he has made him-
self from various materials, including human remains. Initially he is excited 
when he sees ‘the dull yellow eye of the creature open’ (ibid.: 58). But 
only a moment later, he finds himself filled with horror and disgust. The 
experiment turns out to be a catastrophe. The creature he made looks like 
a wretch. He abandons it and flees from his laboratory, in order to return 
to the beautiful places where he spent his innocent, dreamy youth. But the 
traumatic event will not leave him in peace. When his younger brother is 
viciously murdered, it is clear to him that his hideous creation is respon-
sible for this violent death. Unable to work things out with the monster 
he himself created, Victor must then witness how his best friend and wife 
also fall victim to ‘the fiend’. Sorrow and regret are the results of Victor’s 
irresponsible behaviour. At the end of the story, he sets out to reunite with 
the monster who has decided to retreat from the civilized world. When his 
life is coming to an end, Victor Frankenstein confesses the story of his life 
to Captain Walton, who finds him almost frozen, wandering in an Arctic 
waste. When Victor recognises the ambition of the young adventurer, he 
warns him about the possible consequences of scientific aspirations. ‘You 
seek for knowledge and wisdom as I once did; and I ardently hope that 
the gratification of your wishes may not be a serpent to you, as mine has 
been’ (ibid.: 31).
The birth of a myth
In the two centuries that have passed since it was first published, the story 
of Frankenstein has truly become a modern myth (Turney 1998; Haynes 
1995). In his book Frankenstein’s footsteps, science, genetics and popular 
culture, Jon Turney explores the birth of the Frankenstein myth. As he 
the archetype of popular ‘biotech-monsterphobia’. What is it exactly that 
people like Anker and Nelkin fear about biotechnology when they refer 
to Frankenstein? This question implies three sub-questions. First of all, 
what is it exactly that is ‘no longer a myth’? Secondly, do scientists really 
possess the resources necessary for re-engineering the human body? And 
thirdly, if this proves to be the case, are contemporary biotechnologists 
indeed examples of scientists who are following in the footsteps of Victor 
Frankenstein? In other words, how does the myth of Frankenstein relate to 
new developments in biotechnology, now and in the near future?
In order to answer these questions, I will first of all subject the Frank-
enstein myth to a close rereading. What are the essential ingredients/
characteristics of the Frankenstein myth? Why did the story become a 
myth? And why do people feel that the Frankenstein story is relevant for 
understanding the implications of biotechnology today? Subsequently, I 
will turn my attention to the contemporary monsters of modern biotech-
nology: genetically engineered and mutant mice. I will tell the story of 
four supermice and their creators in order to illustrate the (future) pos-
sibilities of genetic human enhancement. I will argue that, in the days of 
the supermice, rereading Shelley’s novel is of great importance. Myths play 
an important role in our perception of the world. In our understanding of 
modern biotechnology, the Frankenstein myth is beyond doubt the most 
influential myth. It has helped us to frame the issue. But exactly how does 
the Frankenstein myth influence our ‘spontaneous’ (that is: culturally and 
socially constructed) responses to biotechnology? Shelley’s was the first 
effort to flesh out the intuitive reception of what was just beginning to take 
shape. Now that the project of redesigning life seems to becoming reality, I 
believe it is important to return to this first original effort and see what we, 
who live at the beginnings of a biotech revolution, may learn from it.
Part One: The Frankenstein myth
The story of Victor Frankenstein
Frankenstein is the story of a young and ambitious scientist, seeking 
dangerous knowledge, and his hideous creation. Victor Frankenstein is 
haunted by the ambition to unravel the secrets of life. He wants to control 
life and to learn how to put life into lifeless matter. ‘With the greatest 
diligence’ he wants to become involved in ‘the search of the philosopher’s 
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proportions. Frankenstein, with his scientific mindset, serves as a model 
for the new scientific ideal. Like Prometheus, Frankenstein could be con-
sidered a benefactor of humankind. His desire to renew life where death 
had apparently condemned the body to corruption, was a vision he shared 
with other medical ‘Prometheans’ of the early 19th century (Lederer 2002). 
But Victor Frankenstein was more successful with his experiments. He 
truly succeeded in finding the elixir of life. The creature he made was 
really alive. But, at the same time, the experiment was a dramatic failure, 
notably because the creature he made was hideous rather than perfect.
What is it that distinguishes the myth from other fictional narratives such 
as legends or fables that are also continuously being retold? Part of the 
answer is that myths seem to have a predictive power. Myths are stories 
intended to explain apparently inexplicable events, such as the creation of 
the world or the introduction of important technical devices (such as fire) 
or cultural conventions (such as marriage). In that sense, they have both 
explicative and normative meaning. They reveal fundamental truths about 
the human condition, often through the use of archetypes, and serve as 
moral guides. This should also apply to the Frankenstein tale if it is to be 
truly a myth. It should have a mythical aura and should convey an important 
moral message about modern technology. The truth of the Frankenstein 
myth is that those who go beyond nature, by artificially reshaping life, are 
playing with ‘fire’ and will be punished for this. Containment will prove 
impossible. Their artifacts will get out of control.
According to Jon Turney (1998), the Frankenstein story became a myth 
because Shelley’s novel was the first secular narrative about a scientist 
involved in the artificial creation of life. As Turney explains: ‘Frankenstein 
marks a transition in stories of men creating life because Victor does not 
invoke the aid of a Deity or any other supernatural agency. He achieves 
his goal by dint of his own (scientific) efforts’ (Turney 1998: 14). He has 
good intentions, but is blind to the consequences. ‘Natural philosophy is 
the genius that regulated my fate’, Victor Frankenstein confesses when he 
explains his deeds (Shelley 2002: 40). Herein lays the crucial difference 
between the Frankenstein story and other classical narratives like the Faust 
story, the Golem legend, and the Prometheus myth: it offers the first truly 
secular treatment of the great aspirations and fears of humanity, replacing 
eschatological punishment with scientific determinism (Haynes 1995).
Frankenstein-the-monster myth continues to allow individuals to articu-
late uneasiness about the natural sciences, in particular biology. Of all 
explains, whether a story becomes a myth depends on the number of 
times it is retold. The vitality of myths lies in their capacity to change, their 
adaptability and openness to new combinations of meaning (Turney 1998). 
In other words, a myth is a story that takes on a life of its own. A myth is 
a narrative that, through many retellings, becomes part of our collective 
memory, our reservoir of shared references. In the process of becoming 
a myth, the author more or less loses control over his or her own story. 
What is thought, felt and said about the story by countless others takes 
on progressively greater significance while the details and nuances of the 
original story are more or less erased. By the time a story approaches 
mythical status, the original version has become almost irrelevant. In that 
respect Mary Shelley’s novel is remarkable. It is a modern example of a 
myth: an almost ‘anonymous’ story that became firmly embedded in our 
culture (Turney 1998). Since its first appearance, the story has more or less 
emancipated itself from the original book. Frankenstein has been continu-
ally retold in various media (novels, plays, films, newspaper articles, etc.). 
Two years after its publication, the first stage version based on the novel 
was performed. And within three years, 14 other dramatisations appeared 
on English and French stages (Lederer 2002). The story is still being retold 
in comic magazines, horror movies, and motion pictures. Although only a 
few people have actually read the original book, everybody has heard of 
Frankenstein.
The rough outline of the Frankenstein myth (in all its adaptations and 
retellings) is the story of the mad scientist. These stories display a typical 
structure or script: a scientist makes a discovery that poses a significant 
threat to society, to the everyday world, either deliberately or by accident. 
Like the traditional monsters, these man-made monsters serve as a warning 
to those who intend to transgress natural or Divine laws. But this does not 
imply that the Frankenstein myth is a straightforward anti-science story 
(Turney 1998). Very often, the mad scientist is simply naïve. He failed to 
really consider possible consequences, but acts with good intentions. It 
is too easy to read the Frankenstein story simply as a warning about the 
dangers of scientific ambitions, as some readers (both in Shelley’s own 
time and today) have done. The subtitle of her novel, the new Prometheus, 
suggests that the novel displays a number of layers, and that its message 
concerning the potential dangers and benefits involved in penetrating the 
secrets of nature is more ambiguous. By introducing Frankenstein as the 
new Prometheus, Shelley is intentionally creating a character of mythical 
112
Biotech Pioneers
113
The ‘Frankenstein thing’ or the monsters we fear
is more or less regained. Yet, the fact that he managed to achieve his goals 
remains a source of uneasiness.
Mad science
The ‘birth’ of the Frankenstein myth took place at a time when the method 
of experimental investigation was rapidly gaining prominence in the life 
sciences. The new scientists no longer studied the secrets of nature by 
relying only on books or observation (‘natural history’); they subjected 
nature to experimental procedures. The shift from natural philosophy and 
natural history to experimental life science is an important element in the 
Frankenstein story. The new powers over life and death are associated 
with the new, experimental approach, the new inheritor of time-old mythi-
cal aspiration. In the final decades of the 18th and in the early decades of 
the 19th century, a new practice of science evolved that we nowadays call 
‘experimental biology’. Biology increasingly came to rely on experiments 
on living animals: vivisection. Biologists began to have dirty hands57. In 
the story, Victor testifies to Walton how he ‘tortured the living animal to 
animate the lifeless clay’ (Turney 1998; Shelley 2002: 55). Vivisection was 
not completely new at the time when Shelley wrote her novel (Harvey, 
Von Haller, etc.), but it was now done on a much larger scale than before, 
and it had started to become ‘normal practice’.
The ‘torturing of animals’, for several reasons, takes place behind closed 
doors, invisible to the public eye. First of all, in order to create a secluded 
space where specialists can freely work in a scientific atmosphere. But per-
haps even more important, secrecy prevents exposure to, the ‘emotional 
responses’ of the public that would probably make this type of scientific 
work impossible. In Shelley’s novel, there is a clear tension between the 
importance attributed to this type of work by the scientists involved (i.e. 
Victor) and the moral sensitivities of his cultural environment. This renders 
the moral profile of this practice (the animal cruelty it involves, the use 
of human corpses, etc.) highly problematic. Somehow, the public needs 
to come to terms with this ambiguous image of the sciences. Turney de-
scribes how, in response to this ‘dirty work’, at the turn of the 18th century 
a paradoxical public image of the scientist develops. On the one hand, 
57. In the early 19th century, anatomical studies like those conducted by Victor Frankenstein also 
generated public hostility. Before the revised version of the novel in 1831, the only bodies legally available 
to physicians and surgeons for study were those of executed criminals (Lederer 2002).
the sciences, biology is the discipline that touches on the most powerful 
desires of human life. Biological research is about life itself: birth, sex, 
suffering, disease, disability, and death. We have always been prisoners 
of the body, victims of morbidity and mortality, and we desire that the 
power that biology might give us will relieve us from these burdens. The 
realisation that biology offers the prospect of ultimate control over the 
living realm evokes deep-rooted ambivalent feelings. The ambiguity in the 
story of Victor Frankenstein articulates a deeply-felt cultural neurosis about 
modern science (Turney 1998). This neurosis evolves out of a conflict be-
tween apparently incompatible basic attitudes towards science: (manifest) 
enthusiasm and (latent) fear. Enthusiasm, because of the progress it will 
entail in the medical sciences; fear because of the potential monstrous 
artifacts that are made in laboratories (see Zwart 2004). Frankenstein him-
self is the classical example of a person suffering from this neurosis. He 
is both extremely enthusiastic and extremely traumatised. After fleeing 
from his laboratory and abandoning his creature, he suffers from a severe 
nervous breakdown. Unable to act in a responsible way, he does not act 
at all. He is has paralyses of will and suffers from depression. The Frank-
enstein story is an archetypical myth that expresses deep concerns that 
trouble the modern mind. The many interpretations of the Frankenstein 
story offer a powerful illustration of the ways in which society responds 
to discoveries in biology and other sciences. Frankenstein is part of our 
cultural vocabulary and can readily be used to express fears and anxieties 
about the implications of new developments in science and medicine55. It 
differs from other classical myths like the Prometheus myth because it is 
neither a Divine power, nor a troubled conscience, but the artifact itself 
that turns against us. This is what the artist Adam Zaretsky refers to as 
Boomerangaphobia56. If a biotechnological artifact gets out of control and 
turns against us, there is nobody to blame but ourselves. The myth offers 
a vehicle for packaging and personifying fears and doubts about science 
and technology. This form of personalisation helps us to deal with these 
fears. The myth also contains an element of catharsis: namely, by punish-
ing those who intend to go beyond nature. The fact that Frankenstein is 
punished offers a certain amount of comfort. In the end, cultural stability 
55. e.g. Greenpeace’s anti-biotech slogan: ‘Say no to Frankenfood’.
56. Personal communication.
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perceptions, the creature and its maker lost much of the complexity, that 
Mary Shelley had given them59.
Whoever takes the trouble to read Shelley’s original novel will, however, 
understand that the monster is not born as a vicious and murderous crea-
ture, but is driven to his horrible deeds after years of sadness, loneliness 
and deprivation. It is the negligence of his creator Victor Frankenstein, who 
failed to take responsibility for his creation, that resulted in the traumatic 
failure of the monster’s efforts to become civilised. And this (abandonment 
and rejection by society) was what made the creature become a monster. 
Victor Frankenstein’s struggle with his own responsibilities – Should he 
kill the creature? Make him a female counterpart, in order to free him from 
his loneliness? Who is to blame for the terrible death of his young brother, 
maid, wife, and friend, he or his creature? – indicates that the novel is not 
at all a simple horror story. Rather, it is a story about science ethics and 
bioethics.
Frankensteinian ethics and contemporary biotechnology
To warn about the consequences of the search for dangerous knowledge 
is a key theme in the story. It is the reason why Victor confesses to Walton: 
‘Learn from me’, he begs him, ‘if not by my precepts, at least by my exam-
ple, how dangerous is the acquirement of knowledge and much happier 
that man is who believes his native town to be the world, than he who 
aspires to become greater than his nature will allow’ (Shelley 2002: 54). 
Nevertheless, the ethical lessons to be learned from Shelley’s novel are 
more than simple warnings about the catastrophic consequences of play-
ing God. It is not an anti-science novel. In the words of Stephen Jay Gould: 
‘Victor Frankenstein is guilty of a great moral failing, but his crime is not 
technological transgression against natural or divine order’ (Gould 1996: 
54). Had Shelley believed that scientists should not explore the ‘cause of 
generation and life’, she would surely have chosen to portray him as a 
genuine moral monster (Segal 2001). The story tells us about the scientists’ 
responsibility for their work. It urges us to take good care of our creations. 
Indeed, it is a story about care rather than a story about control.
Another important theme in the novel is the way Frankenstein com-
municates about his experiments to the people that surround him (Zwart 
59. An exception to this is the 1994 movie Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein by Kenneth Branagh, starring 
Robert de Niro as the monster.
scientists are celebrated as heroes because of their achievements in the 
medical sciences. On the other, the image of the scientists in popular 
fiction begins to resemble that of the mad scientist. Whereas newspapers 
frequently report on medical breakthroughs as the result of scientific re-
search, ‘The image of the fictional biologist, at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, is one of an unfeeling and obsessive scientist’ (Turney 1998: 54). 
Another famous fictional (late) nineteenth century scientist is Wells’s Dr 
Moreau58. While Frankenstein more or less represents the beginning of the 
19th century, Moreau emerges when the century approaches its final years. 
His experiments on beast people – he tries to turn animals into humans 
by means of surgical operations – are of such an evil nature that he can 
only perform his ‘research’ far away from the civilised world on a secret 
island. This paradoxical image of the (biomedical) scientist, being, on the 
one hand, benevolent and, on the other involved in dirty business, is still 
persistent today.
A life of its own
Frankenstein, however, seems to have been deprived more or less of his 
original ambiguity. In the two centuries that have passed since Mary Shel-
ley published her novel, Victor Frankenstein became the stereotype of 
the mad bio-scientist, his hideous creation the archetype of science out 
of control. He is no longer a potential benefactor. He is simply portrayed 
as a mad scientist. His monster is no longer a pitiful creature seeking 
for acceptance and understanding. In the popular myth it has become a 
plainly evil monster. In the process of turning Frankenstein into a myth, 
the movie industry played an important role. Shelley’s story has been used 
as a source of inspiration for an impressive number of horror movies. The 
first motion picture of Frankenstein was made in 1931 by James Whale. It 
was the actor Boris Karloff who defined the popular image of the monster: 
a flat forehead of massive size, lots of highly visible stitches in the facial 
area and two metal studs protruding from the neck. In this movie and the 
countless Hollywood remakes that followed, the fate of Frankenstein and 
his monster became a clear-cut moral lesson illustrating the punishment 
that awaits ambitious scientists who play God by creating life. Much em-
phasis it put on the bloody revenge and horrible features of the monster 
and the evil or mad character of the scientist. As a result, in popular 
58. H.G. Wells, The Island of Doctor Moreau was first published in 1896.
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most recently, through the Internet. But, it is only on rare occasions that 
these sources of information confront us with real monsters, resembling 
Frankenstein’s. They hardly exist in laboratories. They are the product of 
imagination, produced by authors of fiction and Hollywood film directors. 
At the same time, biotechnology is progressing at an unprecedented pace, 
and it is not at all easy for the public to keep track of what the scien-
tists are doing. In the field of animal biotechnology, breakthrough after 
breakthrough is being reported. Transgenic pigs are supposed to become 
donors of human organs; a cloned sheep demonstrates in vivo the extent 
to which we have become masters in mammalian reproduction, and the 
OncoMouse™ is expected to free us from cancer. Does this also imply that 
we truly have all the resources we need ‘to engineer the human body’? 
What monsters are hidden away in secret laboratories? And what monsters 
are bound to emerge in the near future if things continue to evolve in this 
manner?
Part Two: Transgenic mice and the longing for perfection
Human heath and genetically engineered model mice
If there were a suitable candidate for monster status in today’s labora-
tories, it would probably be the transgenic mouse. Transgenic mice are 
the pioneers in tomorrow’s world of biotechnology. Virtually everything 
in biomedicine that will be applied to humans will first be tested on a 
mouse. So, if we think we have all the resources needed ‘to engineer the 
human body for cosmetic as well as therapeutic purposes’ as Anker and 
Nelkin argue, mice will tell us whether this really is the case (Anker and 
Nelkin 2004: 71). The techniques of genetic engineering are not new. The 
first transgenic mice were born at the beginning of the 1980s, when a mo-
lecular bio-revolution took place as five different laboratories independ-
ently reported the successful transduction of foreign genes into a mouse 
embryo. In the 25 years that followed the revolutionary events of the early 
1980s, transgenic mice have successfully invaded biomedicine. They have 
become part of the standard equipment of an average biomedical labora-
tory. In 2002, the year in which the mouse genome was ‘cracked’, Tom 
Clarke whom I quoted before in Chapter 2, estimated ‘the army of mice 
helping researchers each day all over the world’ to be 25 million strong 
(Clarke 2002).
2004). He is working night and day on his scientific project. Obsessed with 
his work, he becomes estranged from the research community to which he 
belongs. He does not communicate about his work: neither to his profes-
sional colleagues nor to the people who love and care about him. He does 
not even inform his own professor. He keeps the doors to his laboratory 
closed to the outside world. In a solitary chamber, or rather a cell, at the 
top of the house he keeps his ‘workshop of filthy creation’. Even when it 
becomes clear that his monster is on the rampage; hurting and killing his 
loved ones, he still does not confide in anyone. Rather than revealing what 
he knows about the murder of his young brother William, he prefers to say 
nothing. By remaining silent he lets the tragedy continue and more violent 
deaths follow. Only at the end of his life, when the monster has decided 
to withdraw from the hard and unwelcome world he was forced to live in, 
does Frankenstein confess his deeds to a stranger.
So the moral of the story is not to place a moratorium on all research in-
volving matters of life and death. Rather, its moral is a much more modern 
one. It is about careful scientists’ communication with others. According 
to Gould, Frankenstein should have taken time to educate the monster in 
order to make him fit for our society and at the same time educate society 
in acceptance and tolerance (Zwart 2004)60. ‘Frankenstein’s monster was 
a good man in an appallingly ugly body. His countrymen could have 
been educated to accept him, but the person responsible for that instruc-
tion – his creator Victor Frankenstein – ran away from his foremost duty 
and abandoned him at first sight’ (Gould 1996: 61). In 1818, Mary Shelley 
identified a feature of scientific research that people find disturbing today: 
the idea that scientists do not share their information and the results of 
their experiments, but keep silent about their research and its possible 
implications (Lederer 2002).
How does modern biotechnology relate to the obscure activities of Victor 
Frankenstein? In contrast to Frankenstein’s fictional scientific environment, 
today’s life sciences are controlled by strong internal and external monitor-
ing practices and guided by strict safety procedures. Unlike the situation 
in Mary Shelley’s days, where access to medical and scientific knowledge 
was limited to the wealthy and educated elite, today we have unparalleled 
access to information about scientific developments through the popular 
media, including television, film, radio, magazines and newspapers and, 
60. Zwart is referring to Gould (1996).
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that the human abnormalities that will be shown on tomorrow’s mass 
media freak shows are being created in today’s laboratories. Does the 
mouse research as it actually evolves justify this fear? Genetically engi-
neered humans do not exist yet. Since mice are the practice material, so 
to speak, for human enhancement studies, mouse genetics is the place to 
look for (future) monster anthropotechnologies.
Supermice
Although usually presented as laboratory animals necessary in our fight 
to conquer life-threatening diseases, not all transgenic mice represent the 
ill and the weak. On the contrary, serious research is undertaken on mice 
that can be referred to as genetic enhancement studies to further improve 
the normal and healthy. For example, biologists are studying the process 
of ageing by producing mutant mice that live longer. Others study decay of 
the physical body (muscles) in genetically engineered super-muscle-mice 
in order to learn how to stop or deter the process of physical ageing in 
humans. And, last but not least, there are biologists who study genes that 
are regarded as coding for intelligence in the smart mutant mouse. Unlike 
the majority of genetically modified mice that are only identifiable by 
the codes that describe their genetic mutations, mice that participate in 
such enhancement studies are given a name61. These mice are supermice. 
They are part of research projects aiming at mouse improvement and, as a 
future implication, the enhancement of the human body. Therefore, they 
carry the names of superheroes. Yoda is famous for his longevity; Doogie 
is the smart one; and He-Man and Marathon Mouse are the ones with the 
superior muscles, useful for strength and endurance.
Yoda
In 2001, Richard Miller and his group reported about lifespan extension 
in (naturally occurring) mutant dwarf mice in the scientific journal Pro-
ceeding of the National Academy of science62. In this paper, they stated 
that: ‘These observations show that a single genetic difference can retard 
multiple indices of senescence as well as an increasing longevity in mam-
mals’ (Flurkey et al. 2001: 6736). When one of these dwarf mice reached 
61. Usually not as individuals, but as a strain.
62. These mice are not transgenic. The genetic mutations occurred spontaneously. The mice are inbred 
by researchers.
The widespread use of the mouse as a research animal is based on the 
homology between the mouse and the human genome. Genomics research 
reveals that the mouse genome and the human genome are closely related. 
Transgenic mice, also known as ‘mouse models’, are created in order to 
study human genetic diseases. Mouse genes analogous to human genes 
are knocked out, while genes that code for human diseases are knocked 
in. Since the first knock-out mouse was made in 1990, the ‘knock-out 
mouse’ has become the most important model organism for biomedical 
research. The reason for the existence of these mice is their role in the 
battle against life-threatening diseases. It is here that I see a resemblance 
with Frankenstein’s creature. These mice are created on the basis of the 
same desire that drove Frankenstein to conduct his experiments. Both 
Frankenstein and contemporary biotechnologists acted, and continue to 
act, in order ‘to banish disease from the human frame’. Their ‘working 
materials’ also have certain features in common. Like the monster, trans-
genic mice are man-made living creatures, living artifacts. Because some 
of them carry human genes, they are also to a certain extent human. If 
not literally, they are quasi-human in the figurative sense. In scientific 
practice, mice serve as models for human diseases. In laboratory research, 
mice are stand-ins for human beings. In other words, transgenic mice 
are designed to be like us, humans. With their humanised genomes, they 
inform us about life-threatening human diseases. Transgenic mouse gene- 
tics is never an end in itself, it is always about human genetics. Being a 
mixture of, or intermediate form between, mouse and human, these mice 
are contemporary monsters that perhaps rightfully evoke associations with 
mythical monsters such as Frankenstein’s. But what is it we have to fear? 
These mice are neither out of control, nor hurting the innocent. They are 
safely hidden away in scientific laboratories specialised in the containment 
of hazardous materials. No human body parts are stitched on their backs. 
There is no physical resemblance with Frankenstein’s monster.
Is there any other reason to associate the genetic engineering (of ani-
mals) with the activities of Frankenstein? What horror scenarios may be 
awaiting us? Of course it is not the monstrous mouse, as such, that people 
fear when they refer to Frankenstein. What they fear are monsters that 
visibly resemble humans, monsters that are human. The ‘gruesome parade 
of horribles’ that Anker and Nelkin have in mind will be the horrifying 
result of engineering applied to human bodies, but made possible by the 
OncoMouse™. People who refer to Frankenstein, tend to express the fear 
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a fantastic dream. Like old age, a young and healthy body is one of the 
promises made by today’s biotechnology. At the end of the 1990s, a group 
led by H. Lee Sweeney at the University of Pennsylvania reported results 
on mice injected with synthetic genes that indicated that stronger muscles 
are in fact technically possible by means of genetic therapy. The results 
of their experiments with mice that were injected with a virus carrying 
the IGF-I gene suggested ‘that gene transfer of IGF-I into muscle could 
form the basis of a human gene therapy for preventing the loss of muscle 
function associated with ageing’ (Barton-Davis et al. 1998: 15603).
It was in 2001 that the IGF mouse started to receive wide public atten-
tion (Hruby 2002; Swift and Yeager 2001; Fitzpatrick 2002; Purgavie 2002; 
Brownlee 2004; Henderson 2004; Sokolove 2004; DeFrancesco 2004; Gar-
reau 2005; Naam 2006). By then, it turned out that these mice, two years 
after injection, developed 60 percent more muscle mass than an average 
mouse. Two years after the initial experimental treatment with the gene 
transfer, these mice’s strength remained intact. This is, of course, very in-
teresting, not only for people with particular forms of muscular dystrophy, 
but also for example for the (professional) sports community. ‘Are the 
mice representatives of a future generation of athletes?’, as E.M. Swift and 
Don Yeager write in The Observer. Because of their massive muscles the 
mice were named after He-Man (‘the most powerful man in the universe’), 
the popular muscled superhero from the toy series the Masters of the Uni-
verse 66. The He-Man mice received massive attention from the sports and 
fitness community. In September 2001, an article about these mice was 
published in Sports Illustrated. The ramifications for sports are obvious: 
to enhance the gene is to enhance the performance. Not to mention the 
potential. ‘If researchers are developing genetic therapies to treat broken 
bones, muscle tears and ligament damage, performance enhancing sports 
applications aren’t far behind’, remarks Patrick Hruby in The Washington 
Post (Hruby 2002: C01).
How great the potential for sports could be, is easy to illustrate. ‘Even 
if you train you lose speed’, explains Sweeney in the interview with Swift 
and Yeager. ‘It happened to Carl Lewis, Linford Christie, Jeremy Guscott, 
among others. But it hasn’t happened to He-Man [the mouse]. Because of 
the gene that was injected two years ago, the mouse grew exceptionally 
large muscles, and those muscles keep producing IGF-I. He-Man in the 
66. They are also referred to as Schwarzenegger mice (see Brownlee 2004).
its 4th birthday in 2004, it was nicknamed Yoda. The mouse was named 
after the 900-year-old yedi Yoda, known from the popular SF movie series 
Star Wars63. After celebrating his 4th birthday, Yoda’s picture appeared 
in several newspapers and on Internet websites (Ayres 2004; O’Connor 
2004). 4 years is a rather exceptional age for a mouse that has not been 
on a special restrictive diet. The average lifespan of an ordinary laboratory 
mouse is 2 years64. Mice in Miller’s stock usually grow to an average of 
3½ years. According to Miller, Yoda did reach a milestone. When asked 
about the future applications of his research results to human health, Miller 
responded to a NY Times reporter ‘that it was not a lead in for gene 
therapy’. His idea was ‘to find out what the key controlling chemicals are, 
so that the problems people now are facing in their 60s or 70s can be 
postponed for another 20 or 30 years’ (O’Connor 2004: A2). Miller’s mice 
do not only get very old, they also remain in a strikingly good physical 
condition. Probably the most important reason for being able to grow that 
old is their enhanced resistance to a number of lethal and chronic diseases. 
They do not develop arthritis for many years, they are resistant to cataracts 
and they are resistant to cancers. Their immune system stays healthy for 
a very long time. Interesting lessons could be learned from these mice. 
As Miller explained on the Australian ABC radio programme The Science 
Show, he would like to ‘be able to translate the mouse findings to figure 
out ways to produce medicines basically so that people in their 80s 90s, 
up to the age of 100, 110 perhaps, are also active and viable and have 
good cognitive powers and retain most of the functions they had when 
they were middle-aged’65.
He-Man and Marathon Mouse
A tempting thought. Imagine that with the aid of biotechnology we can 
really live longer, retaining a mid-life condition. The next step would, of 
course, be the wish for a younger and stronger body. If we are able to 
‘live forever’, we also want to feel ‘forever young’. We need a healthy and 
strong body that keeps in shape despite old age. This might not just be 
63. News about Yoda, his 4th birthday (and peaceful death) can be found at: <http://.med.umich.edu/
opm/newspage/2004/yoda.htm>.
64. Complementary to Miller’s research is the work of Makoto Kuro-o. This scientist from Dallas has 
found that mice engineered with overactive Klotho genes live, on average, 20 to 30 percent longer than 
normal mice (Kuro-o et al. 1997; Stein 2004).
65. Miller on the ABC radio Science Show broadcast on May 2004.
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have time to discuss and debate them before the ability to use this power 
is upon us’ (Sweeney 2004)67. This remark seems reassuring. But it is 
questionable whether this is a realistic view of the situation. It is perhaps 
too optimistic a view on the level and impact of the ethical debate on 
biotechnology and genetic enhancement, and perhaps too modest a view 
with regard to the state of the art in biotechnology. The biotech future 
could be closer to us than he realises. In the words of WADA’s Friedman: 
‘It is not rocket science. If you ask a molecular biologist, or even his 
students, how he would implant genes to change muscle function within 
half an hour he could write down three or four ways to do it’ (Swift and 
Yeager 2001: 44).
Three years after He-Man hit the newspapers, the marathon mice from 
San Diego excited the sports community. Researchers from the Salk In-
stitute injected a human version of the PPARδ gene into the mouse DNA 
(Salk Institute 2004). The genetically engineered mice which were the 
result of this treatment could run twice as far as their unaltered bud-
dies (Anonymous 2004). In contrast to He-Man, these ‘marathon mice’ are 
transgenic. This means they will pass on their athletic talents to their off-
spring. In the laboratory of Ron Evans of the Salk Institute, the transgenic 
mice were run on oxygen-infused enclosed treadmills until exhaustion. 
The running time these transgenic mice were able to sustain increased 
by 6 percent compared with normal mice, and the distance they were 
able to travel by 92 percent (Wang et al. 2004). Compare these results 
with the breaking of a record in sports. ‘Records are broken on a fraction 
of a percent, a few percentage points is like a minute or two in a race. 
This was a big change: 100 percent’, explains Evans to a reporter from 
Wired (Philipkoski 2004). This work demonstrates that complex physi-
ological properties such as fatigue, endurance, and running capacity can 
relatively easily be genetically manipulated (Wang et al. 2004). ‘They are 
like Lance Armstrong without getting on a bike’ Evans told the reporter of 
The Guardian (Pearson 2005: 28).
Doogie
We not only want to live longer and feel forever young. We also want to be 
super-intelligent. People have always been fascinated with the genetic ba-
sis of intelligence, and this also goes for biotechnologists. Only two years 
67. I have accessed the Scientific American via the Internet; therefore, a page number is not available.
throes of mouse old age, remains as mighty as he ever was, an Arnold 
Schwarzenegger of mice. […] He effortlessly climbs a ladder with 120 
grams of weights – equal to three times his body weight – strapped on his 
back’ (Swift and Yeager 2001: 44).
Will these remarkable results also come within reach for human ath-
letes? To Theodore Friedman, member of the World Anti Doping Agency 
(WADA), the answer is: Yes, gene therapy, such as He-Man underwent, 
will also be applicable to humans (Swift and Yeager 2001). According to 
Bengt Saltin, Professor of Human Physiology of the University of Copen-
hagen and also a member of WADA’ s special committee on gene doping, 
humans are not that far behind. But he has some hope for tomorrow’s 
sports. ‘I guess I am naïve but I hope ethics will win out. If I ‘m wrong it’s 
the end of sports as we know it. Sport will be a circus of unbelievable per-
formances’ (Swift and Yeager 2001: 44). Others are more sceptical about 
the morality of sports and the temptations of genetic enhancement: ‘Even 
after knowing the potentially damaging, sometimes fatal, side effects of the 
performance enhancing drugs now available, athletes of all cultures have 
not hesitated to experiment with them. They’re the 21st century Fausts, 
willing to bargain future health for present glory’, writes Patrick Hruby in 
The Washington Post (Hruby 2001: C01). Sweeney has certainly discovered 
that. In 2004, he still receives emails and calls from sports people with 
requests to perform this gene treatment on them. He has been contacted 
by several athletes, most of them weightlifters and sprinters who have 
heard about his research and wonder if he is looking for human volunteers 
on whom he might test the IGF-1 gene. A high school football coach asked 
Sweeney to treat his whole team (ibid.; Brownlee 2004).
According to Sweeney, in the end the public will accept genetic inter-
ventions like his IGF treatment ‘because it will want them’. He believes 
the day will come when this is going to be commonly used in the general 
population because the population ‘does not like getting old and weak 
and ending up in a wheelchair’ (Swift and Yeager 2001: 44). So, in the eyes 
of the creator of He-Man the idea of biotechnology applied to the human 
body in order to be better adapted to old age is not simply a matter of 
science fiction. Of course, Sweeney is aware of the ethical implications 
of his work. ‘Even in its infancy, this technology clearly has tremendous 
potential to change both sports and society. The ethical issues surrounding 
genetic enhancement are many and complex’. But, nevertheless, he does 
not feel uncomfortable about future consequences because ‘for once we 
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young? The transgenic supermice represent the promise of biotechnology. 
They are the pioneer species entering the future world of biotech. And, as 
these mice show, reshaping the living body into something more perfect, 
healthier, stronger and even more intelligent is no longer science fiction. 
If it is possible in mice, then why not try it on humans? After supermice, 
the next frontier will be our own body. The scientists involved in research 
with these supermice all sincerely believe that biotechnology someday 
in the future in some form or other will be applied to humans. This is 
simply because we have the choice and nobody wants to end his life in 
a wheelchair.
Part Three: Rereading Shelley and the Frankensteinian 
nature of biotechnology
Remaking Eden
In the two centuries that have passed since the Frankenstein story was first 
published, the meaning of the monster and the state of the art in the life 
sciences has changed dramatically. As I pointed out above, in the course 
of its development into a myth, the Frankenstein story lost much of its 
ambiguity. Victor Frankenstein was transformed from a student lost in his 
groundbreaking quest to make man more invulnerable into a mad scientist. 
As the story evolved into a myth, Frankenstein seems to have lost his good 
intentions. No positive reading about scientists involved in matters of life 
and death seems possible. His hideous creation likewise transformed from 
a sensitive, intelligent, self-educated, potential role model into a plainly 
evil and revengeful monster. But perhaps the most radical change that has 
taken place in the process of becoming a myth has been that the creature 
lost its human character.
The life sciences, however, and biotechnology in particular, have moved 
forward in directions that allow scientists to perform experiments that 
Shelley in her day could only dream of. The most powerful image of the 
Frankenstein story is that of a human being created in the laboratory by a 
scientist. Today, two centuries after Shelley’s fantasy, laboratory mice show 
that it is theoretically possible to create ‘superior’ human beings in the 
laboratory. If people are willing to donate their own offspring, embryos, 
to scientific procedures involving human germ line enhancement, and sci-
entists can be found who are willing to assist people in their wish for the 
after the knock-out technique became available, the first gene involved in 
memory and learning was knocked out in a mouse. This CAM knock-out 
mouse matured normally but exhibited learning problems when tested 
in a maze (Rensberger 1992a; Maugh II 1992). In 1999, the reverse effect 
was achieved by scientists by over-regulating a gene coding for the NMDA 
receptor b2 in mice. In contrast to the 1992 knock-out, this mouse exhib-
ited superior ability in learning and memory in various behavioural tasks. 
These transgenic animals were named Doogie by their proud scientists af-
ter Doogie Howser, the boy genius on TV show Doogie Howser, MD (Tang 
et al. 1999). Doogie had its own website68 with a cute picture of a tiny 
brown mouse about to perform a difficult physical exercise (see Figure 7). 
With these experiments, Joe Tsien and his group found ‘a new target for 
treatment of learning and memory disorders’. The study also revealed ‘a 
promising strategy of other genetically modified mammals with enhanced 
intelligence and memory’ (Tang et al. 1999: 68). Joe Tsien himself has 
high aspirations: ‘That molecule could one day serve as a possible target 
for drugs to treat brain disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease or even, 
perhaps, to boost learning and memory capacity in normal people’ (Tsien 
2000)69. He concludes his popular scientific paper on smart Doogie in the 
Scientific American with the statement that: ‘The idea that natural selection 
does not foster optimum learning and memory ability in adult organisms 
certainly has profound implications. It means that genetically modifying 
mental and cognitive attributes such as learning and memory can open an 
entirely new way for the targeted genetic evolution of biology, and per-
haps civilization, with unprecedented speed’ (Tsien 2000). The breaking 
news of these smart mice received massive media attention (Wade 1999a, 
1999b; Salkever 1999; Hawkes 1999; Weiss 1999, 2001, Connor 1999; Saltus 
1999).
Becoming superhuman?
Supermice like Yoda, He-Man and Doogie help us to imagine the kind of 
future that the knowledge of human and mouse genetics is likely to bring 
us. What will we do with this knowledge of our genes? Will we end up be-
coming 130 years old with super-strong and healthy bodies feeling forever 
68. In 2004, Joe Tsien moved to Boston University and, as a result, Doogie’s website at Princeton was 
reduced to one page: <http://www.princeton.edu/pr/pictures/other/smartmouse/index.html>.
69. I have accessed the Scientific American via the Internet; therefore, a page number is not available.
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of the super-intelligent baby is on its way. However, the mice are indeed 
awesome examples of progress made in biotechnology. In the popular 
media, the positive impact that mouse biotechnology research might have 
on human medicine is often highlighted. At the same time, the possibility 
that these technologies could also be applied to humans is a genuine issue 
of concern.
Taking as my point of departure a number of recent mouse stories, I 
have argued that the genetic enhancement of man is indeed theoretically 
possible. Does this mean that contemporary biotechnologists are produc-
ing (or about to produce) monsters? Are the supermice I presented mon-
sters? Is Doogie a monster? Is Yoda horrible? Is He-Man mouse gruesome? 
When I take a look at their pictures my answer cannot be affirmative. 
Although these mice are living artifacts, ‘man-made’70 laboratory creatures, 
they seem to have nothing in common with traditional monsters discussed 
in the beginning of this chapter. They are incredible; they are extraordi-
nary, but above all they are cute and funny. The mice are fascinating and 
thought provoking because they challenge our ideas about the ‘given na-
ture’ of mice. Even more disturbing, these mice show that capacities such 
as intelligence, muscular strength, and resistance to the physical process 
of ageing have a genetic basis that can, in principle, be manipulated. 
Beyond doubt they are monsters of the type discussed in Chapter 2. They 
are man-made living beings. But given their beauty and superpowers, 
in what sense do these products of biotechnology resemble the monster 
Frankenstein created?
Who or what is the monster?
The question whether these genetically modified mice are monsters of the 
type Frankenstein created can also be phrased differently: Are the scien-
tists involved in this type of research actually following in the footsteps of 
Frankenstein? In my view, the analogy between current genetic enhance-
ment research and the Frankenstein story is very problematic; in particular 
with regard to the way the research is embedded in our society. One of the 
most important ethical lessons to be drawn from Shelley’s original story is 
the importance of communication about, and the visibility of, the scientific 
practice. Well, Sweeney, Tsien, Evans, Miller and Silver, all scientists who 
work at the frontiers of biotechnology, have a remarkably open attitude 
70. With the exception of Yoda who is a naturally-occurring mutant mouse.
genetic enhancement of their embryos, then the genetic enhancement of 
humans suddenly becomes a very realistic story. Lee Silver, a well-known 
mouse geneticist and author of the book Remaking Eden, how genetic 
engineering and cloning will transform the American family, has no doubt 
that this will happen: ‘I am absolutely convinced that we will have […] 
expansion of the enhancement of embryos. The reason I’m sure this is 
going to happen is because we have already perfected this in animals. It 
is something we do with mice […] everyday.’ According to Silver, people 
who are denied the technology will say: ‘Why can’t I give this to my child 
when others get it naturally?’ (PBS date unknown). For most people today, 
changing man’s genetic code – our blueprint, human nature, our essence – 
is morally out of the question. The vast majority of experimental scientists 
who perform research involving genetic engineering of animals also tend 
to oppose genetic engineering of human beings. But, Silver adds, almost 
always they state their objections in terms of safety and efficiency rather 
than ethics (Silver 2006a), thereby suggesting that the genetic engineering 
of the first human being is simply a matter of time, until the technologies 
involved have become more reliable. As soon as mouse studies prove that 
genetic engineering has become safe and efficient enough, what further 
objections will there be for the scientists to proceed with the genetic en-
hancement of human embryos? The first candidates will be couples who 
are both carriers of recessive genes for life-threatening diseases and who 
nevertheless wish to have a healthy child. And then, in time, the fulfillment 
of other, more trivial and bizarre gene-based wishes will follow.
Does this imply that the Frankenstein myth is about to become reality 
and is therefore no longer a myth? As I have argued, the Frankenstein 
story gained popularity because it appeals to a widespread public fear 
of monsters coming out of laboratories. I cited Turney who described 
this fear as a deeply-felt cultural ambivalence about modern science, a 
conflict in our basic attitudes towards science: (manifest) enthusiasm and 
(latent) fear. In that respect, the transgenic supermice are good examples 
of the ambiguities evoked by modern science. The attention they have 
received from popular media suggests that the public is fascinated by 
transgenic supermice. The press certainly do like to give the impression 
that human enhancement is a realistic future scenario. For example, after 
hearing the news about the smart mouse, TIME magazine did not show 
Doogie on its front page (13 September issue), but a human baby with a 
double helix representing its umbilical cord suggesting that the creation 
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Although I do take Silver’s future scenario seriously, I do not believe 
that the first biotech supermen will be created in Petri dishes. To me, 
the most likely future scenario based on the supermouse story seems to 
be one where individuals (most likely weightlifters and top athletes) will 
start applying biotechnology to their own body, in other words: genetic 
doping. In this future scenario, human enhancement is achieved by intro-
ducing genetically modified materials into our own bodies. Like the IGF 1 
mouse, people will be injected with genes – contained in non-germ-line 
cells – in order to enhance, so they believe, their sportive, intellectual, or 
seductive (sexual) capabilities. It is only the individual himself or herself 
that is affected. In contrast to the genetic engineering of the embryo, the 
genetic changes will not be transmitted to the offspring. So, whatever the 
consequences, the effect will only be noticeable on the individual level. 
Gene doping will not really influence human evolution. Genetic engineer-
ing of embryos would, of course, do so, but such a scenario seems, for the 
time being at least, less plausible. Moreover, both in the case of genetic 
enhancement and in the case of genetic doping I find it hard to imagine 
how human enhancement will lead to ‘a gruesome parade of horribles’.
On the contrary, I believe what worries people the most is the possibility 
that these ‘enhanced’ people – either resulting from embryo enhancement 
or gene doping – will not essentially differ from us. These superpeople will 
still be human beings, and they will have a human ‘nature’. Silver’s geneti-
cally enhanced babies will be born the same way as other human babies. 
Their parents will not look that different in comparison with their children. 
These children will look like ‘normal’ ones. A genetically enhanced athlete 
who uses gene doping to boost his sportive achievements, is no less a 
human being than he was before the gene treatment. This is why I argue 
that perhaps ‘the monstrous’ that people fear is not so much ‘the parade of 
gruesome horribles’ but rather that idea that humans are, by their nature, 
malleable. Genetic ‘supermen’ and ‘supermice’ challenge our vision of 
human nature. It is the very fact that biotechnologists have discovered that 
humans, like mice, have a malleable genetic make-up, which makes these 
scientists the contemporary equivalents of Frankenstein.
A different reading
This puts the questions how the Frankenstein myth helps us to deal with 
our fear of monsters (and how the Frankenstein story can be meaningful 
in an ethical assessment of biotechnology) in a new perspective. As I 
towards the public. In that sense, Sweeney, Tsien, Miller and Evans, who 
not only publicly discuss their work but also openly express their fantasies 
about the application of genetic technology for the benefit of humans, in 
no way resemble the neurotic and obscure Victor Frankenstein. They are 
highly visible geneticists. They write papers for popular science magazines, 
accessible to the general public, they appear on radio and television and 
they willingly discuss their scientific work and the implications for society 
with the members of the President’s Council on Bioethics71. They do their 
very best to ‘educate’ the public about the future of biotechnology.
So, if the mice are not monsters in the literal sense and the scientists 
who create them do not resemble Victor Frankenstein, then how can the 
‘monster phobia’ evoked by contemporary biotechnology be explained? If 
the mice are not the monsters, who or what is the monster of modern bio-
technology? My answer to this question is that the monstrosity of the mice 
is that they show us what the future possibilities for genetic enhancement 
could be. They tell us something about the malleability of human nature. 
And, according to Gregory Stock, ‘the next frontier might be ourselves’ 
(Garreau 2005). They are not gruesome and horrible, they are animals that 
transgress a border between what is given by nature and made by man. 
They show us that what is given by nature can and probably will be per-
fected by man. This makes them monsters of the type defined by Smits, but 
not monstrosities of the Frankenstein type. So strictly speaking these mice 
represent fear. The present ‘Frankenstein thing’ is not that scientists will 
create monstrosities. On the contrary, we should rather fear (or at least: 
expect) that scientists will succeed where Victor Frankenstein failed, and 
that scientists like Lee Silver will actually do a good job in the genetic en-
hancement of human embryos and will successfully create strong, healthy 
and good-looking human beings. The supermice do indeed indicate that 
scientists have a good chance to achieve their goals. What the stories of 
the supermice also show is that it is very likely that people will make 
use of new technologies. Stories about Yoda and He-Man mouse were 
widely covered in sports journals, as well as in magazines with a focus on 
geriatrics. Overall, the reviews were optimistic and very positive.
71. Miller was represented by his colleague Steve Austad, and Sweeney addressed the committee in 
person. See: <http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/sep02/session7.html> and <http://www.bioethics.
gov/transcripts/dec02/session1.html>.
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we are potentially malleable entities. This idea is monstrous because it 
forces us to reconsider our views about ourselves. The monster we fear 
is the idea that we humans are malleable. The discovery of the malleable 
genome does not imply that biotechnologists will inevitably create grue-
some and horrible creatures, resembling Frankenstein’s monster in their 
physical appearance. I can find no convincing argument that biotechnolo-
gists would have the creation of this type of monsters in mind. This is 
simply an evocation of the monster image. The monster we are confronted 
with is rather a symbolic monster, something like a boundary we have 
crossed. We thought we were in control, but in reality we are becoming 
the object, the ultimate target of future biotechnology. The popular reading 
of the myth somehow suggests that contemporary scientists have a hidden 
agenda: that biotechnologists are ‘mad scientists’ who use their danger-
ous knowledge only to feed their curiosity or ambition, regardless of the 
outcome. Therefore, the public needs to be protected against science. 
Without proper warning the public is defenseless against what science 
brings. It will be forced to eat the bitter fruits of biotechnology.
As I said, I believe this diagnosis of biotechnology to be one-sided and 
misleading. I do not think that an informed public will automatically accept 
biotechnology. On the contrary, this would come down to suggesting that 
biotechnology is unproblematic and people’s fears about this technology 
are irrational, emotional or based on ignorance. Both these assumptions 
are too simplistic. Many people feel deeply that there is something wrong 
with the manipulation of genes even if or, as I have argued, particularly 
if scientists prove to be successful with human genetic-enhancement tech-
nologies. The monstrous facts that our genetic make-up is malleable, and 
that some traits can ‘simply’ be improved by means of genetic engineering, 
are disturbing in themselves. Biotechnology does have a radical impact 
on our self-understanding. This is both fascinating and frightening. Are 
we wise enough to use this new knowledge of our genes in a responsible 
way? What effect will biotechnology have on future society? At what point 
does benevolence turn into monstrosity? What does it mean for our under-
standing of human nature? These are serious questions. In answering these 
questions we have to take the Frankenstein myth seriously because it plays 
such an important role in the public understanding of biotechnology.
have already indicated, there are two different readings of the Franken-
stein myth. The ‘popular’ reading of the myth is a rather straight forward 
anti-science interpretation of the tale. It carries the unambiguous moral 
lesson that those who transgress Divine will or natural law will be pun-
ished. In this reading, the Frankenstein myth offers a good metaphor for 
science out of control. Like no other story, it shows how tampering with 
the essence of life (genes) will inevitably lead to catastrophe. The second, 
more ‘academic’, reading is more optimistic about biotechnology. In this 
reading, Frankenstein is not a mad scientist who transgresses natural or 
Divine orders. If one reads the original story about Frankenstein, one 
will understand that it is about a scientist who acts irresponsibly, both 
towards society and towards his creation. In this reading, as put forward 
by, amongst others, the biologist Stephen Jay Gould, the Frankenstein 
story is not an anti-science story but rather a story about the importance 
of communication in science. If only scientists would better inform and 
educate the public about science and technology, the public would be 
more likely to accept or even embrace the monsters that scientists create.
Both readings have their attractions and their shortcomings. The first 
reading is very powerful in the sense that it invokes a strong sense of the 
potential danger involved in biotechnologies. But it remains unsatisfying 
since it fails to explain why or how this is so dangerous. For example, 
the apocalyptic scenario is not shared by the experts involved in genetic 
engineering, the biotechnologists themselves. However lacking a sound 
‘evidence-based’ underpinning, biotechnology leads to a horror scenario 
which often fails to rise above the level of stereotypical, indeed ‘Pavlovian’ 
responses. Another objection that can be made is that it is a too simplistic 
or even ‘reductionist’ reading of the original story. There is no place for the 
ambiguity that is so characteristic of both Shelley’s novel and the currently 
evolving practice of biotechnology. Authors like Anker and Nelkin, so it 
seems, are somewhat too eager to join the chorus, so to speak. They do 
not really want to consider the original story that lies at the basis of the 
popular myth, they do not really take it seriously. It is their – no doubt 
sincere – intention to warn people about the future risks of biotechnology, 
but in doing so they seem to neglect other dimensions of the original story, 
other levels of meaning, notably the original ‘good intentions’ of both 
Victor Frankenstein and contemporary biotechnologists.
In my reading, biotechnologists are not creating monsters. However, 
they did discover one: namely, the more or less ‘monstrous’ idea that 
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we should be lured towards a more science-positive attitude, but rather 
because we really need to face the monster. We have to develop the 
conceptual and ethical tools to do so. And this cannot be done by telling 
horror stories. We need to re-consider and redefine who and what we are, 
and can become. But this is only possible when biotechnology, as well as 
the society in which it is embedded, has – finally! – come to terms with 
the Frankenstein myth.
Concluding remarks
I do not believe that the genetic engineering of mice is a practice that 
can or should be put on hold. Nor do I believe that human beings will 
never become subject to genetic engineering because it is in itself an 
‘unethical’ thing to do. One important implication of the discovery of 
the malleable human genome is that this awareness, once gained, is 
not something that can simply be reversed. We simply have to face the 
monster. Neurosis, a paralysed state of not being able to cope with the 
consequences of recently discovered knowledge, is not a very responsive 
way of facing the monster. Therefore, I propose a different reading of 
the story, one that asks for a different use of our imagination. In contrast 
to the popular myth – predicting that hubris inevitably leads to nemesis 
– the original story leaves open other possibilities than catastrophe and 
punishment. What would have happened if Victor had openly discussed 
his experiments with colleagues, and the people would have been better 
prepared and ‘educated’ to accept his creature? Would it have meant that 
his experiment would not have turned into a catastrophe? Imagine that 
Victor had truly succeeded in his ambitions, and that the creature would 
have been perfect and beautiful. In other words, what would happen if 
biotechnologists were to truly succeed in relieving us from the burden 
of ageing? That we would really live to become 130 years old in bodies 
that look like 35? Would that be gruesome, would that be horrible? This 
is an important and intriguing – and no doubt even troubling – question, 
but not one that can be answered by referring to ‘the Frankenstein myth 
becoming true’ or by simply reducing it to a story of communication and 
education.
‘Metaphors’, as Nelkin explains in her Nature article in 2001, ‘are a 
prevalent and important form of public communication, and they are es-
pecially important in conveying scientific information. […] By connecting 
different orders of reality, metaphors enable the translation of very com-
plex scientific information in culturally meaningful ways. But metaphors 
are more than an aid to explanation: repeated metaphors affect the way 
we perceive, think and act, for they shape our understanding of events’ 
(Nelkin 2001: 556). I believe this is exactly what the Frankenstein myth 
does. It keeps the cultural neurosis alive. And this is worrisome, because 
I do believe that scientific progress is inevitable and the public ought to 
be educated about the futures of biotechnology. Not in the sense that 
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By stripping bio-science of its pragmatic function and recontextualizing it as aes-
thetics, gene artists reanimate issues Duchamp would have appreciated, especially 
those about authorship and originality and the nature and purpose of art.72
 Steve Tomasula
That artists are now showing living organisms as art is an incredible step in the 
aesthetic sense of human culture.73
 Dave Powell
Introduction
Gut feelings and moral judgements
In the previous chapters, I have argued that the genetically modified 
mouse, despite its general use in the biomedical laboratory and its appar-
ent domestication, still has for many people the appearance of a techno-
monster. Its monstrous character is underscored by the myths, metaphors 
and vocabularies that mark the biotechnology debate. I have examined the 
two most dominant ones: the playing God metaphor and the Frankenstein 
myth. In this chapter, I want to examine the role of the yuk!-factor in 
the debate on animal biotechnology. What is it in biotechnology that is 
evoking a gut response? Of all the metaphors, myths and words that are 
used to express feelings of moral concern, the yuk!-factor is the one that 
most closely resembles Bernard Rollin’s definition of ‘aesthetic judgement’ 
in animal biotechnology. Rollin believes that moral concerns based on 
‘aesthetic judgements’ are not genuine moral concerns. In his argumenta-
tion, Rollin makes a distinction between rational moral judgments based 
on objective measurable factors (such as animal suffering) and subjective 
72. Steve Tomasula (2002) ‘Genetic art and the aesthetics of biology’, Leonardo, Vol. 35, p. 137.
73. Dave Powell (2004) ‘Chimera contemporary: The enduring arts of the composite beast’, Leonardo, 
Vol. 37, p. 340.
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instruments with primarily economic value. What we perceive as a good 
life for a genetically engineered animal that is deprived of feeling (so as not 
to experience suffering from being subjected to animal experimentation) 
is basically a ‘matter of taste’. What we perceive as ‘natural’ is probably 
also based on aesthetic deliberations (at least in part). We tend to have a 
(more or less idealistic) vision of nature, but in fact an unequivocal and 
robust definition of ‘nature’ or ‘natural’ is not available. When people 
express their moral intuition about animal biotechnology and say that it 
is ‘unnatural’, they seem to appeal to a visual image, to an aesthetic norm 
that informs their vision of nature or what they believe to be natural. 
This also goes for the species concept. There is a strong concern that, at 
a certain point, genetically modified mice will no longer look like mice, 
will no longer look like natural animals at all. When Susanne Anker and 
Dorothy Nelkin, whom I quoted before, state that (human) biotechnology 
will lead to a ‘gruesome parade of horribles’, they make a moral judgment 
by appealing to an aesthetic norm (Anker and Nelkin 2004). Others, who 
believe that biotechnological enhancement of the human race will lead 
to ‘perfect’ people, fear a world where there will no longer be room for 
(natural) imperfection. Perfection and imperfection in this much feared 
future of biotechnology can both be regarded as aesthetic notions. In 
these scenarios, biotechnology leads either to monstrosities or to beauty 
in its most extreme form. Both outcomes are apparently regarded as un-
desirable, both evoke a gut response. Finally, these ‘distasteful’ practices 
are only possible when commercial biotech companies are willing to 
invest in them. And these companies usually do so merely for the sake of 
profit-making.
Given the important role that ‘aesthetic’ notions play in the genesis of 
moral judgments on animal biotechnology, I do not find it very helpful to 
see the debate on animal biotechnology as a conflict between thought and 
feeling like Rollin does. Both are involved, both are intimately connected. As 
Midgley claims, to oppose feeling and thought has been especially unfortu-
nate in the case of animal biotechnology. ‘People often have the impression 
that reason quite simply favours the new developments although feeling is 
against them. This stereotyping paralyses them because they cannot see how 
to arbitrate between these different litigants’ (Midgley 2003: 103). Therefore, 
a more fruitful approach than simply rejecting aesthetically-informed moral 
judgments as irrational, would be to study how moral and aesthetic judg-
ments are connected in people’s appreciation of animal biotechnology, and 
aesthetic judgments based on feelings and emotionally-laden notions such 
as ‘nature’, ‘harmony’ or ‘quality of life’. In his perception of the animal 
biotechnology debate, the moral concerns based on objective reasoning 
and subjective feeling (also referred to as the ‘Frankenstein thing’) tend 
to get confused, and Rollin wants to see the two separated. For example, 
we have to understand that any appeal to ‘nature’ entails, in fact, aesthetic 
judgments and is therefore morally irrelevant (Rollin 1995, 1998).
However, there are two elements in Rollin’s vision that I find difficult to 
accept. My first difficulty with Rollin’s distinction of aesthetic feeling and 
ethical reasoning is that, as Mary Midgley argues: ‘In real life we tend not 
to find that reason and feeling are separate items. They are interdependent 
aspects of a person, divisible only for thought’ (Midgley 2003: 102). Moral 
convictions are always partly non-rational. This is not to say that moral 
convictions are contrary to reason. They are non–rational in the sense 
of being ultimately not based on, or guided by, any process of rational 
decision making (Hauskeller 2005). Moral convictions are always based 
on a mixture of both reason and feeling. Secondly, I do not see why 
aesthetic judgments should not be morally relevant. People who say ‘yuk!’ 
at being confronted with animal biotechnology are not, as is sometimes 
suggested, merely expressing an inarticulate disgust with the unfamiliar. As 
Midgley explains it: ‘Their further conversation shows that they are saying 
something intelligible, something that needs to be answered’ (Midgley 
2003: 105). In opposition to what Rollin believes, I will argue that we have 
to take aesthetic judgements and yuk!-responses very seriously. Moral con-
victions are always based on a mixture of both reason and (gut) feeling. 
Exploring the roots of what we perceive as ‘yuk!’ is what ethics is about. 
People who say ‘yuk!’ at being confronted with animal biotechnology are 
expressing genuine feelings of moral concern, but apparently lack the 
vocabulary to do so in an articulate way. The question remains: What is 
expressed when people say ‘yuk!’?
I believe the yuk!-response in the animal biotechnology debate involves 
a number of things. First of all, there is a feeling of confusion that results 
from the fact that apparently self-evident notions such as ‘natural’ and 
‘unnatural’ are challenged and undermined. Secondly, it refers to the threat 
that animal biotechnology imposes on what we perceive as ‘a good life’, 
or a life worth living. This is what Robin Attfield refers to as the ‘quality of 
life’ (Attfield 1995, 1998); And, thirdly, there is the awareness that animals 
are acquiring more and more the status of ‘instruments’ or commodities, 
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modifiedness of these mice, they remain abstract animals. As a result, the 
moral assessment of animal biotechnology remains an abstract activity. 
This abstractness is reflected in the bioethical vocabulary, which consists 
of rather abstract notions such as ‘animal integrity’, ‘intrinsic value’, ‘telos’, 
etc. The contrast between the very real and lively mice and the abstract 
and inflexible ethical vocabulary calls for a less abstract and a more crea-
tive style of ethical assessment. How can this be achieved?
In my discussion of the playing God metaphor, the sculptures Ecce 
Homo by Bryan Crockett and Mann und Maus by Katharina Fritsch 
were essential to my argumentation. These sculptures tell us something 
about mouse biotechnology that written discourses of bioethics can not: 
not simply as visual images, but by suggesting a ‘physical’ presence of 
the genetically engineered mice. These sculptures are ‘real’. Ecce Homo 
evokes mixed responses that include both aesthetic and moral judgments 
on the oncomouse. So does Mann und Maus. This sculpture is both 
comforting and disturbing: it is ‘unheimlich74. I believe these works of art 
are morally effective – by this I mean that they make a moral appeal to 
us – because the responses they evoke are as ambiguous as the technol-
ogy to which they refer (or seem75 to refer). The yuk!-factor is essential 
to the understanding of both Ecce Homo and my interpretation of Mann 
und Maus. Mann und Maus and Ecce Homo illustrate how, in discussing 
the meaning of a work of art, the aesthetic and the ethical cannot be 
separated. It is here that I see the great potential that art can have in the 
moral and social assessment of animal biotechnology, in particular where 
issues such as visions of nature, quality of life, identity, the normal and 
the abnormal are concerned. This leads me to the central question of 
this chapter: How can works of art assist us in exploring the yuk!-factor 
of animal biotechnology and our moral understanding and evaluation of 
animal biotechnology?
74. According to Freud ‘unheimlich’, as an aesthetic category, refers to something that used to be 
familiar but from which we have suddenly become estranged (such as a corpse). Certain locations are 
definitely unheimlich, such as graveyards or – laboratories, really a ‘locus suspectus’. Very ‘unheimlich’ are 
loose body parts (such as head, hands, eyes). According to Freud, this category used to be associated 
whith mechanics (with automata), but has moved to the life sciences where the new homunculus is 
now produced. Sigmund Freud (1919/1947) ‘Das Unheimliche’, in: Gesammelte Werke XII. London: Imago; 
Frankfurt am Main, Fischer.
75. One can doubt whether it really was Katharina Frisch’s intention to express something about the 
mouse as it is used in biomedical research (see also Chapter 3).
to find out what people mean or fear when they express the feeling that 
some forms of bio-engineering are monstrous or unnatural. That is what 
ethics, the critical assessment of morality, is about.
Works of art as a source of moral inspiration
But, as I have shown, the vocabulary and approaches developed in the field 
of bioethics have serious shortcomings when it comes to addressing issues 
that are related to the way biotechnology challenges our vision of nature. 
The ethical framework developed for bioethical committees dealing with 
animal biotechnology roughly comes down to a trade-off between animal 
suffering and human benefits. From a practical point of view, this is an 
adequate approach, but philosophically speaking it is highly unsatisfying. 
I believe one of the reasons why the bioethical vocabulary is unsatisfac-
tory is because, as a reflective discipline, bioethics is not as dynamic and 
lively as its object of reflection. It does not share the explosive creativity 
of biotechnology. In short, I believe the bioethical vocabulary suffers from 
an imagination deficit. Biotechnology is simply evolving at too high a pace 
for bioethics to keep up with it. Or, as Joe Tsien (the creator of Doogie the 
smart mouse) puts it: ‘We are in an era when breakthroughs in biology and 
intelligence are outpacing the culture’s capacity to deal with the ethics’ 
(Weiss 1999: A01). For most people, it is hard to imagine what it is really 
about. Although transgenic mice have become a commodity within the 
biomedical industry, to audiences outside the scientific and biotech com-
munity they are still highly invisible animals. The most important reason 
for this is that the mice in question spend their entire lives in laboratories 
and, as such, seldom enter the public arena. Not surprisingly, most people 
are unaware of the large number of transgenic mice (millions worldwide) 
that are used in medical research and (as a consequence of this) are also 
unaware of the state of the art in mammalian biotechnology. Another 
reason for the invisibility of transgenic mice has to do with the microscopic 
size of DNA. Genetic technologies are technologies of the invisible. Even 
if the mouse as such is visible, the genetic modifications of its genome 
remain invisible from the outside, to the untrained eye. So, even if we 
had the opportunity to see ‘real’ transgenic mice, we would probably 
see nothing peculiar or special. Usually one cannot tell from the outside 
whether or not a laboratory mouse is a genetically engineered laboratory 
mouse. Most transgenic mice simply look like ordinary laboratory mice. 
And, because most people are unable to ‘physically experience’ the genetic 
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science that makes cloning and genetic engineering possible’. In a some-
what broader sense, the concept refers to ‘the new technical media and 
structures of political economy that are transforming the conditions of all 
living organisms on this planet’ (Mitchell 2003: 483). According to Mitch-
ell, bio(techn)ology has replaced physics at the frontiers of science and 
has become the dominant technical and scientific discipline of our age. 
Mitchell, who is obviously referring to Walter Benjamin’s classic text The 
work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction (1936), explains how, 
during the biocybernetic revolution, the status of the original artwork and 
its copy have changed radically. First, ‘the copy is no longer inferior to 
the original, but is in principal an improvement of the original; secondly, 
the relation between the artist and the work, the work and the model, is 
both more distant and more intimate than anything that had been possible 
in the realm of mechanical reproduction; and, thirdly, a new temporality, 
characterized by an erosion of the event, and a vertiginous deepening 
of the relevant past, produces a peculiar sense of “accelerated stasis” in 
our sense of history’ (Mitchell 2003:487). We live in a time that is at best 
described as ‘a limbo of continually deferred expectations and anxieties. 
Everything is about to happen or has already happened without our notic-
ing it’ (Mitchell 2003: 489). As an example he discusses the cracking of 
the human genome. This is what he calls a ‘non-event’. ‘The very “secret 
of life itself” is decoded, and yet everything remains the same’ (Mitchell 
2001: 490).
Now, this type of confusion is of course typical of revolutions. When 
a revolution is actually taking place, no one knows where it is heading. 
Initially, bystanders tend to underestimate the dramatic consequences for 
the future. They tend to think that, after some turbulence, their lives can 
be resumed as usual. It is only with hindsight that we are really forced to 
ask ourselves how life has changed as a result of the revolution. But the 
biotech revolution involves something that has never happened before, 
something that is radical and really new, something that calls for a critical 
mode of questioning the present. DNA technologies enable us, for the 
first time in history, to change the mouse’s and our own evolution in 
a controlled and directed way. It is a revolution that will allow us to 
‘control’ ourselves. What could or should be the role of art in this age of 
revolutionary biotechnology? Mitchell discusses four tasks of art in the 
age of biocybernetic reproduction: 1) to ‘reveal the codes and expose the 
illusion of the ultimate mastery of life’; 2) to re-articulate what we mean 
In the first part of this chapter, I will address this question by discussing 
the possible roles of the work of art in the age of biotechnology, building 
on an article by W.T.J. Mitchell about the work of art in the age of biocy-
bernetic reproduction (Mitchell 2003). As an example of an art form that 
meets Mitchell’s criteria, I will discuss a ‘new’ form of contemporary art: 
namely, bioart. By bioart, I mean artistic reflections on the life sciences, 
either by representing and visualising biotechnological developments or 
by using biotechnologies as artistic tools. In the second part, I introduce 
the work of three artists whose artworks explicitly reflect upon the present 
and future practice of animal biotechnology: the GFP Bunny project by 
Eduardo Kac (2000), the Transgenic Mice Series by Catherine Chalmers 
(2000), and Genpets™ by Adam Brandejs (2005). These works are selected 
because they seem to convey something about the genetic engineering of 
mice, either directly or indirectly, that is important for our question. But as 
works of art they differ significantly from one another. They involve differ-
ent media and seem to entail different forms of ‘intentionalilty’ as it were. 
By ‘works of art’ I do not only mean the physical objects that form the 
artwork. In my view, it also includes the processes of producing art, the 
responses to these works, and the role of the artist in the ensuing debates. 
In these three works of art I see the ambiguities of the genetically modified 
mice represented: their monstrosity, their unnaturalness, their promise, 
and even their innocence. All these artworks, – the ‘GFP Bunny’ project, 
Chalmers’s Transgenic Mice Series and Brandejs’s Genpets™ –, evoke yuk!-
responses. It is these yuk!-responses I am after. Is something expressed 
in these yuk!-responses that can help us to understand yuk!-responses 
to animal or mouse biotechnology in general? What do these works of 
art express or reveal about animal biotechnology that is so difficult to 
articulate when we solely rely on current bioethical vocabularies?
Part One: Art, ethics and animal biotechnology
The work of art in the age of biotechnology
In ‘The work of art in the age of cybernetic reproduction’, W.J.T. Mitchell 
explores the possible new roles of artworks in the age of the contempo-
rary technosciences. As ‘a target of inquiry’, Mitchell offers the concept 
of ‘biocybernetic reproduction’. Mitchell tends to use this concept in a 
rather strict sense: ‘the combination of computer technology and biological 
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Bioart
In the last two decades76, a new art form has emerged that seems to 
correspond quite well with this idea of the work of art in the age of biocy-
bernetic reproduction: namely, bioart. It is a general term used to refer to 
works of art that in some way relate to biology, biotechnology and life77. 
Preferably, these works are created with new visualisation techniques and 
tools borrowed from the life sciences, such as MRI, DNA gels, fluorescent 
bacteria, etc., as ways of representing bodies, identities. Contemporary 
bioart portraits are good examples of art that reflects (on) biotechnology. 
A well-known example of such an artwork is Marc Quinn’s portrait of Sir 
John Sulston. This portrait, Sir John Sulston: a genomic portrait, was made 
out of colonies grown from bacterial cells taken from Sultston’s sperm 
(Ibid.). But also the works of artists like Alexis Roxman, Catherine Chalm-
ers and Bryan Crockett who use ‘traditional’ materials and processes of 
representation like paint, photography and marble to comment upon the 
biotech revolution are relevant to my question (Anker and Nelkin 2004). 
In addition to these ‘dead’ or rather ‘non-living’ artworks, a new phenom-
enon within the biological arts can be observed: one that is very different 
from the traditional artistic engagement with science because, ‘with it, 
biological materials/life and scientific tools and protocols have become an 
integral part of the artistic process as well as the artwork itself’ (Zurr and 
Catts 2003, 2004). Bioartists who are involved in this latest type of bioart 
create living and/or semi-living beings. Life itself, the living organism, is 
the medium with which they work.
The discussion about bioart and the growing number of art exhibitions 
on themes, materials, technologies, etc. borrowed from the life sciences, 
such as the DNA code, genes, life and the post-human, indicate that the 
arts ‘have discovered’ biotechnology. ‘A molecular gaze’ has emerged in 
the world of contemporary art (Anker and Nelkin 2004). There are many 
different reasons for artist to engage with the (life) sciences. Art critic Sian 
Ede gives four: first, because artists are challenged by the new ‘materials’ 
76. In 1982, artist Joe Davis walked uninvited into the MIT Center for Advanced Visual Studies and walked 
out 45 minutes later with an appointment as a research fellow (Gibbs 2001). So, in fact, it is three decades, 
but Davis was ahead of his time.
77. The definition of bioart is a topic of debate. Since I am primarily interested in the role bioart can play 
in the ethical and social debate and not in demarcating bioart from other forms of art, this dispute about 
the definition of bioart is irrelevant to me. I am interested in how contemporary art (or bioart) reflects 
upon current developments in biotechnology.
by the human, by humanism and the humanities; 3) to elaborate a ‘palae-
ontology of the present’, a discipline that should begin by acknowledging 
that the contemporary world is perhaps even more mysterious to us than 
the recent or distant past, challenging our insistence on the connectedness 
of all forms of life; and, 4) ‘to unleash the images, in order to see where 
they lead us, how they go before us’ (Mitchell 2003: 498). How can these 
four tasks be translated into something that is applicable to the biotech 
revolution, something that can be useful in exploring the yuk!-factor of 
animal biotechnology? The first task, ‘to reveal the codes’ implies a read-
ing of the biotechnology language. Mitchell seems to imply that it is the 
task of artists to critically assess and inform their audiences about what 
the state of the art in technology is. The second task, ‘to re-articulate 
what it means to be human’, seems to suggest that biotechnology has an 
impact on our self-understanding. Artists, according to Mitchell, have to 
take a lead in reflecting on the impact that biotechnology has on what it 
means to be human. The third task, to elaborate ‘a palaeontology of the 
present’ seems to refer to a level of complexity and confusion that is typi-
cal for the biotech revolution of the present. Whereas previous revolutions 
were guided by future objectives, this seems to be a revolution without 
a goal, driven simply by the dynamics of science. A paleontology of the 
present would be the reconstruction of what is going on today in the age 
of biotechnology by putting together pieces of information that, seen in 
isolation, do not make much sense: pieces of information, for instance, 
that inform us about the state of the art in DNA technology and embryo 
and stem cell research, but that are so technical, leading to applications 
that are so difficult to imagine, that as such they hardly seem to make 
any sense. Too many things are happening at the same time that seem 
unrelated, but taken together certain constellations may emerge that may 
help us determine what the biotech revolution means. Mitchell seems to 
imply that by building these pieces of information into a coherent image 
(a reconstruction), artists can help us make sense of this revolution that is 
taking place right now. And last but not least, he believes that artists have 
the freedom to do this in a more or less ‘irresponsible’ way. They have to 
unleash the images and see where they go.
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would think that artists can be yet another powerful force ensuring that 
these matters are addressed in the public forum and not merely in closely 
guarded laboratories and behind closed doors of corporate boardrooms’ 
(Powell 2004, 340).
When discussing bioart as a social, political and ethical activity it is 
important to acknowledge that bioart is a heterogeneous practice, with 
various artists occupying a broad variety of (sometimes rather fluid) ethi-
cal positions. Bioartists may have many different (ethical) agendas. As a 
consequence, there cannot be such a thing as a ‘general theory of the 
morality of bioart’. And it is definitely not my intention to make any gen-
eral statements concerning the role that bioart ‘should’ play in the ethical 
debate on animal biotechnology. Nonetheless, some artists involved in 
bioart do explicitly take an ethical position when talking or writing about 
their artwork. For instance, in their paper The ethical claims of Bio Art: 
killing the other or self-cannibalism?, Ionat Zurr and Oron Catts of the 
Tissue Culture and Art project (TC&A) describe how some of the outcomes 
of biotechnologies bring into question ‘deep-rooted perceptions of life and 
identity, concept of self, and the position of the human in regard to other 
living beings and the environment’ (Zurr and Catts 2003/2004)78. As artists, 
they believe that it is their role ‘to reveal inconsistencies with regard to our 
current attitudes to life and to focus attention on the discrepancies between 
our western cultural perceptions and the new techno-scientific under-
standings about life’. Moreover, they also intend to ‘further problematise 
ethical frameworks and shift the goalposts of contemporary ethics’ (Ibid.). 
Transgenic artist Eduardo Kac has similar ideas about the critical task of 
art. He sees it as ‘the urgent task of art’ to unpack the implicit meanings of 
the biotechnology revolution by revealing the cultural implications of the 
revolution underway and by offering ‘different ways of thinking about and 
with biotechnology’ (Kac 2000)79.
Kac and TC&A do not attempt to give answers or find solutions to the 
ethical dilemmas raised by biotechnology. Rather they attempt ‘to gen-
erate further debate and expose our social inconsistencies towards the 
living’ (Zurr and Catts 2003, 2004) or to offer ‘new perspectives that offer 
78. The article by Zurr and Catts is accessed via the web, and therefore the page number is not 
available.
79. The references Kac (1998, 2000, 2001) are all accessed via the Eduardo Kac website, and therefore 
page numbers are not available.
provided by the life sciences; secondly, because they are fascinated with 
scientific paradigms that help us to view the world differently; thirdly, (in a 
few rare cases) because artists can assist with scientific investigation; and, 
finally, because they feel they need to engage in a complex, non-simplistic 
way with the political and ethical consequences of science (Ede 2002: 
67). Working with new, sometimes living materials, and participating in 
ethical or political debates, bioart elicits two main types of discourse. One 
is technical: an assessment and categorisation of artworks according to 
the process of their production. The other one focuses on content. It is 
about bioart as a social, political and ethical commentary. It is this latter 
discourse that interests me.
The morality of bioart
The writings of art critics, or art historians and bioartists on bioart reveal 
both fascination for the new technologies offered by the life sciences and 
worries about the impacts of biotechnology on (our understanding of) 
life. In the light of the biotech revolution, some authors see it explicitly as 
the task of art to address the big questions concerning life. ‘The gaze of 
artists often dwells on the values challenged by a rapidly growing science 
that frequently seems to defy natural categories, common morality, and 
traditional understandings of human nature. Touching on the moral and 
ethical dilemmas of manipulating nature, the patenting of genes, and the 
concerns brought about by the changing status of humans in the post-
genomic world, visual artists portray the expectations and salient anxieties 
of our genetic age’, write Anker and Nelkin in their book on bioart (Anker 
and Nelkin 2004: 4). Stephen Tomasula has a similar view on the task of 
gene artists: ‘By collapsing the metaphor of art as a mirror of life with life 
itself, by making art that mirrors biological processes and the network 
of commercial concerns that configure our dawning biological age, gene 
artists engage in questions raised by their scientific/corporate/government 
counterparts: What does it mean to alter a natural evolutionary process 
millions years old? How will people think of themselves and their rela-
tions to others once boundaries such as ‘plant’ and ‘animal’ have eroded?’ 
(Tomasula 2002: 138). In a similar vein, art critic and artist Dave Powell 
sees a specific task for artists in addressing these questions in the public 
forum. ‘In this age of ecological awareness and animal rights it is we, the 
artistic community, who should consciously and wholeheartedly embrace 
the asking of these vital questions as part of the greater art discourse. I 
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the present? And, finally, what kind of images are unleashed and where 
do they go? For each individual art project, I will discuss the moral appeal 
it makes, the yuk!-factor it entails (in particular the messages it seems 
to convey with regard to issues such as naturalness, quality of life and 
the commodification of life). By discussing these works of art, I want to 
demonstrate that, when discussing animal biotechnology, it is impossible 
to separate aesthetics from ethics.
The ‘GFP Bunny’ project
In 2000, Eduardo Kac surprised and shocked the (art) world by claiming 
to have created a green fluorescent rabbit for merely artistic reasons. Alba 
was the first living transgenic rabbit made for non-scientific purposes. Two 
years before, Kac introduced/defined the notion of transgenic art as a ‘new 
art form based on the use of genetic-engineering techniques to transfer 
synthetic genes to an organism or to transfer natural genetic material from 
one species into another, to create unique living beings’ (Kac 1998). But 
the transgenic artwork ‘GFP Bunny’ was not simply about the creation of 
the green fluorescent rabbit Alba. Of much more importance to Kac was 
the public dialogue generated by the project and the social integration and 
cultural adoption of the rabbit (Kac 2000).
On his website, Kac keeps a record of the public debate on Alba. All 
kinds of publications about his rabbit can be found. However, as the 
webmaster, he decides what to put on his website and what not to include. 
For example, an article in Wired that is rather critical about the reality of 
Alba’s green fluorescence and the relationship between the artist and the 
scientist responsible for her creation, cannot be found on this website 
(Philipkoski 2002). This indicates the dubious extent to which Kac is not 
only inciting a public debate on Alba but also trying to control and direct 
it. Apart from this website, two images from the GFP Bunny project are 
very important. One is a photograph of a green (albeit compared with 
the green fluorescent OncoBrite mice (see Figure 2) rather unrealistically 
green) fluorescent rabbit (Figure 8a), and the other is a photograph of the 
artist holding a white rabbit in his arms in front of a wall, – or is it a studio? 
It is definitely not in a laboratory – as it is decorated with a somewhat 
oddly designed, 1970s style wallpaper (Figure 8b).
What was new and radical about Alba the GFP bunny was not the 
technology involved, but rather the fact that she was supposed to be a 
work of art. At the time Alba was ‘created’, the use of green fluorescent 
ambiguity and subtlety where we usually only find affirmative (‘in favor’) 
and negative (‘against’) polarity’ (Kac 2000). Kac who sees transgenic art 
as a firm rejection of the reductionist view that life is purely and simply 
a matter of genetics emphasizes our communication with transgenic life. 
According to Kac transgenic art can ‘help science to recognize the role of 
relational and communicational issues in the development of organisms’ 
(Kac 2000). The questions remain: What is it exactly that bioartists have to 
offer to the social and moral debate on animal biotechnology? How does 
bioart in practice address these bio-philosophical questions? And, finally, 
how does this affect the aesthetic and ethical quality of their work?
Part Two: Bioart on animal biotechnology: Yuk!
Bioartists are inspired in numerous ways by a wide range of biotech-
nologies. I am interested in artworks that reflect upon, are inspired by, 
or involve animal biotechnology. In particular, artworks that evoke yuk!-
responses. These are the artworks that make a moral appeal to us, that 
challenge us to think (more deeply) about animal biotechnology. I have 
chosen three art projects that meet my criteria for further investigation: 
Kac’s ‘GFP Bunny’ project’80, Catherine Chalmers’s Transgenic Mice Series, 
and Adam Brandejs’s Genpets™. I have chosen these three art projects 
because they show the (future) potential of animal biotechnology and 
play a prominent role in social and moral debate, either by accident or on 
purpose. The artists who created these artworks are all visible artists, their 
work is discussed by academic writers and exhibited in galleries, travelling 
exhibitions, on websites, in newspapers and magazines.
In the following, I will analyse the aesthetic and moral quality of 
these artworks more or less along the lines of the four questions that I 
have ‘distilled’ from Mitchell’s four tasks of the work of art in the age of 
biocybernetic reproduction: First, what does this particular work of art 
tell/imply about the state of the art in animal biotechnology; what does 
it reveal about the technologies of manipulation; and what does it say 
about biology as the science that seeks knowledge about life and death? 
Secondly, what does it tell us about the implications of biotechnology for 
us humans? Thirdly, how does it make sense of biotechnology? In what 
sense does the artwork contribute to an elaboration of a paleontology of 
80. GFP stands for green fluorescent protein.
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the ‘domestic and social integration of transgenic animals’. As a transgenic 
artist, Kac claims not to be interested in ‘the creation of genetic objects, 
but in the invention of transgenic social subjects’ (Kac 2000). In his article 
on the GFP Bunny, he explains that the project is about ‘the completely 
integrated process of creating the bunny, bringing her to society at large, 
and providing her with a loving, caring, and nurturing environment in 
which she can grow safe and healthy’ (Kac 2000). The most radical mo-
ment of the GFP Bunny project is the moment Kac takes Alba out of her 
cage and holds her in his arms for a photo opportunity. This is how Kac 
describes this moment: ‘She immediately awoke in me a strong and urgent 
sense of responsibility for her well-being’ (Kac 2000).
What do people find disturbing about Alba? Why does she evoke a 
yuk!-response? As Kac himself has noted, he did not break any social rule 
with the ‘GFP Bunny’ project’. Neither did the rabbit suffer from being 
fluorescent. Humans have determined the evolution of rabbits for at least 
1400 years, and there were no mutagenic effects resulting from transgene 
integration into the host genome (Kac 2000). In other words, Kac did 
not do anything unethical to the rabbit. The procedure used in order to 
create Alba was fairly standard within accepted scientific practice. This is 
basically the most important information Kac gives about the state of the 
art in animal biotechnology. Nontheless, Alba was the subject of a public 
debate, a public debate initiated by Kac himself. What was so ‘yukky’ 
about Alba, was the fact as such that Kac had created her as a work of 
art. In doing so, he bypassed a dominant ethical rule: that there should be 
a clear human benefit that outweighs the use of transgenic animals. Alba 
was not meant to be used as a laboratory animal to help a scientist find a 
cure for a genetic disease.
More or less in response to this type of criticism, Kac put emphasis on the 
responsibility one has as an artist vis-a-vis transgenic artworks. He states 
that we have to love and nurture these new forms of life we have created 
just like any other animal (Kac 1998). Is he suggesting that scientists do not 
love and nurture their animals? What does Alba tell us about what goes on 
with animals inside the laboratory? Kac is suggesting that dramatic events 
are taking place behind closed doors, but he remains rather silent about 
what exactly those might be. He does not say anything about the millions 
of transgenic creatures like Alba that are living in today’s modern biomedi-
cal laboratories, nor does he say anything about her countless invisible 
transgenic brothers and sisters who live identity-less lives in laboratories 
protein as a marker was an established and well-known tool in the field of 
molecular biology (Okabe et al. 1997; Yang et al. 2000). The ‘GFP Bunny’ 
project was not a genetic experiment but an artistic experiment. Kac’s 
fluorescent rabbit Alba was in a sense ‘ready-made’. The birth of Alba has 
always been surrounded by a cloud of vagueness. The one story about 
Alba I find most convincing is that she was created in a laboratory in the 
context of a routine process and picked up by Kac who took her in his 
arms and must have said something like ‘I name you Alba and from now 
on you are a work of art’ (Philipkoski 2002). Whether Alba was really 
created on behalf of Kac – on special demand as it were – or was in fact an 
ordinary (even non–transgenic?) laboratory rabbit that had her 15 minutes 
of fame simply because she was picked out for a photo session with an 
artist, remains unclear. But, even if Alba is a hoax, the fact remains that, by 
staging Alba, Kac introduced the concept of the GFP Bunny as a genetic 
animal ‘biopaint’ to a wider audience.
By choosing the GFP gene as the gene to be added to Alba’s genome, 
Kac made gene technology visible. Whether the green fluorescent colour 
was really the effect of a GFP gene added to Alba’s genome, or rather the 
result of photoshopping is in fact irrelevant. On the image of Alba that 
was sent into the world, you could really see that her genome was altered. 
By taking her out of the laboratory and showing Alba to the public, Kac 
pointed both to the state of the art in gene technology (a technology easily 
applied to mammals like us), and to our responsibility for, and moral 
connectedness with, these animals that are created with the aid of new 
genetic technologies.
The staging of Alba involves more that just presenting a green fluores-
cent rabbit to the world. With the GFP Bunny project, Kac was actually 
initiating a social debate on Alba and the social integration of transgenic 
animals. Kac is not only the initiator of the debate – his involvement goes 
much further than that. After unleashing the image of Alba, he continued to 
play a rather important role in this debate. He was, and still is, more or less 
its ‘conductor’. Raising our level of awareness is what he seems to be after. 
‘More than making visible the invisible, art needs to raise our awareness 
of what firmly remains beyond our visual reach but which, nonetheless, 
affects us directly’, he writes (Kac 1998). There is something taking place 
behind closed doors that ‘in the safe harbour of scientific rationalism, 
nourished by global capital […] unfortunately remains partially sheltered 
from larger social issues’ (Kac 1998). Kac is particularly concerned about 
150
Biotech Pioneers
151
‘Yuk!’ and the aesthetics of mouse biotechnology
us the impression that he is a lazy mouse (see Figure 9a). Curly Tail does 
not show his face. In this portrait, it is the curly tail that is pointing at the 
lens. The tail is its most dominant feature. Except for this strange tail, the 
mouse looks normal and healthy. The most active one seems to be Rhino, 
a pink nude with a spectacular wrinkled skin. He is standing high on his 
feet, and points his nose squarely at the camera. He is both monstrous and 
cute (see Figure 9b).
This publication of mouse portraits was not an isolated event. Rather, 
it was part of a series of events. In April 2002, Chalmers’s Transgenic 
Mice series were presented at Gene(sis): Contemporary Art Explores Hu-
man Genomics, a national touring exhibition in the USA that explored the 
implications of human genome research on human life and understanding 
(Stern 2003). The artworks presented at this exhibition were artistic explo-
rations and imaginings of the social and economic ramifications of genetic 
and genome research. The idea behind the exhibition was to stimulate 
public dialogue about contemporary genetics. Especially for this occasion, 
the size of the photographs, originally taken as illustrations to a critical 
journalistic article about the mouse business and the Jackson Lab, were 
increased to a scale enormously larger than the original prints. Exhibited 
in a gallery, these photographs became impressive works of art. In order 
to explore the experience and response of the audience to the artworks 
presented, the Henry Art Gallery (where the opening of the travelling 
exhibition took place) developed a ‘visual thinking strategy adapted for 
dialogue’ (VTS). Described by the staff as an ‘interactive looking experi-
ence’, VTS had to ‘initiate dialogue by posing questions that encourage 
viewers to bring their own personal associations and interpretations to the 
work’ (Stern 2003). In order to set up a dialogue about ethics, questions 
were asked about the abnormality of Chalmers’s mice, the right we have to 
use transgenic mice for research, and the financial benefits Chalmers might 
enjoy from the artworks that exploit these mice.
Chalmers’s work was much praised for the feelings of ambivalence it 
evoked. ‘Enlarged in huge, full-colour prints to hundreds of times their 
actual size, it is impossible to ignore their disfigurement, and yet we can’t 
help guiltily thinking that many of them are still cute. The mice are both 
horrible and darling; they represent both a massively profitable industry 
and little bits of intelligent, furry life with whom we are fully capable of 
empathizing’, writes one art critic (Westbrook 2003). ‘Catherine Chalmers’ 
large-scale portraits of mice bred for specific diseases give a heightened 
that are closed to the public. By focussing on the social integration of Alba, 
rather than her monstrosity, Kac is in a sense elaborating a palaeontology 
of the present. He is making sense of something that usually remains out 
of focus, but is highly relevant. We are in many ways connected to these 
transgenic animals.
This takes me to Mitchell’s final point. How does Kac unleash his image, 
and where does the work lead to? Is the fact that Alba is art and not sci-
ence relevant at all? Is there really a difference? And, if so, what exactly is 
the difference, from a moral point of view? Alba differs from her transgenic 
kin because she is a work of art. But in fact she is not really different at 
all. Yet, at the same time, she is different from all other laboratory rabbits 
because an artist claimed her to be a work of art and promised to take her 
home and care for her as if she were his pet. By displaying her as a work 
of art and potential pet, Kac changed her fate. Alba was set free from the 
laboratory. Is this innocent white/green rabbit the so-feared monster, the 
monstrous that has to be shown, and that sooner or later will escape from 
its laboratory premises?
Catherine Chalmers’ transgenic mice series
In 2000, six highly artistic photographs of transgenic mice, taken by nature 
photographer Catherine Chalmers, appeared in The New York Times as 
illustrations to the article Fuzzy Little Test Tubes by Lawrence Osborne. 
The photographs, taken at the Jackson Laboratories, showed not only 
exemplary genetically engineered mice as they are used in biomedical 
science but also the price tag attached to them. The most expensive mouse 
Chalmers portrayed is Blind Sterile, a mouse that is used for research into 
genetically-related reproductive disorders and eye disorders. At that time, 
such mice made a fair price: $231.70 per breeding pair. The photographs 
that Chalmers took of these mice are not mere illustrations, they are por-
traits of these mice. The focus is on their face and its expression. As a 
result the photographs show something of these mice that might be called 
their ‘personality’. Pigmented Nude seems highly vulnerable, it is nude 
and seems to be shivering all over, it is a pitiful animal. Down’s Syndrome 
simply looks severely ill. It seems smaller than the other mice, and its body 
seems cramped and in a curved position. Blind Sterile seems more lively 
and normal, except for its creepy eyes. They are white/blueish. The animal 
is blind but still seems rather attentive. Obese is strickingly fat. It seems 
highly dubious whether he is still able to stand on his own feet. This gives 
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animal welfare and profit-making. Chalmers took the pictures in 2000. At 
that time, the US law on animal welfare, the Department of Agriculture’s 
1966 Animal Welfare Act (AWA) was highly debated. The definition on ‘an 
animal’ of the AWA excludes birds, rats and mice bred for use in research. 
As a result, laboratory mice are unprotected and their standards of care 
unmonitored81. A change in the status of the mouse could have an effect 
on profits. By exposing these mice in The New York Times, Chalmers made 
visible the ‘fuzzy little test tubes’ that Osborne wrote about. Behind the 
production and use of genetically engineered mice for medical research a 
‘bioindustrial complex’ exists that is as much driven by economic interests 
as by scientific or medical ones. In his article mentioned above, Osborne 
estimated that the profit of private ‘mouse ranches’ nationwide amounts to 
$200 million per year (Osborne 2000). Chalmers’s Transgenic Mice Series 
‘highlights this industry that has until recently escaped public scrutiny 
or calls for accountability’ as curator Robin Held wrote on the genesis 
website82.
Adam Brandejs’s Genpets™
The work Genpets™ by the artist Adam Brandejs is presented on his 
personal website and was exhibited in several art galleries. The work 
represents both the virtual biotech company Bio-Genica and its products, 
– the Genpets. Bio-Genica is presented on a website (www.genpet.com) 
that gives the impression of being the website of a real biotech company83. 
It provides information about the mission of the company and its products, 
and it contains a service and support page that gives online assistance, 
as well as ‘tech support’ for dealing with ‘your Genpet’. Genpets™ are 
mass-produced Bio-engineered pets made by Bio-Genica (see Figure 10). 
Genpets™ are actually ‘bizarre, altered, bipedal mammals sealed in a plastic 
bubble where they uneasily rest in some kind of induced hibernation. They 
are there, ready to take home and add to your life as the next entertain-
ment gadget; bioengineered creatures, mass-produced, and pre-packaged 
81. Today, the Animal Welfare Act in the USA still does not include laboratory mice. Researchers claim 
that the welfare of mice is adequately regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)/Food 
& Drug Administration (FDA) Good Laboratory Practice Standards (GLP), the US Public Health Service 
(PHS) Policy on Humane Care and Use of Laboratory Animals, and the Association for Assessment and 
Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care (AAALAC).
82. <http://web.archive.org/web/20050223010412/www.gene-sis.net/artists_chalmers.html>
83. At www.biogenica.com the website of a real biotech company can be found.
sense of obligation to the control of actual lives, without resorting to easy 
emotions. These mice have a larger-than-life dignity; they very nearly dare 
you to feel sorry for them’ wrote another (Hall 2002).
Unlike Kac, Chalmers did not write about her ‘yukky’ mice. She probably 
did not intend at all to participate in a moral and social debate on mouse 
biotechnology with her photographs. As a photographer, she documented 
what she saw in the laboratory. Not by taking snapshots of these trans-
genic mice, but by carefully picking some striking examples and putting 
them in the spotlight, she made portraits of these mice emphasising certain 
features. The photographs do not reveal the endless rows of (dirty) cages 
or other typical laboratory surroundings of laboratory mice. Neither do 
the photographs reveal the countless numbers of animals that are ‘geneti-
cally speaking’ interchangeable. The photographs show unique animals, 
individuals with their specific ugliness or beauty. These photographs show 
the mice in all their ambiguity. Some are cute, some are weird, and others 
are monstrous. ‘Make up your mind’, they seem to say. To somebody who 
is confronted with these to animals for the first time, they raise questions. 
What are these mice, and why do they exist? In what way are these bizarre 
creatures connected to our health?
Chalmers’s photographs of transgenic mice that appeared in The New 
York Times were probably an eye opener to the public. Gazing into the 
camera’s lens the mice confronted their audience with the bare fact of their 
existence. Animals that are normally invisible, abstract and anonymous 
suddenly look us straight in the face. They become real. These mice, in 
particular Rhino and Pigmented Nude, the two nude mice, have something 
uncanny about them, something yukky. Being confronted with these trans-
genic mice, the viewers are forced out of their comfort zone. The mice 
are both real and bizarre; they have something monstrous about them, 
they look emphatically unnatural. Chalmers shows them the way they are, 
ambiguous animals. On the one hand, these mice are mice like any other 
mice. On the other, they are grotesque, – technological artefacts. They 
are high-tech fuzzy in vivo test tubes. By adding to the mouse images the 
price tags and their specific use in biomedicine, these works of art inform 
the public about the animals behind biomedicine and biomedical industry 
in a disturbing way. The work reveals an uncomfortable relationship be-
tween human health, science and the biotech industry. A relationship that 
makes many people feel yukky. They seem to suggest there is not only a 
trade-off between animal suffering and human health, but also between 
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Brandejs has a clear message built into his artwork. ‘Re-think nature’, he 
writes in Bio-Genica’s catalogue. ‘Nature has never been a closed system, 
nor has it ever been balanced – we as a species have been affecting it for 
thousands of years. It has been our inspiration, and by choosing the best 
it has to offer we have been able to create absolute perfection. Patenting 
of living systems has become slowly accepted as our outlook on life has 
changed. As it is obvious that Genpets™ have never, and would never 
exist in nature, it seems silly to even question them as patented technol-
ogy. Unlike other domesticated pets, Genpets™ have not been torn out 
of their natural environment and forced to quickly adapt to a foreign 
habitat; instead they are fulfilling a pre-designed destiny. Now doesn’t 
bioengineering nature make far more sense?’ (Brandejs 2005a: 8)
The Genpets™ are explicitly presented as pets and not as laboratory ani-
mals. They are apparently made by a biotech company, but clearly in order 
to be useful at home in a pet-like fashion; they are high-tech living gadgets 
for personal use. With this artwork, Brandejs is implying that biotechnology 
will lead us, or has already begun to lead us, into a world where there is 
a growing (mis)use of animals by humans, even for purposes that many 
will consider as frivolous. But most striking are the responses of the public 
to his Genpets™. In his afterthought about the Genpets artwork, Brandejs 
writes how the piece was meant to illicit a reaction and how surprised or 
even shocked he was by the many positive responses, the eager acceptance 
of his Genpets™, eager to an uncanny extent. This notably applied to the 
responses he received from teens. ‘When I designed Genpets, I had no clue 
how people would react. It disturbed me to see such a positive acceptance 
of Genpets by people who wanted to buy a genetic pet’ (Brandejs 2005b). 
There are, of course, people that understand very well what the Genpets as 
an art project are about. And there were also people that ‘cried upon seeing 
them’. Overall though, Genpets.com was swamped with emails from people 
wanting to buy a pre-packaged pet. To Brandejs, this proves the importance 
and relevance of Genpets™ as an art piece. ‘It baffles me how one generation 
can be banging at a store window in absolute protest and outrage, while the 
younger is crying out and demanding I sell them’ (Brandejs 2005b). It is here 
I believe the artwork of Brandejs is a good example of ‘a palaeontology of 
the present’. The artwork gives a hint about the future, but by provoking a 
series of comments it opens up future scenarios that could not be predicted 
beforehand. The response to Genpets seems to suggest that future genera-
tions (Brandejs was born in the 1980s (1982), but a significant part of his 
as a fully self-contained unit for your convenience’ (Brandejs 2005b)84. On 
the website the catalogue of Bio-Gencia can also be found with interesting 
details about the company profile and the market potential of Genpets™.
The Genpets™ are made of plastics and electronics. They are not real 
living creatures but Brandejs does everything to give the spectator the feel-
ing that these genetically engineered pets are really alive. As he argues, it 
is ‘easier to dismiss Genpets as a hoax or exaggeration when you’re not 
faced with a wall of them. The experience of a grainy photo is different 
than standing face to face with a breathing, sleeping creature’. The whole 
set-up of the Genpets™ artwork is designed to give the audience the im-
pression that they are alive. The packages contain a series of glowing and 
beeping heart monitors, the chests of the pets rise and fall as if they are 
breathing and they occasionally twitch, shake and claw. Their movements 
are limited by tie-wraps, which keep them in place. All of this seems 
to confirm that these creatures are alive, that they are real, like biotech 
foetuses. But the sculpture is not about whether the Genpets are real or 
not. To Brandejs, the sculpture is ‘the physical representation of a ques-
tion.’ And this question about bioengineering is not about its positive or 
negative ramifications, or where it can take us. To Brandejs, the question 
is ‘whether or not we are ready to go there’ (Brandejs 2005b). It shows us 
the future of biotechnologies that, at present, are in their foetal stage. Are 
we ready for the adult version?
Brandejs’s work differs from Chalmers’s and Kac’s in the sense that it is 
not about ‘the real thing’ and not about today’s scientific practice. Brandejs 
reflects upon the future of animal biotechnology. His work is a kind of 
science fiction. To Brandejs: ‘Art is something that pushes boundaries and 
stirs thought and debate as well as something that reflects the times it was 
created in’ (Brandejs 2005b). So, reflecting upon today, Brandejs is stretch-
ing reality and creating an image of the world of tomorrow. He is using 
mixed media: (imaginary) biological sciences and computer technology. In 
doing so, he is reflecting upon his world. When he looks around he does 
not see bronze or wood, he sees ‘plastic, cement, steel, flashing lights, 
electronics, and LCD displays’. He sees ‘a mass media machine telling us 
to “buy, buy, buy”’, so these are the elements he uses to accomplish his 
artworks (Brandejs 2005b). Brandejs is showing us where biotechnology 
might lead.
84. The reference Brandejs 2005b is a website, and therefore a page number is not available.
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is irrelevant because strictly speaking individuals do not have natures), 
Bio-Genica has a rather radical vision of nature: a vision of nature that is 
by essence malleable. ‘Nature to us is nothing more than inspiration for 
rough parts. We have picked out the best of everything to create absolute 
perfection’ (Brandejs 2005a).
What strikes me most about Brandejs’s writing on biotechnology is that 
he seems surprised by the fact that the actual biotechnological develop-
ments (the ‘real thing’) are progressing much faster and further (are more 
‘far out’) than he had imagined. In a ‘quick note’ about the packaging of 
the Genpets, Brandejs writes: ‘I don’t believe the pets in packages to be a 
far stretch. Take a look at any farm or pet store; we already package our 
animals. The idea behind the Genpet packages is that Bio-Genica places 
the animals into an artificial hibernation. Again, when I read in a news-
paper that scientists have just combined sheep + spider to make stronger 
thread, is it far out to assume we could add a gene for hibernation from 
another animal? I think not. I think many of the concepts behind Genpets 
are far less “out there” than the majority of what is happening behind 
closed doors’ (Brandejs 2005b)
Part three: Making the invisible visible
Presenting the invisible
This chapter began with the hypothesis that bioart, sharing some of its 
ambiguities with the technologies upon which it is reflecting, but at the 
same time apparently being driven by a strong ethical agenda (the morality 
of bio-art), could offer something useful to the debate on the social and 
moral aspects of animal biotechnology. By making animal biotechnology 
visible in a way that confronts, disturbs and/or challenges our imagination, 
bioart can make an appeal to a variety of aesthetically-based moral judg-
ments on animal biotechnology.
In the first place, I have described how bioartists make animal biotech-
nology visible and even tangible (both the animals themselves and the 
technology), not by merely ‘informing’ the public about mouse biotechnol-
ogy, and nor by merely presenting them with images of the mice, but by 
presenting mouse biotechnology in its full and often ambiguous meaning. 
By this, I mean presenting transgenic mice as monsters (Chalmers), as 
promises (Crockett’s Ecce Homo), as commodities (Brandejs), as innocent 
audience in the 1990s) are likely to have less problems with using these 
kinds of biotechnologies in such a way. To them, Genpets™ are cool.
In fact, the artwork Genpets™ has two layers. The work has an upper 
layer that consists of the Genpets and the website. This is the layer of ar-
tistic fantasy, Brandejs’s vision of how a biotech company in future might 
look. But the artwork also has a second layer: the layer of physical reality. 
Some people take the website seriously, and really believe that they can 
order Genpets at Bio-Genica. To them, the Genpets are not simply im-
ages; Genpets are real. These people send in serious requests to Genpets.
com. As a result, a true conversation about gen-tech animals takes place 
between the artist and his audience.
What is yukky about the Genpets is that the genetically engineered 
animals are presented as commodities, packed for retail. This is what the 
work is about. ‘Life itself is quickly becoming a processed commodity in 
the privatization of nature. Biological engineering by large companies, 
outside of nature has become a terrifying reality for my generation to 
contend with’, Brandejs writes in his artist statement about the Genpets 
series 01 (Brandejs 2005b). ‘Today, we are well within the process of 
desensitizing an upcoming generation towards accepting bioengineering 
as “natural’’ (Brandejs 2005b). By presenting Genpets as commodities, he 
is highlighting the commercial interests that companies have (and will 
have even more in the future) in genetic engineering. When making profit 
is the number one incentive of the biotech industry, claiming to do ani-
mal biotechnology in order to save lives and to feed the world does not 
sound very sincere. It is marketing rhetoric: it is what people wish to hear. 
According to Brandejs, the work Genpets™ deals with three, related but 
different themes: fear, ignorance, and consumerism. ‘Bioengineering’, he 
explains ‘like any new technology promises a great deal of positive effects. 
We as a race, however, tend to put a great deal more faith into technology 
as a savior than it necessarily has earned. Through Genpets I question the 
negative effect that bioengineering can have, for we all know that when it 
all comes down to it, profit is the bottom line’ (Brandejs 2005b).
What is equally disturbing, or yukky, is the unnaturalness of the Gen-
pets. BioGenica’s vision of nature is a vision of nature as malleable, a 
nature that in and of itself has no value. What has economic value is not 
given by nature, but rather determined by man. This vision of nature re-
sembles Rollin’s vision when discussing animal biotechnology. But unlike 
Rollin, who prefers to avoid the issue of nature (by claiming that nature 
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The work of Brandejs, in particular the public response to it, suggests 
that when the biotechnology is ready for it, transgenic animals might very 
well become part of our lives85. This is also what Kac believes: ‘As we try 
to negotiate current disputes, it is clear that transgenics will be an integral 
part of our existence in the future. It will be possible, for example, to 
harness the glow of the jellyfish protein for optical data storage devices. 
Transgenic crops will be a predominant part of the landscape, transgenic 
organisms will populate the farm, and transgenic animals will become part 
of our expanded family’ (Kac 1998).
The message of these works of bioart seems to be that we already 
seem to have accepted that, sooner or later, these monstrous products 
will enter the public sphere. Therefore, we can no longer (mentally) hide 
these animals in laboratories. The question how we relate to transgenic or 
genetically modified animals suddenly becomes highly relevant. Because 
at the moment, so it seems, we do not relate to them at all, they are 
invisible. By presenting them as ‘real’ (Chalmers and Kac) or as a future 
possibility (Brandejs), these bioartists have made the genetically modi-
fied animals visible and by doing so they are questioning our confused 
(reluctant) moral position towards these creatures. They present us with 
the state of the art; this is what animal biotechnology (potentially) is about. 
There are monsters hidden in laboratories, and it is our moral duty, not 
only to take good care of them, but also to be prepared to welcome them 
into our world.
The economy of hope
Another issue that is addressed in a provocative way by these bioartists 
concerns the supposed benefits of biotechnology. When discussing the 
blessings of biotechnology, Catts frequently refers to the ‘rhetoric of saving 
lives and feeding the world’86. By scientists, both from academic circles 
and from biotech companies, animal biotechnology is often presented as a 
necessary evil: ‘Only with the use of genetically engineered mice will we 
have a chance of finding a cure for cancer’, or, ‘We can only win the battle 
against AIDS if we have a reliable transgenic mouse model’. Presented 
like this, transgenic mice are the only hope we have. Bioartists seem to 
be more critical about this hope and the promise of biotechnology than 
85. Transgenic glowing fish are already available. You can order at Glofish.com.
86. Personal communication.
creatures (Kac, Chalmers), as individual personalities of unique animals 
(Chalmers), etc. When presenting the transgenic mice (or other genetically 
engineered animals), the bio-artists I discussed also present the myths and 
metaphors that give meaning to these mice.
Presenting the monster
Both scientist and ethicist – the former with their day-to-day experience 
and the latter with their focus on animal welfare –, have reduced the ge-
netically engineered mouse to an ordinary laboratory mouse. In everyday 
laboratory practice, genetically engineered mice do not differ from non-
genetically altered mice. Therefore, I see it as one of the merits of bioart 
to put emphasis on the fact that these animals are genetically engineered 
animals, and that there is something about biotechnology that deserves our 
attention. The genetically modified mouse is not simply a pitiful animal 
that is being used in science, it is the pioneer species of biotechnology. It 
is that latter role that is still in need of thorough investigation. What will 
biotechnology bring to the mouse, and, by implication, to us? What will 
FutureMouse look like? What will FutureMan look like?
I argued that ethicist and scientist when dealing with the transgenic 
mouse monster usually apply a strategy of containment. Genetically en-
gineered animals are carefully locked away in laboratories. The outside 
world is a no-go-area for these gen-tech animals. By ‘creating’ transgenic 
pet animals and bringing them out in the open, both Kac and Brandjes 
have broken this rule. They have set the monster free. Kac set the monster 
free by literally embracing his monster and asking for her domestication. 
He asked us to welcome transgenic organisms like Alba in our homes. He 
did exactly what Frankenstein failed to do. Brandejs did a similar thing by 
offering Genpets for sale on his website. He introduced them to the world 
outside the laboratory, to the marketplace, to be more specific. When 
referring to animal biotechnology, both Kac and Brandejs speak about 
what goes on ‘behind closed doors’. But they keep the mystery alive. They 
do not reveal anything about what happens behind these closed doors of 
the laboratories. They only present what comes out.
Chalmers did go behind these closed doors, where she was able to take 
a closer look at these mice. But she focused on the mice as such. We do not 
see laboratory equipment on her mouse portraits; we do not see scientists 
wearing white coats. Yet, in her work the products of these laboratories 
are presented. And these products – monsters – are very real.
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‘shifting boundaries’. They are unnatural, but are in the process of becom-
ing accepted as ‘normal’, at least by the scientific community. In his art 
project, Brandjes presents the question about nature as totally irrelevant 
in the light of future applications. The practice of patenting genes by 
biotech companies is illustrative of this changing attitude towards nature. 
Only what is created or adopted by the biotech companies has economic 
value to the biotech industry, not what is created by nature. Moreover, 
to care about the quality of life of individuals seems out of place in the 
light of the future commodification of genetically engineered animals. To 
most people today, Brandejs’s Genpets™ are both unnatural and do not 
have lives worth living. But as the public response to Brandejs’s artwork 
is pointing out, the attitude towards the genetic engineering of animals 
might be changing more rapidly than we can at present imagine. What 
is perceived today as totally unthinkable in terms of ethical acceptability, 
within a decade or two might be the coolest thing.
Concluding remarks: towards a more creative style of 
ethical inquiry
In answer to the question how works of art can be of assistance to our 
moral understanding and evaluation of animal biotechnology, we may 
conclude that art has something valuable to offer to the ethical debate 
on animal biotechnology, first of all by placing concrete applications in 
a broader, future-oriented perspective. Artistic visualisations are of vital 
importance when it comes to the moral assessment of a technology that 
not only takes place behind the closed doors of the laboratory and on the 
level of the invisible, the DNA molecule, but is bound to become visible 
outside the laboratory in the future. DNA technology is in a sense science 
fiction, a science of future promises. In order to understand the meaning 
and future implications of biotechnology, we have to rely on (artistic) 
imagination. This is what bioart in a broad sense – meaning art inspired 
by, reflecting upon, commenting upon, or involving bio(techn)ology – can 
offer. Artists have a long tradition of visualising the present and the future, 
the fantastic and the real, the good and the bad, using various media, 
varying from traditional materials to multi-media and biotechnology. They 
can visualise the effects of biotechnology by representing or applying it.
But there is another reason why bioart can play a valuable role in 
the social and ethical debate on animal biotechnology. Art can have a 
bioethicists. They seem more willing to question what exactly is promised, 
and how this promise relates to the millions of mice used, or sacrificed, 
in biomedical science. Chalmers’s transgenic mice, like Bryan Crockett’s 
Ecce Homo and his Cultured (the mice representing the Seven Deadly 
Sins) pose a difficult question: How is the fate of these individual mice 
connected to human interests, both financial and medical?
On nature
Biotechnology is changing our vision of nature: ‘nature’ and ‘the natural’ 
seem rather vague notions referring to a world ‘out there’ not yet influ-
enced by us humans, something that is quickly becoming marginal or even 
non-existent. The invention of recombinant DNA technology revealed, as 
no other technology had done before, that the raw materials of nature 
and life are by nature malleable. ‘Do not fight this idea’, ‘do not deny 
the power of biotechnology’ is what bioartists seem to say, ‘but learn to 
live with it and put it to use in a responsible way’. To Kac the image of a 
world that is visibly influenced by biotechnology is a highly realistic future 
scenario. ‘In the future we will have foreign genetic material in us as today 
we have mechanical and electronic implants. In other words, we will be 
transgenic. As the concept of species based on breeding barriers is undone 
through genetic engineering, the very notion of what it means to be hu-
man is at stake. However, this does not constitute an ontological crisis. To 
be human will mean that the human genome is not a limitation, but our 
starting point’ (Kac 1998). When we accept biotechnology as a fact, the 
question surrounding bioengineering is not whether it’s good or bad, or 
where it can take us; it is whether or not we are ready to go there.
The works of Kac, Chalmers and Brandejs, each in their own way, 
pose questions that are relevant to the social and moral assessment of the 
genetic engineering of animals, in particular where questions concerning 
our vision of nature, the normal and the abnormal are at stake. Like Alba, 
the fluorescent mice that inhabit the laboratories look very unnatural. But 
what is natural or unnatural when thinking about laboratory inbred mice? 
Any attempt to introduce an objective unequivocal notion of nature or 
the natural fails in the light of scientific progress. Biotechnologists have 
shown that nature is more malleable than we believed, and that we are 
more connected through our DNA with other species than we expected. 
In short, our (scientific) notion of nature is adrift as a result of the insights 
of biotechnology. Fluorescent rabbits and mice are the living proof of 
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Chapter 6
Conclusions: of FutureMice and FutureMen
The FutureMouse© experiment offers the public a unique opportunity to see life and 
death in a “close-up.” The opportunity to witness for themselves a technology that 
might yet slow the progress of disease, control the process of aging, and eliminate 
genetic defect. The FutureMouse© holds out the tantalizing promise of a new phase 
in human history, where we are not victims of the random but instead the director 
and arbitrators of our own fate.87
 Zadie Smith
In this final chapter, I wish to go back to the beginning and refer once 
again to a passage from Zadie Smith’s White Teeth. This time the quotation 
is taken from a press release about Marcus’s FutureMouse©. Stressing the 
importance of FutureMouse© the author of this press release presents 
the mouse as ‘the promise of a new phase in human history’. The quote 
illustrates very well how the fate of the mouse, the future of the Future-
Mouse© is related to the future of humans, a future where we, with the 
help of biotechnology are said to become ‘directors and arbitrators of our 
own fate’. This is more or less the key message I have put forward in this 
philosophical inquiry into the genetically engineered mouse: if we want to 
understand the biotech revolution, and see what future lies ahead for us, 
we have to look at the mouse. Since in biotechnology research, the mouse 
is often used as a stand-in for us humans, FutureMouse© might very well 
be a stand-in for FutureMan.
But, before jumping to conclusions, I wish to reflect briefly on the previ-
ous chapters and give answers to the questions raised in the Introduction. 
One of the central questions of this book was: What is the genetically 
engineered laboratory mouse? On the basis of the many mouse images 
I came across in my philosophical inquiry, I have come to the conclu-
sion that the genetically engineered mouse is much more than merely a 
laboratory animal whose genome is modified by humans. The genetically 
engineered mouse is a much more ambiguous animal.
87. Zadie Smith (2000), White Teeth, New York, Vintage Books, p. 357.
refreshing impact on the debate because artists open up a different per-
spective on biotechnology than scientists and philosophers or bioethicists 
usually do. Artists can reflect on science by ‘doing science’ and/or ‘ethics’ 
outside the existing scientific or ethical frameworks such as laboratories, 
ethics committees or philosophical discourses. Artists can create ‘truth’ by 
manipulating or disturbing facts. This artistic truth can be of great value 
to the moral debate. An artwork like Alba forces us to step outside the 
dominant ethical discourse and take another (second) look at the monsters 
we are creating. It is because Alba is art and not science that she forces us 
to look at animal biotechnology from a different, not necessarily ‘scientific’ 
perspective.
These works of art enable us to physically experience what usually 
remains unsaid and out of sight: the mice as monsters, but not perhaps 
monsters that we have to fear. On the contrary, these are monsters we 
have to take good care of. These monsters promise many good things. But 
it is our task to remain critical about these promises.
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techniques; and, 3) a member of an infantry group preparing roads or ter-
rain for the main body of troops’. Wikipedia gives the following definition: 
‘One who goes before, as into the wilderness, preparing the way for others 
to follow’. These two definitions point out that being a pioneer is about 
being the first one to enter a new territory, about going to a place where 
no one has gone before. A pioneer is an innovator. But, also essential to 
the definition is that pioneers pave the way for others soon to follow.
When I refer to the mouse as a ‘pioneer’ I do not mean, of course, that 
mice themselves must be seen as developers of new ideas or techniques. 
Rather, the mouse is a ‘pioneer species’ that has already entered a future 
into which we will sooner or later follow him. Because of its unique 
genetic properties the mouse enables us to learn things about genetics and 
biotechnology that would have been unimaginable without its existence. 
Whether the laws of Mendelian genetic inheritance also apply to complex 
organisms such as mammals was tested and proved in the mouse. Because 
of the mouse, biologists were able to unravel mysteries about DNA regula-
tion and transcription. The mouse enabled scientists to discover that DNA 
is universal. But perhaps even more important, through the mouse we 
learned about our own genetic development and genetic diseases. This 
knowledge about genetics is both comforting and disturbing. We are no 
longer prisoners of our own DNA. We can liberate ourselves from our 
genetic fate. This makes the mouse – apart from the animal welfare issues 
animal biotechnology raises – an animal of great moral importance.
As I have shown in Chapter 1, the mouse became the pioneer in the 
biotech revolution sometime in the late 1970s, early 1980s, when scientists 
‘discovered’ recombinant DNA technology, and developed techniques to 
culture embryos and ES cells in vitro, and the first transgenic mice were 
born. As I have argued, the mouse did not become a pioneer ‘out of the 
blue’, the first transgenic mouse was not created ex nihilo. The history of 
these biotech pioneers began over a hundred years ago when Clarence 
Cook Little started inbreeding mice for scientific purposes. As a result of 
these inbreeding practices, some of the inbred strains developed unique 
genetic and embryological characteristics that made the introduction of 
foreign DNA in the early 1980s possible. Like no other mammal the inbred 
mouse can be genetically modified. So it was in the course of a long 
process of inbreeding and other forms of biological interference with the 
mouse genome that the genetically engineered laboratory mouse became 
a living artefact, a creature that could never have been the result of a 
It is the ‘right tool for the job’ that will enable us to find a cure for 
life-threatening genetic diseases, as well as a victim of biomedical science, 
programmed to become ill and to suffer from human illnesses. It is ‘a 
high-bio-tech fuzzy test tube’, but also a mouse like any other mouse, with 
ordinary mouse needs and interests. On the one hand, it is looked upon 
(by the scientists who work with it) as a piece of standard equipment of the 
modern biomedical laboratory, or even a commodity while, on the other 
hand, it is praised as a potential hero by these same researchers. From 
an animal ethics perspective, the genetically engineered mouse models 
can be seen as a ‘refinement’ of the ‘conventional’ mouse experiments. 
For example, the fluorescent oncomice discussed in Chapter 1 are highly 
sophisticated research models compared with traditional cancer mouse 
models. So in that respect, biotechnology can be seen as an improvement 
for the animals involved. But, in the near future, it will definitely not lead 
to replacement or reduction, as is sometimes suggested. On the contrary, 
animal biotechnology is the major driving force behind the breeding of 
a growing number of laboratory animals. If we take the ambitions of the 
mouse knock-out project seriously, then eventually every single gene will 
be knocked out in the mouse. Mouse biotechnology is Big Science, a 
practice that involves millions of mice. They are of great scientific value 
because they can serve as a stand-in for us humans in medical research. 
But their intrinsic value is similar to that of other animals. We use them 
because, biologically speaking, they resemble us so much. And yet we 
believe we are allowed to use them because, morally speaking, they are 
different, not human. The genetically engineered mouse is perceived both 
as a promise and as a threat. It is compared to Jesus, but also regarded as 
a monster. Being at the frontiers of science, they are a source of inspiration 
for artists and writers.
From this broad variety of mouse images, or perceptions of the mouse, 
I believe the image of the mouse as the pioneer species in biotechnology 
is the most powerful. It is the most complete image. It is an image that can 
incorporate the others. It is an image that allows me to answer the other 
two questions that lie at the heart of this book: What can we learn from 
the mouse, about life, the life sciences, and about ourselves? And, what are 
the moral consequences of the genetic engineering of mice: that is, how 
should we deal with the mouse?
A pioneer is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as ‘1) a person who 
explores or settles in a new region; 2) a developer of new ideas or 
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myths do; they help us shape the meaning of the world as we perceive it. 
By paying close attention to the myth and metaphors that give shape to the 
mouse debate, we can learn something about the complex meaning that 
the genetically engineered mouse has for us humans.
A superficial reading of ‘God talk’ indicates that people feel there is a 
dividing line between what is man-made and what is given. Apparently, 
they worry about what happens when we cross this line. Crossing that line 
is a gesture that evokes fear, fear of the unknown consequences, or, in a 
religious vocabulary, fear of God’s punishment. But as I have shown in 
Chapter 3, the ‘playing God’ metaphor involves much more than simply a 
fear of God’s punishment. It also reveals that the genetically engineered 
mouse, as the pioneer species in biotechnology, has the character of a 
promise. If we see the mouse as a promise, as many people whom I have 
quoted throughout this book tend to do, we may begin to understand the 
political and economic driving forces behind biotechnology. We begin 
to acknowledge that the mouse is one of the key actors in a political 
economy of hope. This is, in fact, a network that involves various kinds 
of people, and various kinds of hope, such as: carriers of or sufferers 
from a genetic disease hoping for a cure; scientists and researchers seek-
ing a breakthrough; doctors and health care professionals in search of a 
successful therapy; biotech companies aiming for products that generate 
profit; and governments looking for industrial and commercial develop-
ments that will generate employment and stimulate economic activity and 
international competitiveness. A whole industry is based on this hope 
and promise.
A point of moral concern is the position of the mouse in the trade-off 
between the potential harm done to the animal and the potential human 
benefits. In this trade-off, the mouse does not really stand a chance. In the 
light of the element of promise, every mouse that is ‘sacrificed’ is worth 
the try. As I argued before, there are not many members of animal ethics 
committees who dare to say ‘no’ to an experiment that potentially could 
lead to a significant breakthrough in cancer research. It is my own experi-
ence that most people on such committees feel very reluctant to reject an 
experiment and prefer to reason on the basis of the benefit of the doubt. 
They take the promise of biotechnology seriously, they simply have to.
Another point of moral concern has to do with the division of power 
in the new bio-politics in the age of biotechnology. Who is promising all 
these ‘good things’ about biotechnology? Who is playing God? Of course, 
‘natural process’. This made me conclude that the transgenic mouse is as 
much a man-made species as a biological species. As a man-made living 
animal it belongs both to the world of artifacts that can be patented and to 
the world of the living creatures that are part of nature.
As I have explained in Chapter 2, the fact that these animals are both 
natural and unnatural is what, apart from the animal suffering involved, 
people find most disturbing about mouse biotechnology. By changing the 
mouse’s genetic make-up, we change something unique that has been 
the result of a long ‘natural’ process called evolution. We do things with 
genes that would never have happened in ‘nature’. Through our ‘messing 
with nature’ we have created living artefacts. But how can a living being 
be unnatural? How can a living being be an artifact? What does being 
‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’ mean in the case of laboratory animals? Humans 
have interfered with the mouse’s genome for more than a century. What 
makes biotechnology more unnatural than traditional cross-breeding or 
Little’s inbreeding? The moral debate on the genetic engineering of mice 
illustrates that ‘nature’ or, more precisely, our vision of nature is adrift as 
a consequence of biotechnology. The difficulty of defining ‘nature’ and 
‘natural’ in a way that is both satisfactory both to the high-tech rapidly 
changing life sciences and to our common sense makes it hard to make 
a moral assessment of mouse biotechnology. Being a product of both 
nature and techno-science, these mice challenge the nature/culture di-
chotomy and, by doing so, they make us feel uncomfortable. According to 
Smits’s monster theory these mice are ‘monsters’, since they belong to two 
categories that are mutually exclusive. An effective strategy to deal with 
monsters of this kind is to reduce them to a less problematic category. In 
the case of the genetically engineered mouse, this is the category of the 
ordinary laboratory mouse. But as I have argued in Chapter 2, this monster 
strategy does not lead to the domestication of the mouse monster. Its most 
monstrous aspect is simply ignored. The mouse remains a monster.
Subsequently, I investigated the two most dominant myths and meta-
phors to which people refer when they express their moral feelings about 
these monster mice: the playing God metaphor, and the Frankenstein myth. 
When people refer to God or Frankenstein in order to express their moral 
doubts, or their anxieties, I argued, they are not simply being emotional or 
irrational. On the contrary, by referring to these myths and by using these 
metaphors they reveal something important about how we are struggling 
to make sense of what we know about mouse biotechnology. This is what 
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the mouse?, I believe this is the most important lesson the mouse teaches 
us. The mice have taught us about the potential of genetics. They made it 
possible to develop the techniques to modify genes, to turn them ‘off’ and 
‘on’ on command, and to make genes visible. Over a period of 25 years 
the mice have ‘taught us’ to control fate – theirs and ours. We have also 
learned that DNA is universal and can be exchanged between animals of 
different species, including man. Taken together, this suggests that we can 
also control the fate of man; and that FutureMouse© is indeed holding out 
the tantalising promise of a new phase in human history, where we are not 
victims of random variation but rather the directors and arbitrators of our 
own fate. This is the ‘monster’ we fear. But, as I put forward in Chapter 4, 
I do not believe the genetic engineering of mice is a practice that can, or 
should be, put on hold. Nor, do I believe that human beings will never be 
subject to genetic engineering because it is an ‘unethical’ thing to do. The 
discovery of the malleable human genome is not one that can be turned 
back. We simply have to face the monster.
This takes me to the third and final question of this book: How should 
we face this monster? How can we make a moral assessment of mouse 
biotechnology? One of the reasons why I find the image of the mouse as 
a biotech pioneer appealing is that presenting the mouse as a pioneer is 
a way of facing the monster. A pioneer is facing the future. A pioneer is 
discovering new territories that have future potential. The main purpose of 
the pioneer’s travels is that sooner or later others will follow. This is what 
the genetically engineered mice are doing, they are test animals, they are 
stand-ins, and this is why Marcus (or Zadie Smith as his inventor) calls 
his mouse FutureMouse. As the pioneer species par excellence, the mouse 
provides us with important information about the biotech future. But, how 
can we make sense of this biotech revolution? How do we know where 
we are heading? How can we make a moral assessment of something that 
lies ahead of us?
One way to address these questions is by using our imagination: think 
of what might be possible, let your guts speak (figuratively speaking of 
course). Yuk!, the outcry of disgust, can be a very good starting point for 
a moral assessment. This is not to say that what evokes a yuk!-response is 
by definition wrong. On the contrary, disgust is a rather primal emotion 
that probably evolved in order to protect us from eating contaminated 
food (Jones 2007). But in a moral context disgust is a response in need of 
further investigation. There is a difference in moral and visceral disgust. 
it is not the mice themselves who are promising this type of ‘salvation’ 
through biotech, they merely represent this promise. They are the living 
flesh, the physical ‘proof’ of this promise. The biotechnologists, the uni-
versities that employ them, and the biotech and pharmaceutical companies 
who pay for the research are the ones who are making these claims. And 
whom do they address? Is it a new emerging elite class of those who will 
have access to the benefits of our biotech future?
What seems to worry people most is probably the promise itself. What is 
exactly promised, what is the master plan of the creative biotechnologists? 
Experiments with transgenic mice have illustrated how easy it is to modify 
mammalian DNA. They have shown that DNA is universal; that all living 
species share the same DNA and that DNA can easily be transported from 
any organism to another. The mouse genome is malleable, and, if DNA 
is universal, by implication the human genome is also malleable. What 
we can do with the mouse today, we can do with humans tomorrow. 
The mouse is after all a stand-in for us humans. This means that through 
biotechnology we will someday be able to cure people who suffer from 
life-threatening or degenerative diseases. We can correct genes in humans 
that cause illness just like we can correct genes in mice. If scientists can 
cure mice through biotechnology, they can cure humans through biotech-
nology. But, as I have shown in Chapter 4, if we resemble mice that much 
in terms of ‘genetic correctability’, this implies, in theory at least, that we 
also can enhance ourselves: that we can become more intelligent, stronger 
and live longer. If scientists can create ‘supermice’, they can also create 
‘supermen’. Now this is a thought that really seems to disturb most people. 
When giving their opinion about the creation of ‘supermen’ through bio-
technology, people often refer to Frankenstein. The reference to Franken-
stein is an expression of a feeling of disgust. It is the expression of the fear 
that (human) biotechnology will lead to ‘a gruesome parade of horribles’. 
This is what a superficial reading of the Frankenstein myth is about. But 
after looking more closely at the Frankenstein myth, I have suggested a 
different reading. I came to the conclusion that biotechnologists have not 
created a monster, but discovered one. This is the main conclusion of my 
chapter on the ‘Frankenstein thing’. Supermice Doogie, He-Man-mouse, 
Yoda and Marathon-mouse show what is possible; they show what bio-
tech can do. The monster the biotechnologists discovered is the idea that 
mice, and by implication also humans, are potentially malleable entities. 
In answer to the second question of this book: What can we learn from 
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5, contributions by artists can be of great value to the moral debate on 
animal biotechnology, but so are those of scientists, philosophers, journal-
ists, literary authors, and various other parties involved in the creation of 
the image of the mouse. I see it as the task of this heterogeneous group 
of scientists, philosophers, artists, journalists, writers, etc to elaborate a 
palaeontology of the present, trying to discover patterns of meaning in 
series of apparently fragmented and unrelated events. This will help us to 
face the monster, to make our moral assessments, and to prepare us for 
the future.
This takes me to my final question about the moral consequences. 
Indeed, as Adam Brandejs puts it: the basic issue raised by mouse biotech-
nology is not an ethical ‘No, unless’. Rather, the questions are: Where will 
biotechnology take us? And are we ready now to go there?
Therefore, we should keep a close eye on the biotech mouse. We 
should put it in the spotlight. Not only because it is the pioneer species, 
but because as a visible living being it deserves good care and attention 
and forces us to think more critically about the promises of biotechnology. 
With the mouse in mind we can ask ourselves:
So, are we ready to go there?
An outcry of disgust in response to an image of a genetically engineered 
mouse or any other animal is a first verbalization of a moral intuition. The 
next step is to ask ourselves why we feel that a fluorescent rabbit, for 
instance, is yukky, or a nude pink mouse with a wrinkled skin? On what 
convictions is this moral intuition based? The conviction that rabbits ought 
not to fluorescent? The conviction that humans ought not engineer them-
selves into genetically stronger, more intelligent and more healthy human 
beings? Why not embrace biotechnology? These are important questions 
that lie ahead of us when facing the biotech future.
In Chapter 5, I used artworks to explore the yuk-factor of animal 
biotechnology. I carefully selected artworks that convey a moral message 
about animal biotechnology. These moral messages are often far from 
clear. But this is exactly why these artworks can be so valuable in a moral 
assessment. The messages of the artworks I discussed are as ambiguous 
as the mixed feelings animal biotechnology raises. Works of (bio)art and 
moral intuitions have something in common: in order to make sense of 
them, we need interpret them. And in the process of interpretation we 
will find that a straightforward unequivocal judgement is probably not 
possible. Discussing these artworks (aesthetics) can be a useful step in 
a morale debate (ethics). But there is another reason why I believe that 
in the case of animal biotechnology aesthetics can contribute to ethics. 
Genetically engineered animals are artificial animals. These are animals 
created by humans, so in a sense they are works of art. This is why in 
the moral assessment of animal biotechnology aesthetic judgements play 
an important role. Why do we find genetically engineered mice cute or 
disgusting? What we perceive as tasteful or disgusting is dependent on 
many factors. In the case of animal biotechnology I have argued that one 
of these is our perception of nature and another that of a good life. Both 
these notions are as aesthetic as they are ethical. Dealing with animal 
biotechnology implies dealing with these notions.
Meanwhile, we have to make sense of a future that is not yet here 
and a technology that is not fully understood by many. In Chapter 5, I 
used the concept of ‘a palaeontology of the present’ to address this issue. 
The concept was introduced by Mitchell as one of the tasks of the work 
of art in the age of biocybernetic reproduction. I would like to see a 
‘palaeontology of the present’ as a collective and interdisciplinary effort. 
Therefore I would like to expand the group of people responsible for its 
elaboration far beyond the usual candidates. As I have argued in Chapter 
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Vandaag de dag is het genetisch modificeren van muizen ten behoeve van 
biomedische onderzoek een gangbare wetenschappelijke praktijk. Miljoe-
nen transgene muizen bevolken laboratoria over de gehele wereld. De 
meeste van deze transgene muizen zijn door biotechnologen ontwikkeld 
als diermodel voor studie naar humane genetische ziekten. Maar daarnaast 
hebben biotechnologen muizen gecreëerd die slimmer zijn, langer leven 
en sterker zijn dan gewone muizen. De vraag hierbij is niet zozeer of deze 
technologieën ooit op de mens zullen worden toegepast. De vraag is eer-
der wanneer dat zal gebeuren. Elke vorm van biotechnologie die ooit op 
de mens zal worden toegepast, zoals gentherapie of genetic enhancement, 
zal hoogstwaarschijnlijk in de muis worden ontwikkeld en eerst op de 
muis worden getest. De muis is dus, zo luidt de hoofdstelling van mijn 
proefschrift, de pionier in de nieuwe wereld van de biotechnologie.
In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik de verwachtingen en angsten die ten 
grondslag liggen aan de biotechnologie revolutie door haar hoofdrolspe-
ler, de genetisch gemodificeerde muis, te presenteren als afwisselend een 
monster, een held, een Messias, een levend artefact en een deerniswek-
kend proefdier. Wijsgerig gezien is de muis een uitermate dubbelzinnig 
wezen dat vanwege zijn unieke genetische eigenschappen carrière wist te 
maken binnen de biomedische wetenschappen.
In het eerste hoofdstuk, The birth of the transgenic laboratory mouse 
(De geboorte van de transgene labmuis), richt ik mijn aandacht primair 
op de biomedische wetenschappen. In dit hoofdstuk introduceer ik de 
transgene muis door hem op te zoeken in zijn ‘natuurlijke’ habitat: het 
laboratorium. Ten einde het antwoord te geven op de vragen hoe de muis 
daar terecht is gekomen en hoe hij zich heeft kunnen ontwikkelen tot 
meest gebruikte proefdier, ga ik terug naar het begin van de vorige eeuw 
toen de muis zijn intrede deed in het wetenschappelijke laboratorium. 
Vanaf dat moment volg ik zijn ‘carrière’ tot standaard poefdier voor studies 
in de genetica. Ik onderscheid drie cruciale stappen in de ‘genealogie’ van 
laboratorium muis.1) De transformatie van de muis van een studieobject 
als dier naar een homogeen laboratorium instrument of het modeldier 
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dominante ethische toetskader te zijn. Dit geldt zowel voor de betrokken 
biomedisch onderzoekers als voor leden van Dier Experimenten Commis-
sies. Hoe dit is te verklaren leg ik uit aan de hand van Martijntje Smits’s 
monstertheorie. Deze theorie biedt een verklaring voor publieke reacties 
op producten van nieuwe technologieën die zich niet laten herleiden tot 
de natuur-cultuur dichotomie. De genetisch gemodificeerde muis is zo’n 
‘product’. In dit hoofdstuk beargumenteer ik, tot slot, dat de muis ondanks 
zijn wijdverbreide gebruik in biomedische laboratoria en de schijn van 
domesticatie, voor velen nog steeds het karakter van monster heeft. Het 
monsterkarakter van de muis blijkt onder andere uit de mythen en me-
taforen die het vocabulaire van het debat over biotechnologie bij dieren 
domineren. In de hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5 bespreek ik achtereenvolgens 
de ‘waarheden’ die schuil gaan achter de drie belangrijkste metaforen en 
mythen: de ‘voor God spelen’ metafoor; de Frankenstein mythe; en de 
yuk!-factor.
In het derde hoofdstuk, Playing God or the promise of mouse biotech-
nology (Voor God spelen of de belofte van de muisbiotechnologie), neem 
ik het kunstwerk Ecce Home van Bryan Crockett als vertrekpunt bij het 
bespreken van de ‘voor God spelen’ metafoor in biotechnologie. In dit 
kunstwerk wordt de genetisch gemodificeerde oncomuis gerepresenteerd 
als de Christus figuur. Dit manshoge marmeren beeld is een veelzeggende 
verbeelding van de ‘voor God spelen’ metafoor. Het suggereert niet alleen 
dat wetenschappers die betrokken zijn bij muisbiotechnologie voor God 
spelen, maar ook dat biotechnologen pretenderen verlossing te brengen. 
In mijn verkenning van de mythe van de ‘wetenschap als verlossing’, be-
argumenteer ik dat, los van het feit of we dit nu letterlijk of metaforisch 
moeten zien, biotechnologie het karakter heeft van een belofte. En dat 
de genetisch gemodificeerde muis is te zien als de personificatie van die 
belofte. Wie zijn het die deze belofte doen, wie spelen er voor God? En 
wat beloven zij, wat is hun ‘goddelijke’ plan?
Dit brengt mij op de angst voor potentiële monsters die binnen labora-
toria worden geschapen. Deze angst is het onderwerp van hoofdstuk 4, 
The ‘Frankenstein thing’ or the monsters we fear (De Frankenstein mythe 
of de monsters die we vrezen). Bij de formulering van deze angst verwijst 
men dikwijls naar de klassieke roman van Mary Shelley. Frankenstein’s 
monster is min of meer het archetype voor de populaire ‘biotech monster 
fobie’. In dit hoofdstuk behandel ik de vraag waar mensen, die refereren 
aan Frankenstein als zij kritiek uiten op biotechnologie, precies bang voor 
dat geschikt is voor onderzoek naar de genetica; 2) de ontwikkeling tot 
pionier in de transgene technologie; en 3) zijn transformatie van model-
dier tot muismodel geschikt voor onderzoek naar menselijke ziekten. Dit 
hoofdstuk sluit ik af met de conclusie dat de muis als gevolg van een lang 
proces van menselijke interventie in zijn genetische opmaak een ‘levend 
artefact’ is geworden.
In het tweede hoofdstuk, Mouse ethics, the taming of a monster (Mui-
zenethiek, een vorm van monsterbezwering), ga ik in op het maatschap-
pelijke en ethische debat over de muisbiotechnologie. Wat zijn de morele 
aspecten van het genetisch modificeren van muizen ten behoeve van 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek? Hoe moeten we omgaan met deze genetisch 
gemodificeerde proefdieren? Welke antwoorden geven filosofen op deze 
vraag? In het debat over biotechnologie bij dieren onderscheid ik drie 
nooit convergerende paden. Op het eerst pad wordt een discussie gevoerd 
over de noodzaak van muisbiotechnologie als het gaat om onze verlossing 
van levensbedreigende genetische ziektes. Op het tweede pad gaat de 
discussie over het dierenleed dat gepaard gaat met deze ingrijpende dier-
experimenten. Op het derde pad gaat het debat over de vraag of wij als 
mens wel het recht hebben om in te grijpen in de schepping en of we niet 
voor ‘God spelen’ als wij ingrijpen op het genoom van de muis. Op elk 
van deze drie paden verschijnt een andere muis, een ander muisbeeld. Op 
het eerste pad zien we de muis als een onderdeel van high-tech laborato-
rium instrumentaria. Op het tweede pad verschijnt een dier van vlees en 
bloed dat slachtoffer is van de wetenschap. Op het derde pad doemt een 
beeld op van de muis dat lijkt op dat van het monster van Frankenstein. 
Deze muisbeelden laten zich niet gemakkelijk tot een eenduidig moreel 
oordeel over muisbiotechnologie herleiden, aangezien zij verwijzen naar 
verschillende en vaak onverenigbare morele waarden, zoals vooruitgang 
in de medische wetenschap, dierenwelzijn en respect voor de natuur.
Volgens Bernard Rollin, een van de meest invloedrijke filosofen op het 
gebied van biotechnologie bij dieren, zijn alleen bezwaren die te maken 
hebben met dierenwelzijn moreel relevant. De overige bezwaren die wor-
den geuit tegen biotechnologie bij dieren zijn, volgens hem, esthetische 
bezwaren. Veel filosofen, (mijzelf incluis) en leken hebben moeite met 
deze lijn van redeneren. Er staat zonder twijfel meer op het spel dan alleen 
dierenwelzijn: namelijk ons natuurbeeld of onze definitie van wat we als 
natuurlijk beschouwen. Echter, in de dagelijkse onderzoekspraktijk lijkt 
een utilistische afweging tussen dierenwelzijn en maatschappelijk nut het 
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project van Eduardo Kac (2000); de Transgenic Mice series van Catherine 
Chalmers (2000); en Genpets™ van Adam Brandejs (2005). Aan de hand 
van deze kunstwerken laat ik zien dat kunst een belangrijke bijdrage kan 
spelen in onze morele oordeelsvorming, omdat kunstenaars het onzicht-
bare zichtbaar maken en omdat beelden soms kunnen overbrengen wat 
taal (nog) niet kan uitdrukken.
zijn. Hoe verhoudt de Frankenstein mythe zich tot de ontwikkelingen in 
de hedendaagse biotechnologie? Om deze vraag te beantwoorden vertel 
ik het verhaal van vier supermuizen en illustreer daarmee de toekomstige 
mogelijkheden van human enhancement. Ik beargumenteer dat in deze 
dagen van supermuizen het kritisch lezen van Shelley’s roman van groot 
belang is en dat biotechnologen inderdaad een monster hebben ontdekt. 
Immers, DNA, onze essentie, is van nature manipuleerbaar en daarmee 
is de mens net als de muis ‘maakbaar’. De cruciale vraag is dan hoe 
we geslaagde ‘re-creaties’ kunnen onderscheiden van monsterlijke. Is het 
mogelijk hier een objectief moreel oordeel over te vellen of is dit slechts 
een kwestie van smaak?
Om deze vraag te beantwoorden bespreek ik het vijfde hoofdstuk, ‘Yuk’ 
and the aesthetics of mouse biotechnology (Yuk! en de esthetica van muis-
biotechnologie), de relatie tussen smaakoordelen en ethische oordelen 
over biotechnologie bij dieren (en mensen) in meer detail. Daartoe keer ik 
eerst terug naar het argument van Rollin dat ik al eerder heb bespoken in 
hoofdstuk 2 (Ik doel hier op het argument dat morele zorgen die hun basis 
vinden in een esthetisch oordeel, geen serieus te nemen, want emotionele 
of subjectieve, morele oordelen zijn.) In tegenstelling tot Rollin beargu-
menteer ik dat we in het debat over biotechnologie bij dieren esthetische 
oordelen juist zeer serieus moeten nemen. Morele overtuigingen hebben 
altijd rationele en emotionele elementen in zich. Mensen die ‘yuk!’ roepen 
in confrontatie met concrete voorbeelden van biotechnologie bij dieren 
geven uiting aan diepe gevoelens van morele zorg, maar beschikken blijk-
baar nog niet over het vocabulaire om dat op filosofisch gearticuleerde 
wijze te doen. Wat drukken mensen uit wanneer zij yuk! zeggen? In het 
vijfde hoofdstuk beargumenteer ik dat yuk!-responsen over het algemeen 
uiting geven aan twee elementen van zorg: ten eerste, het gevoel van 
verwarring dat ontstaat wanneer schijnbaar evidente en objectieve noties 
als ‘natuurlijk’ dat opeens niet meer blijken te zijn. En, ten tweede, de zorg 
over de dreiging die biotechnologie vormt voor de kwaliteit van het leven, 
dat wat een leven de moeite waard maakt om te worden geleefd.
De tweede vraag die ik in dit hoofdstuk centraal stel is de wat de rol van 
kunst kan zijn in de ‘biotech eeuw’. Hoe kan hedendaagse kunt van dienst 
zijn bij het vellen van een moreel oordeel over biotechnologie bij dieren, 
in het bijzonder als het gaat om vragen over natuur en natuurlijkheid, 
kwaliteit van het leven, identiteit, het normale en het abnormale? Om mijn 
argumenten te illustreren bespreek ik drie kunstprojecten: het GFP Bunny 
